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Abstract 
 
Agrarian transformation, a process associated with changes in the relations of 
production, occurs when capitalism penetrates or is adopted into modes of 
agricultural production and labour. It has been classically approached through 
the prism of class and rural differentiation in peasant communities. Previous 
studies have tended to primarily focus on core agricultural areas rather than 
other geographical settings.   
 
This thesis investigates how the socio-cultural and geographic contexts of the 
northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands, specifically the flexibility of border crossing 
and language and cultural similarities, shape the current agrarian transformation 
in particular patterns of migration. It argues that the pathway of agrarian 
transformation in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands is not a linear de-
agrarianisation process. Although villagers are generally involved in a wide 
range of economic activities, many are engaged in farming at the same time. 
Labour shortages in the Thai borderlands have been resolved by transborder 
rural-to-rural migration. 
 
Ethnographic fieldwork and surveys have been conducted in three communities. 
The first two are cross-border communities located along the Mekong River, one 
in Mukdahan Province in northeastern Thailand, and the others in Savannakhet 
Province, Lao PDR. The third community is in the hinterland of Laos, 
approximately 50 km from the border, and is also in Savannakhet Province.   
 
The findings of this thesis are presented in three parts. The first part identifies 
the spatial contexts of northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands that allow the scope of 
compromise in state-village relations in the borderlands. The second part 
exposes migration patterns of villagers in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands 
and their long-distance migration to Bangkok and its vicinities. The third part 
reveals that a certain type of agriculture persisted in the northeastern Thai- Lao 
borderlands and a hinterland village of Laos in contrast to the linear theory of 
v 
 
de-agrarianisation. It argues that the ability of the Thai farmers to absorb cheap 
Lao workers supported ongoing agriculture and led to new agrarian relations 
between the Thai farmers and the Lao workers. In Laos, migration and 
remittance support agricultural households to invest in small businesses, build 
new houses, or buy new lands, all of which provide upward mobility for the Lao 
villagers.   
  
Those findings contribute to theoretical debates about the state power, state-
village relations in the borderlands, the non-linear and overlapping nature of 
rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration, and agrarian transformation in 
Southeast Asia. Taken together, the thesis provides a better understanding on the 
process of agrarian transformation, and suggests that, because this 
transformation often follow a non-linear path, it casts doubt on simple notions of 
de-agrarianisation. 
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Chapter 1 Setting the Case 
1.1 Introduction 
 
On a rainy day in June 2010, a group of Lao people, alighting from long-tail boats, 
stepped ashore in Ban Fangthai,
1
 Mukdahan Province, Thailand. The Mekong River, 
which they had just crossed, serves as a border; but, it is far from an obstacle. Based on 
geographical proximity, ethnic identity, linguistic and cultural closeness, the Lao people 
easily travel back and forth across the river for seasonal wage labour on the Thai border, 
moving through the local checkpoint - which is operated locally - without any 
documents. Formal sets of cross-border regime regulations seem to be less enforced in 
this part of the region. The Thai villagers claimed that transborder
2
 migration and their 
social connections with the Lao people have been everyday practice for centuries past. 
Currently, it was necessary for them to hire labour work from Laos because out-
migration of the young Thai generation has given rise to severe labour shortages.  
 
Such was the context when I commenced my fieldwork in this northeastern Thai border 
village from where I could clearly discern the Lao village located on the opposite side of 
the Mekong River. The River is a border; but, it is far from an obstacle since it provides 
a magnificent route linking Thailand with Laos. Borderland inhabitants engage in cross-
river activities, e.g., labouring, business, trade, shopping, family visits and joining in 
festivals in the form of everyday practice built upon the two communities’ historical 
ties. The official re-opening of the Thai-Lao borders after the end of the Cold War re-
affirms these cross-border activities and supports farming activities in the Thai 
borderland. Faced with labour shortages due to the out-migration of the young 
generation to the country’s urban areas, the Thai farmers have taken advantage of their 
borderland location of agriculture to obtain Lao seasonal workers from the opposite side 
of the river to work on their farms. But, this means passing through the traditional 
checkpoints that are operated locally and only partially follow legalised immigration 
practices and formalities. The rivalry that these cross-border practices set up between 
                                                 
1
 Baan Fangthai, a pseudonym, literally means the village on the Thai side of the river.  
2
 I apply the term ‘transborder migration’ to refer to the movement between people living along the 
northeastern Thai border and Laos and their relationships and networks in both countries.  
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village and state authorities, along with the complexities surrounding transborder 
migration, complicate the agrarian livelihood in the borderlands.  
 
This thesis seeks to explore how the contexts of northeastern Thai - Lao borderlands, 
specifically their border proximity, language, and cultural similarities, shape the current 
agrarian transformation, in particular through patterns of migration.  Prompted by the 
simple observation that the extant agrarian literature largely concentrates on core rice 
growing and the upland areas, I turn my attention to the locally specific context of 
borderlands that to date remains understudied. My analytical mind was thus inspired to 
explore and analyse the prevailing issues relevant to the borderlands.    
 
Moving beyond the treatment of national space as homogenous, I will suggest that 
borders are transcended by the processes of globalisation, regionalisation and 
liberalisation. In effect, the identities of borderlands are shaped by their inhabitants and 
the transactions that occur within and across their boundaries (Das & Poole, 2004; 
Horstmann & Wadley, 2006). I do not approach them as a physically demarcated space 
at the margin of the nation-state. Living as they do under formal regimes of trade 
liberalisation and regional economic integration, borderland people strive to maintain 
their everyday practices, although some have become in-formal and substantially illegal. 
What has occurred in the northeastern Thai - Lao borderlands -indeed in many border 
areas - is somewhat contradictory given that the local government authorities seem 
neither strict agents who control the flows and movement of people and commodities 
across the border, nor ignorant agents barely aware of what is going on.
3
 This perceived 
discrepancy prompted me to explore state-village relations in the borderlands since the 
majority of conceptual tools employed in the study of borders in Southeast Asia are  
                                                 
3
 In general borderland studies, focus is on everyday life at the border, cross-border trade and the 
negotiations between local people and state authorities. Sangkhamanee (2006) and Walker (1999)  
focused on traders and transport on the Lao–China–Burma–Thai borders. Sturgeon (2007) concentrated 
on small-scale border politics on the Burma-Thai-China border, while Schoenbergerand and Turne (2008) 
explored cross-border trade between the ethnic people on the Vietnam–China borders. Abraham and Van 
Schendel (2005) examined the local traders, who cross borders with small quantities of goods. Van 
Schendel (2000) explored the practices of the armpit traders in the border area between India and 
Pakistan.  
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influenced either by theoretical perspectives of the power of state as core and the 
powerlessness of the border as marginal, or, by the explanation of border as frontier 
zones, marked by lawlessness and wildness (Scott, 1998, 2010; Winichakul, 1996). Such 
models are generalisations of local dynamics and disregard the increasingly complex 
relationship between the Thai state and the peoples of the borderlands, who have 
transformed and created a new environment that invites a rethinking of state-village 
relations.  
 
Transborder migration between northeastern Thailand and Laos adds a new dimension 
to both migration and agrarian studies. Looking at the studies of migration and its 
linkages to agrarian transformation, I found overwhelming focus on rural-to-urban 
migration (Bryceson, Kay, & Mooij, 2000; Perjaranonda, Santipaporn, & Guest, 1995; 
Rigg, 2001; Rigg & Sakunee, 2001). In the scenario I am exploring, Thai-Lao border 
proximity contributes to migration across the Mekong River between Mukdahan and 
Savannakhet Provinces. Although almost all of the Lao seasonal migrants are employed 
mainly in agricultural land in the Thai border villages, some opted to go further to 
Bangkok and other urban areas in Thailand out of the cultivating season. In this way, 
they opted to practice both transborder rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration, with 
many of them continuing to return to work on their own farms in their natal villages. 
Much, however, remains to be investigated. For example, the multi-layers of migration, 
and the linkages between internal and international migration as the out-migration and 
labour shortages in the Thai borderlands lead to the immigration of the Lao migrants in 
the cultivating season.  
 
In an attempt to link labour migration with an understanding of the spatiality of agrarian 
transformation, this thesis problematises the relations of transborder migration and the 
persistence of agriculture. In the process, particular attention will be paid to the agrarian 
relations produced in different times and spaces. My analyses in this thesis reveal that 
rural livelihoods in both Northeast Thailand and Laos have similarly changed in 
accordance with de-agrarianisation. Job diversification and out-migration among the 
4 
 
young generation generally prevail in each village; however, the processes are 
concomitant with the persistence of agriculture. In the northeastern Thai borderland, 
remittances, the immigration of Lao migrants, and new cash crops such as rubber 
support the persistence of agriculture. In Lao PDR, although migration has become a 
source of income for many households, labouring jobs in Thailand - and their migrant 
status in a different country - inspire many Lao migrants either to return home or 
practice multiple migration.
4
 The thesis emphasises that the conceptual perspective of 
agricultural transformation is implicit in a spatial socio-cultural geographic context. In 
the borderlands, transborder migration not only contributes to the sending of remittances 
and to social mobility, but also contributes to the new agrarian class that is determined 
by ethnicity and spatiality and goes beyond questions of a linear way of de-
agrarianisation, and the production relations between landlords and the landless. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
This study attempts to determine the links between regional development processes and 
what their manifestations and meanings are at a specific location. It fills a gap in the 
linking of empirical agrarian and borderland studies, namely the absence of 
investigation into agrarian transformation in the locally specific context of borderlands 
and the broadening scale of agrarian studies from specific country to cross-country 
analysis. In doing so, this study sets out a series of research questions, important at both 
the empirical and conceptual levels. 
1.3 Research Questions: 
1. Core Question: 
 How does the combination of geographical location, migration and cross-border 
practices shape agrarian transformation in the borderlands? 
 
                                                 
4
 In this thesis, I employ the terms ‘multiple migration’ to explain the character of the Lao migrants who 
benefit from cross-border proximity and their many similarities to the Thai people. The latter enable them 
to migrate to Thailand or return to Lao whenever they choose.  
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2. Sub-questions: 
2.1 Borderlands 
 What underpins illegal cross-border employment?  
 What mechanisms do the borderland residents and state authorities employ to 
enable them to benefit from border-crossing activities? 
 To what extent have the negotiations between the local state officials and 
borderland residents shaped state-village relations?  
2.2 Migration  
  To what extent - and how – has labour migration become inscribed on the lives 
of peoples in northeastern Thailand and Laos? 
 How do the spatial contexts of the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands, namely, 
the geo-politics of the borderlands and language and cultural similarities, shape 
migration?  
 How does the spatiality of migration, that is, migration around the Thai border 
and further migration to Bangkok and other cities, shape the legal status of the 
Lao migrants?  
2.3 Agrarian transformation 
 How do the individuals’ social identities (gender, age, ethnicities) and social 
relations (family, kinship, friendship, historical ties between individuals and 
groups, occupations) determine the ability of the people to access labour and 
employment? 
 How does cross-border employment shape agricultural relations (social relations 
and class relations) in the villages in the northeastern Thai – Lao borderlands? 
 How does the context of the borderlands contribute to an insight into 
understanding agrarian transformation?  
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1.4 Methodology, Fieldwork, and Research Sites: 
 
I employed an ethnographic methodology to investigate the characteristics of the 
borderlands, cross-border practices and their relevance to agricultural employment, all 
of which characterise agrarian transformation. The first phase of the research involved a 
review of the extant literature focusing on agrarian transformation and borderland 
studies. 
 
In the second phase, my preliminary fieldwork was conducted at the borderlands of 
Northeast Thailand and Laos during the rice transplanting season from June to August 
2010. This allowed me to investigate local cross-border practices and their meaning for 
agrarian relations. In addition, I conducted informal interviews with government 
officials working in the Provincial Government Offices in the border provinces of 
Northeast Thailand, my aim being to discern government policies and critical issues 
pertinent to the borderlands. 
 
The third phase of my research, in-depth ethnographic research, was conducted between 
November 2010 and May 2011. I employed participant observation, in-depth interviews, 
everyday conversations, and walk and talk methods in two communities in Thailand and 
Laos located on either side of the Mekong River, namely Ban Fangthai, Mukdahan 
Province and Ban Kaemkong, Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR. My aim was to explore 
the local cross border practices and agrarian relations and their links with seasonal and 
rural-to-rural migration and employment. Initially, I anticipated seeing migrant workers 
from Ban Kaemkong cross the river using the local checkpoint operated locally for daily 
workers in Ban Fangthai and nearby areas. As well, I intended to analyse the agrarian 
relations that obtained between the northeastern Thai-Lao villages situated opposite each 
other on the Mekong River banks. But, I learned that in fact, the Lao migrants came 
from diverse villages in the Lao hinterlands. During my fieldwork in November 2010, 
only seven of the 120 Lao migrants I met in Ban Fangthai were from Ban Kaemkong: 
the remaining 113 were from nine villages in three districts of Savannakhet Province, 
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Lao PDR. Out of this group, 31 people were from Ban Laonua, Xeno District, which is 
located approximately 50 km from the river border. They made up the largest migration 
group from a certain location; so, I decided to accompany them and to include this 
village in my research site (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1 Research Sites (Provincial 
Level)
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1.4.1 Ban Fangthai, Mukdahan Province, Thailand 
Ban Fangthai, which is located in Mukdahan Province and is the 73
rd
 province of 
Thailand, is located 642 km from Bangkok. The province was upgraded from a district 
in Nakhon Phanom Province in 1982. With an area of 4,339.830 sq km, the province 
comprises seven districts and is home to eight ethnic groups, namely the Thai Isan, Phu 
Thai, Thai Kha, Kra So, Thai Yor, Thai Saek, Thai Kralerng and the Thai Kula. Each 
group has its own distinct traditions and culture.  
 
Situated next to the Mekong River which acts as a boundary between Thailand and 
Laos, the province of Mukdahan has enjoyed a long and close relationship with 
Savannakhet Province, of Lao PDR. It is renowned both as the location of the 2
nd
 Thai-
Lao International Friendship Bridge and as the gateway of Indochina. The bridge, which 
links Mukdahan province with Savannakhet province in central Laos, is part of the 
1,400 kilometer (km) regional East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC), which extends 
from the coastal town of Moulemein in Myanmar to the port of Da Nang in western 
Vietnam. Apart from the First Mekong Friendship Bridge, which links Nong Khai 
Province to Vientiane, the capital city of Laos, Mukdahan is the second most important 
border cross-point between Lao PDR and Thailand (Warr, Menon, & Yusuf, 2009).   
 
But, despite the strategic importance of its border crossing-point, Mukdahan remains 
one of Thailand’s poorest provinces. According to the Office of the Governor of 
Mukdahan (2010), the province ranked 66
th
 out of the 76 provinces in Thailand in terms 
of per capita income; and, its GDP per capita was approximately $US 1,133 per head in 
2010.
5
 Industrialisation in Mukdahan is minimal, in 2010, the manufacturing sector 
accounted for only 9.28 per cent of the GDP. The agricultural sector accounted for 20.49 
per cent of the GDP, while the service sector, the largest sector, accounted for 46 per 
cent.
6
 Although the contribution of agriculture to the GDP was only half that of the 
service sector, most of Mukdahan’s population (approximately 70 per cent) are involved 
                                                 
6
 Other sectors that contributed to the GDP were the trading sector, which produced 18.27 per cent of the 
GDP, and the transportation sectors that accounted for 5.96 per cent. 
5
 In 2010, Thailand GDP per capita was $ US 4,803 (World Bank, 2013b).  
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in agriculture. In 2010, the main cash crops were rice, rubber, sugar cane and cassava. 
Rice farms, including glutinous rice, occupied 552,982 rai (88,477 ha) of the total area 
1,076,355 rai (172,216.8 ha) of the province’s agricultural land. Interestingly, 106,997 
rai (17,119.5 ha) were used to grow rubber, an activity that has expanded rapidly (Office 
of the Governor of Mukdahan, 2010, pp. 8-9).  
 
Ban Fangthai, a border village located approximately 30 km from the provincial town 
that extends up the west side of the Mekong River, encompasses three sub-villages or 
mu
7
 which, in the past, constituted one village. My fieldwork was conducted in two of 
the three mu, namely Ban Fangthai mu 1 and Ban Fangthai mu 2, which comprised 362 
households in 2010, with a total population of 1,274 (625 males and 629 females).
8
 Each 
mu now has its own administrative body and a village headman. The residents of each 
mu still share communal resources and participate in religious activities together. Based 
on the data collected by the District Governor and the Tambon Administration 
Organisation,   agriculture constitutes the main economic activity in Ban Fangthai. The 
villagers, who grow rain-fed rice as their main crop primarily for household 
consumption, use the rest of the land for additional cash crops, i.e., cassava and beans. 
Nowadays, growing numbers of villagers are investing in rubber plantation, a new crop 
that has emerged over the last ten years. 
 
Directly opposite Ban Fangthai is Ban Kaemkong, Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR. It 
can be easily discerned from the Thai side of the river bank. The villagers in Ban 
Fangthai have multiple connections with the villagers on the Lao side of the Mekong 
River in terms of trade and social ties. Initiated in the 1990s, on Sunday mornings and 
Tuseday afternoons, the local checkpoint in the village is opened so that Lao people can 
cross over to shop and trade. Over the last twenty years, socio-economic transformation 
and the out-migration of the young cohort of Ban Fangthai have resulted in labour 
                                                 
7
 The term mu, for administrative purposes, means sub-village.  
8
 In this thesis, I refer to Ban Fangthai Mu 1 and 2 as Ban Fangthai or Fangthai village. My reason for not 
including Ban Fangthai Mu 3 in the research is because it is a newly-established sub-village located in the 
hinterland and is separate from Ban Fangthai Mu 2 and Mu 3 that spread along the Mekong River. 
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shortages in the cultivating season; for this reason, the villagers absorb seasonal labour 
from villages in Lao PDR during the cultivating season from June to August and 
November to December.  These everyday cross-border practices that ostensibly take the 
form of illegal acts, are carried on informally via negotiations between the villagers and 
the local government officials at the district and provincial levels. There are an essential 
part of the livelihoods of the northeastern Thai and Lao peoples living along the Mekong 
River.  
1.4.2 Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua
9
, Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR 
Savannakhet, the largest province of Lao PDR, has a population of 843,000 which 
accounts for 14.7 per cent of Lao PDR’s total population (Warr et al., 2009, p. 3). The 
total land area is approximately 21,774 sq km, and most of the topography of the land is 
marked by gentle hills (Warr et al., 2009). Located in central Laos, the distance from 
Savannakhet to Vientiane, the Lao capital city, is approximately 470 km. The province 
is abundant in natural resources, especially in agricultural land, forests, and resources 
for mining. It shares the border with Thailand and Vietnam, and has an infrastructure 
that links with these countries. Route Number 9 is the main transportation link on the 
EWEC that runs through Savannakhet province.  
 
Between 2005 and 2010, Savannakhet province has experienced steady economic 
growth. Its provincial GDP grew by 10.5 per cent per year during this time. Its GDP per 
capita was  $US 371 in 2000, $US 425 in 2005, and $US 897 in 2010 (Andriesse & 
Phommalath, 2012, p. 13). However, the GDP per capita was well below that of 
Thailand. The GDP per capita of Thailand in 2010 was $US 4,803. Many scholars 
observe that economic growth in Savannakhet and in many parts of Laos has been 
accompanied by labour exploitation, land grabbing and environmental degradation 
(Andriesse & Phommalath, 2012; Barney, 2009; Laungaramsri, 2012).   
 
                                                 
9
 Both are pseudonyms. Ban Kaemkong literally means ‘the village located on the river bank’ while Ban 
Laonua means ‘the village in the northern direction of Lao PDR’.  
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Ban Kaemkong is located 35 km to the north of Savananakhet city. As a new village, it 
was formally established in 1979 with the resettlement of government official families 
from various areas of Lao PDR. Prior to 1979, for many decades some households had 
built their houses near the Mekong River bank. These people, who migrated from the 
Thai side, maintained their connection with their relatives in Thailand. In former times, 
they helped with rice cultivation of their Thai relatives’ land to get their share of 
cropping. The closing of the border during the war from the 1960s to the late 1980s 
rendered travelling across the Mekong River difficult and gave rise to the feeling that 
the peoples living on the Thai and Lao sides of the river were different national entities 
pursuing different paths of political-economic development. When the Thai-Lao border 
was formally re-opened in the 1990s, Ban Fangthai’s economy was significantly more 
developed. The Thai marginal area had become a receiving migrant area providing job 
opportunities for the Lao people.  
 
In the late 1990s, Ban Kaemkong was included in the new economic zone of 
Savannakhet Province. Job opportunities came from the new factories in the middle of 
the village and the sugarcane plantation in the nearby village, increasing job 
opportunities for the villagers. At the same time, the young generation in the village 
opted to migrate to Thailand in search of non-farm jobs. Seasonal migrants, who cross 
the border seeking wage-labouring jobs in Ban Fangthai, have been replaced by people 
from the hinterlands, including Ban Laonua, where the villagers are predominantly 
engaged in agriculture and suffer from a lack of out-agricultural jobs.  
 
Ban Laonua is located five km along a small dirt road which connects to Route Number 
Nine on the EWEC. Because the village is located 30 km from Savannakhet city, it is far 
from the corridor development and industrialisation areas. The topography is flat and 
mainly agricultural land, i.e., rain-fed rice land. Due to the low numbers of job 
opportunities in the village compared to Ban Kaemkong, both short and long distances 
migration to Thailand has become one of the villagers’ main non-farm activities.       
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1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is organised in nine chapters as follows. In the next chapter, Chapter two, the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations of the thesis are set out. This chapter highlights 
the existing issues and arguments surrounding agrarian transformation and borderland 
studies. In order to make sense of the core argument of the thesis, which is 
understanding agrarian transformation in the context of the borderlands, focus is upon 
the topics of mobility and migration across the border and debate concerning the illegal 
and illicit from the perspectives of state authorities and local villagers.  
 
In the third chapter, I outline the main methodology and describe the specific methods 
employed. The discussion includes multi-sited ethnographies in agrarian studies 
fieldwork and the methods employed, e.g., formal and informal interviews, household 
surveys, and participant observation. The author’s reflections, positionality, along with 
ethical issues are also explored in this chapter.  
 
Chapter four contextualises the specificity of Northeast Thailand and Laos and their 
trajectories of development. In this chapter, I provide an historical background of the 
socio-economic development of each country over the past centuries. The impacts of 
transnationalisation in the 21
st
 century are also discussed in relation to the Thai-Lao 
economies and the growing disparity between the two.  
 
Chapters five to eight form the core empirical chapters of this thesis. Chapter five 
analyses the contexts of the northeastern Thai - Lao borderlands which allow various 
spatial practices across the Mekong River border. The chapter explores everyday life at 
the border, the state-village relations in the borderlands, how the local state authorities 
and villagers negotiate to each other’s mutual benefit, and, how they legitimate illegal 
transborder rural-to-rural migration and employment.  
Chapter six, which focuses on migration between Lao PDR and Thailand based on the 
empirical data, discusses the overlapping patterns of rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban 
migration, and how different migration landscapes between the borderlands and the Thai 
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hinterland produce different legal statuses for migration. As well, it looks at how the 
Lao migrants negotiate their migrant status in each location in Thailand.  
 
Chapter seven discusses the conditions appertaining to agriculture in the northeastern 
Thai- Lao borderlands and in a hinterland village in Lao PDR. It delineates the 
agricultural livelihoods in each research location, and the peoples’growing reliance on 
non-farm occupations and migration which can be closely linked to de-agrarianisation. 
The chapter argues that farming has persisted, and that in the northeastern Thai 
borderland, agriculture is still a desirable alternative for many landowners.  As well, it 
looks at how factors of land ownership, education, gender, and generation have 
determined class and social mobility. In case of Lao PDR, the new opportunities linked 
to transborder migration have generated certain inequalities. In addition, the status 
achieved by migrants in Thailand encourages them to struggle to earn money and then 
return home. Because migration between Laos and Thailand is facilitated by border 
proximity and language and cultural similarities, Lao migrants tend to engage in 
multiple migrations rather than practice long-distance migration and permanently return 
home. 
 
Chapter eight links the empirical data addressed in Chapters five, six and seven with the 
existing literature and discusses how the context of the borderlands contributes to the 
particular characteristics of agrarian transformation. The chapter argues that the 
particular context of borderlands attracts scholarly attention to state-village relations, 
transborder rural-to-rural migration in association with agrarian transformation, and the 
agrarian relations and multiple identities of the people, and how they are shaped by 
spatiality.  
 
Chapter nine, the concluding chapter, summarises the main research findings and 
proposes key theoretical implications for the study of agrarian transformation in the 
future. 
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Figure 1.2: The Mekong River runs through Mukdahan  
and Savannakhet Provinces 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.3: The east side of the Mekong River: Savannakhet Province 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Theoretical Discussion 
2.1 Introduction 
Agrarian transformation, a process associated with changes in relations of production, 
occurs, when capitalism penetrates or is adopted into modes of agricultural production 
and labour. It has been classically approached through the prism of class and rural 
differentiation in peasant communities. Previous studies have tended to primarily focus 
on core agricultural areas rather than extend their analyses to other geographical 
settings.  
 
This chapter’s focus is on the borderlands where cross-border regulations and labour 
migration contextualise agrarian relations and rural differentiation. The first section 
explores the broad concepts of agrarian transformation, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
and the requirements to contextualise agrarian transformation based on the geographical 
contexts of the borderlands.  
 
The second section associates concepts of borderlands with human mobility. It 
illustrates the rivalry between the state, that serves as the border controller, and the 
peoples who negotiate their movement across the border. This section also reveals the 
contradictions between the state ideology and local cross-border practices. In addition, 
state-village relations, and their association with concepts of migration, are included in 
the discussion.  
 
In last section, I will draw upon concepts deemed important to exploration of how the 
geographical location of the borderlands and the particular patterns of migration drive 
the process of agrarian transformation. Three themes including de-agrarianisation, the 
transformation of class and labour relations, and multiple class identities will be 
identified to establish a conceptual framework. 
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2.2 Agrarian Transformation in Southeast Asia in Perspectives 
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical framework appertaining to 
agrarian transformation and to address the significance of the Southeast Asian cases at a 
theoretical level.  The major questions that need to be addressed here include:    1) how 
can agrarian transformation be understood? and 2) what are the key processes of 
agrarian transformation in different periods?   
 
Traditionally, agrarian transformation is a process of social change, particularly from the 
primarily rural society to the predominantly urbanized, industrialised and market-based 
society with its capitalist social relations.  Based on the European countries’ 
experiences, the classical literature outlines the transformation of peasant societies into 
capitalism within a wider nation state, and associated class differentiation (Harding, 
1986; Kautsky, 1988; Marx, Engels, & Tucker, 1978). The key processes leading to 
agrarian transformation were: factors generating agrarian classes; i.e. the 
proletariatisation of the peasant into landowning capitalists and landless workers, which 
in time led to dissent and political revolution.  
 
Over the decades, research into agrarian studies in many parts of the world has proven 
that agrarian transformation does not always equate with the classical model. As regards 
the political and social revolution aspects, the classic theories were criticised for being 
too linear, narrowly focused on political economy, and too Eurocentric (Bernstein, 1979; 
Borras Jr, 2010; Rigg, 2001; White, 1989) . Comparative studies undertaken by Byres 
(1996) and  Moore (1966) in particular areas of Europe (United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Russia), Asia (China and Japan), and Latin America, show that agrarian 
transformation takes diverse paths to achieve resolution. In Southeast Asia, the process 
of transformation is continuing in many countries; and the transformation is far-reaching 
from structural change to capitalism and industrialisation, similar to the countries in 
global North. 
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Between the 1960s and the 1980s, studies of agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia 
were prominent in peasant studies, and featured two different ways of explanation. The 
first was relevant to the process of state-led capitalism penetrating the peasant mode of 
production. For example, Scott (1976) and Nartsupha (1986), who studied peasant 
communities in Burma and Vietnam, and in Thailand, argued that transformation of 
peasant communities results from state building processes and capitalism penetration.  
Peasant communities that shared a set of social relations and behaviours termed 
‘subsistence ethical and moral economies’ attempted to remain autonomous and 
developed a sense of historical consciousness to fight against the domination. However, 
the moral economy perspective was challenged by Popkin (1979) who argued that 
peasants pursued their goals rationally and acted more out of self-interest than in a 
collective manner.   
Another group of scholars have explored rural differentiation, proletarisation, and class 
struggle through the prism of Marxist peasant studies. Unlike the first category, this 
challenged the notion that class differentiation was not a natural characteristic of peasant 
communities. The changes that occurred in rural communities were not only attributable 
to external forces, but to internal force at the micro level as well. Investigating the 
complexity of classes and land tenure, they proposed the co-existence of subsistence and 
market economies (Ganjanapan, 1984; Turton, 1978, 1989).  Topics common among the 
extant classical works were on state extraction, exploitation and local resistance. 
Peasants were viewed as a subaltern class who tended to contest state power by 
rebellion.  
From the late 1980s, many processes leading to agrarian transformation were re-
identified. Subsequent studies proved that the process of capitalist penetration of the 
peasant societies was not the only factor that led to social and economic transformation. 
A collection of articles on agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia (Hart, Turton, & 
White, 1989) argued that the key process of agrarian transformation was the Green 
Revolution, greater commercialisation and technologies, and also look more closely at 
the role of different state configurations in shaping agrarian change. This volume also 
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put the notion that classical studies were undertaken – at least to some degree- for 
political purposes. The questions were not directly about the changing structure of rural 
society; rather, they focused on the political roles of the people or peasants and potential 
for peasant revolution. Drawing on different case studies of the core rice growing areas 
in Southeast Asia, this edition suggested more flexibility of the interpretation of agrarian 
change in specific situations, and the linkages between global and local processes and 
the political economic system. Conceptually, the grand narratives of historical 
transformation should be reconsidered. There is a requirement on understanding agrarian 
transformation in specific cases and contexts.     
Today, the literature on contemporary agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia is more 
innovative and broad ranging.  Scholars working on the Challenges of the Agrarian 
Transition in Southeast Asia or ChATSEA (2002) project point out that many key 
factors shape agrarian transformation; for example, intensification of regulations and 
market integration; and, the former has dramatically reshaped resource access. Beyond 
the key actors, which include state, class-based actors, revolutionary movements, 
corporations, NGOs, development agencies and others are additional actors that are 
shaping regulations vis-à-vis who should be morally allowed to access natural resources 
and who should be excluded. Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011) show diﬀerent types of exclusion 
associated with land titling driven by state regulations, protected and community-based 
conservation areas, and tourism development. State regulations, for example, contribute 
to property boundaries and the definition of eligible and non-eligible land usage. Other 
examples include conservation standards that envisage forests as priceless treasures and 
thus deprive people of their land (Li, 2008; Sato, 2000), and state land concessions for 
commercial purposes that exclude people from their right to use both their own land and 
communal forest land (Baird, 2009; La-Orngplew, 2012; Laungaramsri, 2012).       
The expanding role of globalisation forces, particularly the recent expansion of the 
agribusiness sector in Southeast Asia, is one of the important factors in contemporary 
agrarian transformation. This transformation has been marked by a move from the 
predominant agricultural communities that have agriculture as their important source of 
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income to those based on industrial production and associated with the growing 
integration to the world economy (Turner & Caouette, 2009). Agrarian studies, that are 
predominantly analysed at the local level, have thus been shifted to the regional level 
and made subject to wider geographical considerations. International agribusiness firms 
and supra-national organisations have become dominant actors in shaping global 
agrarian processes. At the same time, the growth of agro-industrialisation has required a 
reconceptualization of the farmers’ access to land, agricultural technology, extension 
and capital (Kearney, 1996, p. 128). In a volume of Globalising Food: Agrarian 
Questions and Global Restructuring, Goodman and Watts (2005) present several case 
studies that focus on the changing character of agriculture, with emphasis on 
challenging neo-liberal markets. Some cases address the changing relationship between 
rural places of production and the impact of recent developments in technology upon 
agriculture. For example, Page (1997) who investigates  American pork production in 
Iowa, argues that the arrival of a foreign agribusiness company in the area and new 
technologies have led to a dramatic reduction in the number of small-sized farms raising 
hogs. In addition, a new geography of hog farming has emerged in the Southern regions 
of the US where the big agribusiness companies are able to hire cheap labour from 
Mexico. Raynolds (1997) who studied the reorganisation of the agro-food system and 
livelihood change, considered it due to investment in large agro-food corporations in the 
Dominican Republic. She particularly stressed the disadvantages of workers under 
contract farming. In the case of female day labourers, not only were they paid below the 
national minimum wage, but they were typically paid less than male workers. The 
nation state plays a critical role in reconciling foreign and domestic political pressures 
and promoting the competitiveness of national agriculture under competing global and 
triadic regional trade regimes.Ultimately it is rural populations which are most deeply 
affected by  restructuring  processes  which  are  simultaneously  undermining  existing  
agrarian  livelihoods  and reinforcing rural job insecurity and the political and economic 
marginality of rural workers (Raynold, 1997, p. 94). All of the above examples show     
a shift in the analytical scale of agrarian studies from the national level to a global 
framework wherein market forces and actors have become key players. 
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As one of the key areas of economic achievement, Southeast Asia is experiencing 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and the decline of agriculture as a major source of 
income. Studies conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Cramb, 2012; De 
Koninck & Ahmat, 2012; Rigg, 1998, 2001, 2003; Rigg & Sakunee, 2001; Rigg & 
Salamanca, 2011; Soda, 2007) show that those countries are experiencing rapid de-
agrarianisation; in other words, the diminishing of agricultural livelihoods and a 
transition to non-agricultural employment and rural-to-urban migration. Rural 
diversification is also occurring in pre-socialist countries such as Vietnam and Laos.  
Pham (2006) noted that the rural economic structure has become more diversified. The 
General Statistic Office of Vietnam reported that the non-farm sector has become an 
increasingly important source of employment for rural people, when employment is 
defined by primary jobs, the employment share of the non-farm sector has increased 
from nearly 21 per cent to 32 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (Pham, p. 8). Thanh, 
Anh, and Tacoli (2005), who conducted their research in the Red River Delta of north 
Vietnam, also reported livelihood strategy changes including income diversification and 
migration. As elsewhere in the region, farmers' futures are increasingly viewed as lying 
either beyond agriculture or in a combination of farm and nonfarm pursuits. Rigg (2007) 
notes that the Lao people increasingly migrate to Thailand in search of jobs, especially 
the young generation who generally avoid having to work on farms, preferring to seek 
urban opportunities and city life experience.  
The changing livelihood from farm to non-farm occupation and the intensifying 
migration flows lead to the consideration of rural-urban interpretation and fragility of 
rural households (Hirsch, 1993a; Kemp, 1993b; Rigg, 2013; Rigg & Ritchie, 2002).  
Some scholars in addition raise questions on gender dimension in agrarian 
transformation, in particular on the difference between men and women to cope with the 
commercialisation of agricultural product and landuse (Hew 2003, 2011), and in the age 
cohorts in rural migration (Huijsmans, 2010; Kelly, 2012). Today, agrarian 
transformation is being investigated by the political sciences in terms of democratisation 
and social movements (Borras Jr, 2009). As the factors of transformation have 
proliferated, the theoretical frameworks in contemporary rural studies have moved away 
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from rigid class analysis to more diverse disciplines. In the final analysis, what the 
classic theories and the current identification have in common is the assumption that 
peasants will disappear or at least become less numerous as they are drawn into the 
modern economy (Rigg & Vandergeest, 2012, p. 5) .      
In this context of changing empirical processes and changing conceptual lenses, the 
question of agrarian transformation in a specific context is challenged. Studies of 
agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia overwhelmingly focus on the core rice 
growing areas. Although the current studies extend to the highland communities, few 
explore the spatial context of the borderlands where there are many dimensions to 
consider; for example, state-village relations in a marginal space, licit and illicit 
practices and their impacts on agrarian relations, and the transformation of agrarian 
relations. The spatiality of the villages are reworked through the long-distance linkages 
and spread across international areas; thus, the scales of analysis are no longer limited to 
village studies in one country as they used to be. The fact that the spatial context of the 
borderland, mobility and migration can bring individuals into diverse class positions in 
different spaces (migrants might be unskilled wage labourers in one context but land-
owners in another), and can lead to class mobility over time, means that fixed categories 
(peasants, wage workers, and landlord) need to be reconsidered. 
2.3 State, Borderlands and Human Mobility 
The increased prevalence of human mobility, and the significance of transnational 
workers in many localities, makes for an uneasy juxtaposition of the role of state and its 
representatives in shaping and regulating transnational borders, human mobility, and 
other movements across state boundaries. While migration flows take place as a 
consequence of globalisation, these flows occur within a territorialised framework of 
nation states. State borders are less porous to labour than to capital and goods. The 
border function of states becomes more salient when dealing with transnational labour 
and cross-border migration; for this reason, controlling immigration and cross-border 
regulations have become important policies in many areas (Suriya & Amara, 2000). 
However, transnational labour flows have impacted to national and local economies; for 
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example, in Thailand and Laos where the cheap Lao migrant labour brought pressure to 
bear on low-skilled labour in both agricultural and industrial sectors. Complying with 
the porous geographical nature of the Thai-Lao borders required negotiation between the 
state reinforcing state regulations and people who engage in daily movements across the 
state border.  
 
This section aims to delineate the links between the borderlands, state policies, and 
human mobility. It will discuss (a) the politics of the borderlands; (b) state-village 
relations and the enforcement of state regulations at the border; and, (c) human mobility 
in the borderlands 
2.3.1 The state and the politics of the borderlands  
Areas along boundaries, which are unique in themselves, are basically defined by 
geographical features marginal to the states (Minghi, 1963). Walker (1999, p. 5) notes 
that the state-centric approach, which focuses on unequal, hierarchical and exploitative 
relations between state centre and other areas of society, has been prominent in analyses 
of social formation  and in discussion surrounding the relationships between state centre 
and its peripheries. According to this approach, borderlands are backward regions, that 
is, economic backwaters peripheral to the particular nation-state in whose territory they 
lie.  
In the pre-colonial period, Southeast Asia, borderlands were referred to as ambiguous 
zones of competitive influences exerted by multiple political entities. The powerful 
kingdoms that prevailed in the region tended more to control people rather than their 
territories.  The relationships between states and societies were explained from the 
prespective of centre-periphery model. A set of vocabularies was used to depict the 
power system in the region. For example, Wolters and University (1999, p. 16), who 
characterised a model of diffuse power in early Southeast Asian History, applied the 
term ‘Mandala’ referring to call political situations in a vaguely defined geographic 
areas without fixed boundaries, where smaller centres tended to look in all directions for 
security. Tambiah (1977), when describing political patterns compatible with Mandala, 
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employed the term ‘galactic polity’ to explain when the weaker political units in 
Southeast Asia had to gravitate toward the stronger units.   
The concepts of nation-state and border demarcation in Southeast Asia spread 
throughout European colonialism in the 19
th
 century. Later, they culminated in the 
formation of the modern nation-state in the 20
th
 century, supported by the logics of 
national identity, state citizenship and sovereignty. Employing a national and regional 
construction and reconstruction approach, some scholars argue that a certain kind of 
power and mechanism are implemented in different historical period. According to 
Anderson (1991), for example printing technologies and media contributed to the 
encouragement of nationalism, nationhood and notions of nation-state. Likewise, 
Winichakul’s (1996, p. 79) study of Siam’s nationhood, building in the nineteenth 
century emphasizes how mappings and boundaries were used in the formulation of new 
geography discourse on the geo-body of the Thai-state that replaced the indigenous 
discourse. The latter exemplified the powerlessness and nonchalance of the borderlands 
and the notion state’s domination of its peripheries. Later studies conducted in Thailand 
also held the view that state dominated its frontiers and borders. State penetration and 
the in-corporation of frontiers has been achieved using strategies, e.g., administrative 
systems (Kemp, 1991), culture and language (Keyes, 1993), agricultural expansion 
(Nartsupha & Prasartset, 1978) and development programmes (Hirsch, 1990).   
 
The concepts of nation-state building and rigid border creation were similarly applied by 
Lao PDR. Drawing on the colonial period, the geographical space of the current Laos 
was treated as a marginal zone far from the centre of Siamese Kingdom. The Siamese–
French treaties at the turn of the twentieth century established the territorial limits of 
both French colonial and Thai nationalist expansion in the Mekong region. The French-
ruled Laos emerged as a separate colonial space distinct from Siam (Ivarsson & Goscha, 
2007). The current Lao became a rich resource area ripe for exploitation for the French 
colony (Ivarsson, 2008; Stuart-Fox, 1996). When Laos gained independence from 
France in 1953, the country had been at war until the victory of the Communist Pathet 
Lao in 1975, which saw the country enter the mainstream process of nation-building 
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through state-penetration. According to Rigg (2009), the Lao government  faced specific 
challenges including how to forge the country of Laos given that a large proportion of 
the population was not Lao at all, but belonged to one of several minority groups. An 
early mechanism was to create a history for all of the peoples of Laos. This saw the 
ethnicities of people from various minority groups prefixed by the term ‘Lao’, 
depending on the location of resident. The Lao Loum is referred to the Lao living in the 
lowland. Lao Soung indicated the highland, and Lao Theung the midland. The 
implications of state-penetration paradigm are profound for the analysis of development 
in Laos when the country reopened after 1985. Studies of Lao state formation 
demonstrate how the central government introdued administrative uniformity and 
commercialisation into many parts of the country, including the frontier signalling the 
state’s intention to place itself above both territory and society. It could be said that the 
standard narrative of modern state-making involves the creation of rigid borders and the 
strength of the state’s power. These imply that border crossing represents a challenge to 
both the authority of the state and the modernist project of state formation. 
 
However, there is an alternative approach to understanding the politics of the state in the 
borderlands. Approaching the borderlands through the local residents as agents, and 
challenging the state-centric approach, the anthropology of the borderlands questions the 
overemphasis on state power and the generalisation of the state’s practices over its 
territories and peoples. In addition, this perspective views border regions as areas 
through which to understand social and cultural change driven by  the processes of  state 
formation and the local people’s active negotiation of their cross-border practices (Baud 
& Van Schendel, 1997, p. 235; Das & Poole, 2004; T. M. Wilson & Donna, 1998, p. 3). 
In addition, borderlands are places where diverse ideas and practices 
meet(Gainsborough, 2009, p. 5). People dwelling on the margins of the nation-state live 
their everyday lives at the frontier, regularly crossing international borders, and giving 
rise to questions of monopoly identification and concepts of nationalism (Horstmann, 
2012). Moreover, understanding borderlands through human agents and the process of 
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state formation moves the focus away from the notion of the state as the apex of society 
and the ultimate source of all power (Sharma & Gupta, 2006).   
 
Many anthropologists who study borderlands challenge the state-centric approach by 
focusing on the everyday lives of the borderland residents. Abraham and Van Schendel 
(2005, p. 22) suggest that borderlands constitute a third space wherein special forms of 
state practices are implemented. At the same time, it can be a site for activities that can 
only be called (il) licit: i.e., legally banned but socially sanctioned and protected. Das 
and Poole (2004) state that borderlands are thought of as sites of exception which some 
unique forms of state practice emerge. So, it is important to understand these areas 
through the local people who, ultimately place an important role in shaping the area’s 
political life, and regulatory and disciplinary practices. The anthropological literature of 
the borderlands presupposes a heterogeneous form of social life and struggles between 
the state and other social units such as clans and tribes. In the next section, I will explore 
the interaction between the state and the people through the eyes of anthropologists as a 
broader way of understanding why some spatial practices occur in a particular contexts 
of borderlands.  
2.3.2 State vs the borderland residents; and, the enforcement of state regulations 
Anthropologists who study borderlands employ diverse ways of discerning people 
respond to state rules and regulations. The classic literature on subaltern studies is 
widely used to explain how suppressive local peoples resist the state control. Scott’s 
(1985) book titled ‘Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance’ 
explores peasants’ oppression and resistance, and their vulnerability to more powerful 
people. In this book, he defines everyday resistance as struggles between the dominant 
and subordinate classes, i.e., through individual and small-group actions and simple 
tactics such as insults, humour, foot-dragging, and theft. Scott (2010) additionally 
describes the strategies employed by people living on the fringe of the state to resist 
state power; for example, their occasional rebellions and their attempts to elude paying 
taxes and serving as labourers. The notion of resistance has then become one of the main 
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approaches explaining state and society relations on the borders, margins and frontiers 
of the state.   
 
The notion of resistance has become one of the main approaches adopted to explain state 
and society relations on the borders, margins and frontiers of the state.  Some historical 
research highlights the interaction of the local people and the colonial powers.  Ishikawa 
(2011) contends that the relationships between the peripheral uplands and the lowlands 
in Southeast Asia are the two opposing niches. The borderlands are simultaneously 
stateless spaces where the authority of government is constantly challenged by the local 
residents, not as a political act but as part of their daily lives.  Wadley (2000) points out 
that the formation of borders was a crucial part of the ambition of the colonial states to 
establish control over the peoples and territory of the occupied land and to force them to 
produce revenue. The colonial power controlled the locals through naturalisation and 
marriage regulations. The locals frustrated the colonial regimes by engaging in 
smuggling, transnational bigamous alliances, and migration. Van Schendel (2000) 
argues that those people living in non-state spaces and distinctive regions he called 
‘zomia’ resisted all notion of nation-building and state-making. This resistance has roots 
in the pre-colonial culture refusal of low-land patterns. 
 
In the contemporary period, some anthropologists and social scientists who study states 
and peoples in borderlands insist that peoples’ resistance targeted to the state  (Elinberg, 
2012; Flynn, 1996; Martínez, 1994). The implementation of liberalisation policies and 
improved physical connectivity underpinned the peoples’ views on increasing borderless 
and the diminishing state’s authority. Some researcher, who explored the borderlands in 
Southeast Asia, argue that the liberalised borders offer marginalized ethnic minorities 
the possibility to reconnect with their kin across borders and to revive religious and 
cultural ties. Such reconnections were viewed as a form of resistance against the cultural 
hegemony of the states in which the indigenous people reside (Cohen, 2000; Davis, 
2003). 
 
28 
 
However, it is increasingly challenges the proposition that resistance to state-village 
relations might be too static to understand the relationships that obtain between the state 
and the people in the borderland areas. Horstmann and Wadley (2006) observe there are 
two forms of narratives on borderlands; one endorses the state, while the other endorses 
the border populations. The anthropology of borderlands applies many politically-based 
frameworks. For example, it emphasises the influence of the state on the local people 
and the strategies that the border people employ to maintain their cross-border way of 
life. However, overemphasis on human agents leads to a certain degree of neglected 
investigation into the question of how the local populations engage in networks of 
collusion and other relationships with various state authorities. 
 
Based on the perceptions that the state is not the all-powerful regulatory entity, and that 
the local people are capable of negotiating, collaborating and contesting with the state, 
some scholars have disaggregated the state, choosing instead to focus its diverse and 
dispersed practices and to identify how state agencies and officials are embedded in the 
social and economic networks of the frontiers.  
 
Apropos of the northern Thai–Lao border, Walker (1999)  argues that state officials and 
local traders are involved in forms of collaborative regulations in terms of facilitating 
cross-border trade and, at the same time, restricting entry by potential competitors who 
seek to capture a share of the profits. A literature conducted among the indigenous 
groups stresses that marginal people in actual fact desire connection with and 
recognition by the state, to have security and to be able to market goods. For example; 
Li (2002) contends that highlanders in Indonesia and the Philippines seek the benefits of 
citizenship from the state. Their demands commonly include access to roads, education, 
and health facilities. Sturgeon (2007) claims that the Akha living in Thailand and China 
would welcome property rights and recognition by the state. She explores the local 
border chiefs and their engagement with the state authorities in the borderlands of 
Burma, Thailand, and China through historical analysis of control of access to resources 
and the means by which such relations fromspecial configurations. Sturgeon is critical 
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of border studies that emphasize a basic conflict between border communities and state 
officials, opting instead to clarify how different ethnicities and classes of local people 
influence their capability to negotiation with state officials. She argues that state 
officials and border elites - like village heads - meet each other’s needs. State officials 
do not necessarily wish to eliminate local cross-border networks, irrespective of whether 
they legal or illegal. Rather, they prefer to collaborate with the locals and to take 
advantage of the opportunities and benefits that accrue from these networks.  
 
Another feature of non-resistance state-village relations was offered by geographer,     
De Koninck (1992), who wrote an article in French language about the concept of 
compromised territory. In another article in English language, he claims that: 
 
Peasant communities have been involved in forms of land pioneering which have contributed to 
the territorial formation and consolidation of states. This has been facilitated by a compromise 
between the builder-administrators of the states and the peasants themselves in their capacity as 
guardian-prisoners of the territory. This compromise, through which the state gains territorial 
legitimacy by protecting and administering newly established peasant domains, has been and 
remains exceptionally dynamic in Southeast Asia (De Koninck, 1996, p. 231). 
  
In this thesis, I approach state and village relations in the borderlands by looking at the 
views of the state agencies at both the local and provincial levels, i.e., their views of the 
villagers’ cross- border practices. My focus is upon the state representatives, for 
examples village heads, border patrol police, local and provincial governments.  While 
the concept of the state is an entity apart from society and is reinforced through various 
practices, images, symbols and rituals, I will take Migdal’s state-in-society concept that 
tries not to view the state as a unitary, autonomous entity. According to  Migdal (2001), 
state is a contradictory entity that is understood best at two levels that is, one that 
recognizes the powerful image of the state as a unified entity with clear boundaries and 
territories, and one that reunifies the state as bundles of fragments. As well, it seems 
appropriate to examine the ongoing struggles among the shifting coalitions over the 
rules for daily behaviour that societies and states should create and observe, and how 
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they should maintain distinct ways of structuring their day-to-day lives. However, one 
should not overlook the negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur in every 
human society involving multiple systems of rules. One should also keep in mind that 
particular practices (the routine performances of state actors and agencies) may either 
reinforce the image of the state or weaken it. For example, state officials may use their 
office space to conduct private business, reifying at the public-private divide (Migdal 
2001, pp. 18-20).   
2.3.3 Human Mobility in the Borderlands 
This section identifies some spatial characteristics of migration that occur in the 
borderlands: irregular migration; and, rural-to-rural, rural-to-urban and circular 
migration. In addition, it demonstrates perceived gaps in the migration literature, 
providing a background for later analysis.  
 licit migration   
Borderlands and migration are inevitably interlinked. While borderlands are connected 
geographic spaces around politically drawn boundaries or historically and ethnically-
linked frontiers, migration is relevant to human mobility across spaces and borders of 
different kinds, both within and across national countries and varies with and between 
opportunities and obstacles presented by different borders and borderlands (Abraham & 
Van Schendel, 2005). The more convenient border crossing and the de-bordering 
policies in many parts of the world enhance migration across borders. Stronger border 
connections with uneven development on either side may turn borderlands into newly 
contested terrains for illegal migration. As such, borderlands are crucial spaces where 
migration occurs and as important shapers of migration.  
Das and Poole (2004) contend that borderlands are thought of as sites of exception 
where some unique forms of state practice emerge including state policy on migration 
across the border. Abraham and Van Schendel (2005, p. 22) argue that borderlands can 
be sites for activities that can only be called licit: legally banned, but socially sanctioned 
and protect. They propose a different way to conceptualise illegal flows over time and 
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space. Arguing that nation-state is not the point of departure, they propose investigating 
the distinction between what states consider to be legitimate (legal) and what people 
involved in transnational networks consider to be legitimate (licit). They argue to the 
effect that: 
Many transnational movements of people, commodities, and ideas are illegal because they defy 
the norms and rules of formal political authority, but they are quite acceptable, “licit”, in the eyes 
of participants in these transactions and flows.  To categorise between illegal and licit practices, a 
qualitative difference of scale and intent between the activities of internationally organized 
criminal gangs or networks and the scores of micro-practices that, while often illegal in a formal 
sense, are not driven by a structural logic of organisation and unified people (Abraham and Van 
Schendel 2005, p. 22).  
Based on the above logic, Abraham and Van Schendel distinguish between legal/ illegal 
and licit/ illicit practices by the scale of activities. They contend that licit practices are 
not driven by organisations and unified people. For example, the armpit smugglers or 
ant traders who cross borders all over the world with small quantities of goods may 
together account for huge quantities, but they do not represent global syndicates of 
organised crime. Thus, they cannot be categorised into one particularly group. 
Regarding illegality, Abraham and Van Schendel defined that an effect of criminalised 
objects moving between political, social, cultural and economic spheres wherein human 
smuggling and human trafficking are practiced contrary to the law. Licit, on the other 
hand, is the normative recognition of certain unlawful activities within a social network 
or group. These networks exercise their authority by placing judging on these social 
practices according to perceived norms and values, thus legitimising this practice.  
The forms of cross-border migration I investigate in this thesis may be considered both 
licit and illicit.
10
 On the one hand, undocumented cross-border migration is illegal; but, 
people, on the other hand, involved in practices across state borders may or may not 
recognise the state’s categorisation of their activities as criminal. In the past, people 
living in the frontier areas were able to move freely. In more recent times, however, 
                                                 
10
 Throughout this thesis, I quote Abraham and Van Schendel’s (2005) the use of the terms ‘licit’ and 
‘illicit’to refer to locally regarded legitimacy, different from ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’. 
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conceptual context of the modern nation-state has transformed the everyday mobility of 
the local people into illegal and irregular movement. The importance of this distinction 
is to question the origins of the regulatory authority, which may be either political or 
social. The judging authority includes persons who are involved in the activities and 
practices through direct or indirect participation. Social acceptance may determine the 
‘legality’ of a specific practice even though it might be illegal.  
2.4 Rural-to-rural/rural-to-urban and Circular Migration: the Overlooked 
Connections 
 
In migration studies, conventional patterns tend to be categorised according to sending 
and receiving areas: rural to urban, rural to rural, urban to rural and urban to rural.   In 
addition, migration may occur within or across national boundaries. It may be or 
involuntary (forced as a result of conflict or natural disasters): regular (with 
documentation) or irregular (without documentation); or, temporary, seasonal or longer 
term/permanent (UNDP, 2010, p. 3). Yet, there is increasing awareness that the different 
forms of movement are not always  clearly demarcated, particularly in cases where a 
country cannot accommodate the current migration due to the changing of state 
boundaries, differential border regimes, globalisation, technology ,transportation and 
economic environments (Deeleen & Vasuprasat, 2010; Inthasone, 2009; Pholsena, 
2006). Migrants may become involved in both rural-to-urban and rural-to-rural 
circulation; they may be permanent/return migrants for a few years, but later become 
temporary/seasonal migrants for a certain period of time. Focus upon one specific type 
of movement only without considering the overlapping forms of migration may prove 
inadequate especially in the borderlands where all categories of migration are likely to 
occur. 
 
Studies of internal migration in Asia overwhelmingly focus on a linear process of rural- 
urban migration as a response to economic growth and the transition to urban areas 
(Acharya, 2003; Guest & Kritaya, 1999). Urbanisation and the expansion of 
manufacturing, especially in the export sector, have contributed to the rise of rural-to-
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urban migration. The World Development Report 2009 revealed the implications of 
rapid urbanisation in relations to population growth and rural-to-urban migration (World 
Bank, 2008). The United Nations (Social Environmental Research Consultant, 2010)  
estimate that the world urban population will increase by 72 per cent by 2050, and from 
3.6 billion in 2011 to 6.3 billion by 2050. By mid-century, most of the urban population 
of the world will be concentrated in Asia (53%). However, scholarly investigation 
challenges the population figures for cities in Asia, claiming that the increase will be 
temporary due to the seasonal migration of labourers. In Vietnam, massive seasonal 
migration to Ho Chi Minh City occurs during the Mekong River floods (Dang Nguyen, 
Tacoli, & Hoang Xuan, 2003). Apropos of Indonesia shows an increase in non-
permanent and circular migration and in the numbers of people commuting from rural to 
urban areas (Hugo, 1982, 2001).  
Rural-to-urban and rural-to-rural migration in fact predominate in developing countries 
where the majority of the people lives in the rural areas (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005, p. 
244).  Labour mostly moves from the poorer regions to the agriculturally prosperous 
areas, where there is more work or where irrigation systems are accessible. Rural-to-
rural migration typically involves the poorer people, e.g., those with little education and 
few assets. This way, it requires lower investment (IOM, 2005). Studies conducted in 
Africa and Asia identify the ‘push’ factors e.g., environmental constraints especially 
deforestation, population pressure, and the floods and droughts that lead to socio-
economic deficiency (Carr, 2009; Oucho, 1984; Skeldon, 2003; Srivastava & 
Bhattacharyya, 2003). However, most have specifically focused upon internal rural- 
rural migration without taking into consideration potential forms of migration that might 
occur at the same time. Most consider rural-to-rural migration only as internal 
migration. 
Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in international rural-to-rural 
migration across national boundaries in the agricultural sectors of many countries that 
are considered to be more affluent than their neighbours. The high cost of domestic 
labour, together with out-migration, location, the high wage rate, and changes in 
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demographic structures, has led to agricultural labour shortages during the peak 
harvesting season. As well, it has given rise to the replacement locals by labourers from 
the less affluent countries to work in the rice fields and vegetable farm. Inexpensive 
travel and communication allowed easier information access and travel, culminating in 
circular migration on a larger scale. Many countries developed policies, immigration 
programmes and granted specific visas to facilitate and encourage circular migration in 
their agricultural sectors; for example, berry-picking in Denmark, Finland and Norway 
required seasonal migrants from Eastern Europe (Partanen, 2009). A programme known 
as ‘de gestion integral de l’immigration saisonniere’ promoted by the Spanish 
government organised Moroccan workers to migrate to Span for strawberry and citrus 
fruit cultivation (Constant, Nottmeyer, & Zimmermann, 2012). The shortage of labour 
for fruit and vegetable harvesting in Australia was resolved by welcoming seasonal 
workers from the Pacific Islands as substitutes for domestic labour  (Blanco, 2009). 
Agricultural labour shortages, and the subsequent welcome of guest workers through a 
special type of visa in the United States, attracted predominantly Mexicans and migrants 
from other countries (Griffith & Kissam, 2002). Farmers across Europe and the United 
States, who had come to rely on migrant workers to harvest their fresh fruit and 
vegetables, called for governments to support guest worker schemes.   
In Southeast Asia, few research projects have explored international rural-to-rural 
migration, even though cross-border rural–rural flows have occurred on a wide scale. 
World Bank (2006, pp. 35-36) indicated that drawing from the countries in the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS), Thailand’s agricultural sector employs the highest number 
of migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR on fruit, flower, chicken 
and rice farms in Northern and Northeast Thailand. These workers, however, are not 
confined to the agricultural sectors. The increased level of educational attainment among 
Thai workers has allowed for a wider horizon of employment opportunities. The 
demographic trend towards a low birth rate has created a shortage of unskilled workers 
in jobs such as fishing and fish processing, construction, domestic service and tourism. 
Latt (2009) and  Makpun (2008) focus on the rural-to-rural migration of the ethnic 
minorities living along Thailand’s and neighbouring countries’ borders. Latt investigates 
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the Shan migrants from Burma, who work in vegetable and fruit farms in Northern 
Thailand. He explored the new way of understand agrarian transformation beyond rural-
to-urban migration, and the ethnic division of labour between the Hmong employers and 
the Shan employees. Latt noted that the intensification of agriculture in the highland 
required the Hmong farmers to minimize the costs associated with agriculture. The Shan 
workers after escaping from the clash between the Shan State Army and the United Wa 
State Army, entered Thailand illegally and became cheap labour for the Hmong farmers, 
enabling them to remain economically competitive in the market. Makpun (2008) 
examines the survival tactics employed by the Thai border residents living along the 
course of the Mekong River, in a border village located between Thailand and Lao PDR. 
Their tactics included the maintenance and reproduction of a cross-border network of 
Thai-Lao people who sought to recruit cheap labour from Laos for their vegetable farms. 
This thesis seeks to identify the connection between migration in the borderlands and 
the importance of migrant workers to rural communities. It also addresses the multi-
layer and overlapping forms of migration that involve migrants in rural-to-rural and 
rural-to-urban migration, both internally and internationally. In the last section, I will 
explore the main conceptual frameworks that are crucial for understanding how this 
cross-boundary rural-to-rural migration shapes agrarian relations and transformations, 
both in Thai borderlands and in Laos. 
2.5 Reformulating Agrarian Transformation in the Borderland Context 
In the previous section, I discussed the spatial characteristics of the borderlands, in 
particular the state-village relations at the border and the complex patterns of cross-
border migration. In this section, I will review and discuss the studies on agrarian 
transformation in Southeast Asia. Particular focus is on livelihood change, de-
agrarianisation and social relations associated with changes in and beyond agriculture. 
The above studies, I argue, tend to understate the borderland context where many 
particular practices delineate agrarian transformation in a certain way. This section aims 
to define the conceptual framework of agrarian transformation and the ways in which 
the geographical location of the borderlands - and the particular form of migration - 
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drive processes of agrarian transformation. Three conceptual frameworks are presented: 
a) the borderland and de-agrarianisation; b) the transformation of class and labour 
relations; and, c) the multiple class identities. 
2.5.1 The Borderlands and De-agrarianisation 
The last two decades have seen a growing body of literature on de-agrarianisation. 
Having noted the moving away from strictly agricultural-based modes of livelihood in 
terms of off-farm occupational and off-farm income-earning, Bryceson et al. (2000) 
highlight an active process of de-agrarianisation in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
additional factors contributing to de-agrarianisation include: migration; decreasing farm 
size; increasing inability of young people to access enough land to take up farming as 
their main occupation; poor farming production; and, in some instances, declining yields 
due to declining soil fertility. The same phenomenon as in Africa is later observed in 
Southeast Asia. Contending on the overemphasis on agricultural importance, Rigg 
(2001, 2003) proposes commercialisation, globalisation, and de-agrarianisation as 
analytical foci, contends that rural households in Southeast Asia are increasingly 
diversifying their livelihood activities and becoming hybrid. Rigg and Sakunee (2001) 
make reference to a decline in the economic importance of smallholder agricultural 
activities. Their article titled ‘Embracing the global in Thailand: Activism and 
Pragmatism in an Era of Deagrarianisation’ features an analysis of Thailand’s de-
agrarianisation and evidence from village studies illustrating how a growing number of 
farmers becoming heavily involved in off-farm occupations. They additionally 
emphasise that globalisation, higher education, migration and livelihood diversification 
among farmers resulting new cash crops and off-farm work can prove beneficial. As 
well, they suggest that few farmers in Thailand today rely solely on agriculture to meet 
their needs. In some areas, severe labour shortages due to out-migration cause farmers to 
either leave their land, rent it out or dispose of it.   
However, moving away from the farm is not always the best way to support rural 
livelihoods. Li (2009) critics the World Bank Development Report 2008’s 
recommendation on the best option for Asia’s rural poor is to exit agriculture and work 
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for wages that it could not achieve easily. In addition, in some poor countries the 
opportunities for wage work are still limited. Some studies in Southeast Asia in the 
current era have stressed that there have been several processes working against de-
agrarianisation. Despite the emphasis on the importance of  non-agricultural work, the 
changes in land use and social relations around the land due to industrailisation and 
urbanisation, and the gradual disappearance of farmed land and farmers, agriculture and 
the importance of farming are enduring (Hirsch, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Santasombat, 2008). 
In case of labour shortages, there is always a way to provide labour substitution. 
Geographical location is a crucial factor that determines the pattern of agriculture, and it 
is in the border areas that the labour gaps have been filled by migrants from 
neighbouring countries (Rigg & Salamanca, 2011). Makpun (2009), emphasising the 
importance of cross-border employment, adds that acquiring cheap labour from Laos to 
agricultural border areas is one of the tactics employed by Thai farmers living in the 
Northern Thai-Lao borderlands to facilitate intense commercial cash cropping and 
economic competitiveness in the global market. But, her research does not pay attention 
on spatial location and how cross-border employment sustains agriculture. Rather, she 
focuses on the survival tactics of local people who negotiate their practices and 
networks across the borders in the context of regionalisation in the Mekong Sub-region.  
Geographical location additionally determines the level of livelihood diversification.   
Rigg and Natapoolwat (2001) observe that de-agrarianisation in the villages in Northern 
Thailand has occurred because the villages are located near the urban centre. So, people 
are easily mobile and have many chances to work in off-farm jobs. But, in areas without 
such geographical advantages, few non-farm works are founded. In some developing 
countries, Lao PDR for example, the manufacturing and service sectors are poorly 
developed. Thus, the people remain highly dependent on agriculture and natural 
resources. Those seeking off-farm incomes migrate to Thailand in search of job 
opportunities. However, earning money from off-farm occupations does not necessarily 
imply leaving the farm permanently.  
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Apropos of the linear process of de-agrarianisation, Rigg and Nattapoolwat (2001) 
stated that migrants who experience working in off-farm jobs tend to lose the desire to 
farm. Some opt to avoid farming completely viewing it as a low-status occupation. In 
such instances, land may be sold leading to disengagement and a ﬁnal break between the 
rural household and traditional farm-based livelihoods. Nonetheless, there is some 
critical analysis on the persistence of farming due to the support from off-farm jobs and 
remittances. Santasombat (2008) and Brookfield (2008) argue that the diversification of 
rural livelihood strategies sustains family farms keeping them alive. Farmers are able to 
be both peasants and labourers at the same time; they can be wage labourers in the 
agricultural sector, international labourers migrating abroad, urban labourers and small-
scale traders. But trapped in the path of change, they fight back in various forms under 
varying socio-political conditions and contexts. Arguing that the family farm is far from 
dead in both the developed and developing countries, Brookfield (2008) investigates 
family forms of farm organisation which oscillate between theories on agrarian 
transformation and the reality. He demonstrates that family farming in developed 
countries has persisted through the plural activities of farmers, some of whom have 
undertaken non-agricultural work on their own farms while other have travelled away 
from home to work on the farms of others, or in nearby towns, solutions turned off-farm 
diversification. These alternatively choice have helped the family farm to survive and 
prosper where there is readily accessible off-farm employment or other means of 
livelihood diversification. It also exposes farm households to a comparison of rewards in 
terms of lifestyle and living standards between farm work and urban work (Brookfield, 
2008, pp. 116-117).  
Moreover, in some cases, the adaptation of the farmers’ strategies has sustained 
agriculture. Vaddhanaphuti and Wittayapak (2011) addressing the new challenges posed 
by agrarian transition in the Mekong Subregion showcase different experiences of 
farmers in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and how they have adapted their agrarian 
practices to cope with on-going change. Their practices include, for example, livelihood 
diversification, i.e., switching between farm and non-farm jobs or growing non-rice 
crops and utilising social capital such as kinship ties.    
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In sum, de-agrarianisation is highly contested; but the extant studies lack explanation of 
the specific context of the borderlands. I will suggest that the pattern of agrarian 
transformation may be different in particular contexts and requires more flexibility of 
interpretation.  
2.5.2 The transformation of class and labour relations    
Analysis of class differentiation based upon the differential access to means of 
production, e.g., land, capital, and labour, is the main focus of agrarian studies. Class is 
based on the ownership of means of production while social relations are connected with 
production forces in agriculture. Since land is the primary means of agricultural 
production particular, the form of land property is the basis of agrarian relations, which 
in turn are determined by the nature of landownership and land tenure. Agrarian 
relations change as conditions of landownership and land tenure change.  
Previously, agrarian differentiation or the process involving the differences the rural 
populations, has been the main focus in agrarian studies. As  White (1989) noted that: 
Differentiation thus involves a cumulative and permanent process of change in the ways in which 
different groups in rural society – and some outside it -  gain access to the produce of their own 
or others’ labour, based on their differentiation control over production resources and often, but 
not always, on increasing inequalities access to land (White, 1989, p. 20).  
 
However, as social class differentiation has been reworked in the contemporary times, 
globalisation, migration, urbanisation, and industrialisation have restructured economic 
production, class mobility and social relations in the rural areas.  Many studies have 
proposed extending their criteria to understanding rural class structures and inequalities.  
Nowadays, a broader range of access to resources such as off-farm occupations, 
migration, education, social networks, and information is taken into account. Arguing 
that the landless are not necessarily poor, and, the richest is not necessarily the previous 
who holds the largest amount of land, Rigg & Sakunee (2001) propose that the basis for 
rural differentiation in the 21st century in villages in Northern Thailand is education. 
The higher level of education the villagers achieve, the grater their chance to get better 
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earning off-farm jobs. Kerkvliet (1990) distinguishes groups in a village in the 
Philippines based on their standard of living: very poor, less poor, the adequate and the 
rich. Class can be divided into working class, peasants, petty entrepreneurs, and 
capitalists.  
Some scholars after investigating who can or cannot migrate and the results from 
moving away, contend that migration also reworks class mobility. Lukasiewicz (2011), 
for example, claims that it is only the wealthy families who can afford the recruitment 
costs of an overseas labour contract. Lack of the requisite fundsmake it difficult for poor 
families in Laos to migrate to Thailand. They have to invest by borrowing form their 
village money lender (Barney 2012, Rigg 2007). Furthermore, the benefits accruing 
from migration differentiate the sending communities. Migrant families can move from 
tenant to owner and from user of family labour to employer of waged labour. At the 
same time, migrant earnings in the city make a real difference to rural migrants’ lives; 
they establish new stratifying indices of modern living and social status, indeed defining 
the migration option not only as necessary for their survival, but also as profoundly 
desirable.  Clearly, a class structure of uneven wealth exists; but it is not necessarily 
based upon agrarian or even local, non-farm activities. Instead, it may be based on the 
ability to migrate and to get non-farm jobs. The socio-economic hierarchy in a village 
becomes disconnected from local relations of production.  
I regard class relations as repositioned within much wider processes, and, as imbued 
with many significant factors that the conventional view of class cannot encapsulate. 
The point I am making is that social inequality in contemporary period has to be 
analysed within a wider context. This thesis questions the rework of class and social 
relations in the borderlands where domestic migration commonly occurs. When there is 
a replacement of waged labourers from less affluent neighbouring countries, how are 
classed and labour relations reworked within and across communities and ethnicities? 
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2.5.3 Multiple class identities 
Another sense in which overseas migration reworks class is when the same individual 
experiences different class processes in different places (Kelly, 2011, p. 498). Building 
on the dynamic and fluid nature of the class trajectory and a variety of class processes 
coexisting in diverse economies, Gibson, Law, and Mckay (2011) argue that the 
contradictions in migrant class processes disrupt the hero and victim discourses. Filipino 
women employed as domestic workers, for example, are not only depicted as exploited 
victims in a global economy that is dominated by foreign agendas, but are also seen as 
heroines of national development in the Filipino government scheme. In-depth 
interviews and fieldwork reveal that migrant females remit money regularly to their 
household in the Philippines for investment in buying land and in education for left-
behind children, for example. Although the female domestic workers are frequently 
viewed as victims in their countries of service, Hong Kong, for example, they are often 
landlords in the homeland. In this respect, overseas migration transforms them and their 
families into capitalist class with some capacity to accumulate surplus.  
Rigg (2005) argues that the access to land and migration in Laos does not always signal 
that households with large land areas are inevitably wealthier than those with little land. 
Lao migrants in Thailand do not usually come from poor families. In many wealthy 
areas of Laos, migration to Thailand is not only the route for gaining money. Instead, it 
is an aspiration of people to engage with modernity (Nevins & Peluso, 2008). In this 
sense, the means of production in a village is no longer an indicator of an individual’s 
social and economic status. Class structure is a deciding factor in migration and off-farm 
occupations.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter suggests the following three theoretical implications: the contextual 
approach to understandiing agrarian transformation; the social and political needs to 
understand the borderlands; and, the more details understanding of the relationships 
between class and mobility. 
42 
 
In this chapter, I have detailed relevant concepts on agrarian transformation, borderlands 
and migration. I have reviewed the key processes of agrarian transformation in different 
periods and given significant consideration to understanding agrarian transformation in a 
particular locations and contexts. Taking the borderland as a site of focus, this chapter 
argues that borderlands are spaces wherein unique forms of state-society relations are 
found. In an attempt to explore borderlands, this chapter critically examines local cross-
border practices and negotiations between state officials and borderland residents. In the 
context of porous Thai-Lao borders, various local cross-border practices are considered 
illegal including cross-border migration and employment in agricultural sectors. This 
chapter suggests disaggregating these practices and distinguishing between legal / illegal 
and licit / illicit practices to understand political life and regulations in the border shape 
the state-village relations.  
 The politics of the borderlands, along with patterns of state-village relations and 
migration, are the three components that shape agrarian relations, rural differentiation 
and class mobility in the Thai-Lao borderlands.  Taking these three components as the 
defining framework, this thesis delineates the spatiality of agrarian transformation in the 
context of the borderlands. 
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Chapter 3 
Researching the borderlands: Practice and context 
3.1 Introduction:  
This chapter, which illustrates the methodological and theoretical challenges                   
I encountered throughout my research, also discusses the methodologies employed when 
in doing cross-border research, the dilemmas, and the methodological choices. Research 
methods, limitations, and the reflections of the researcher will also be presented in the 
following sections.  
 
This research addresses three different themes, i.e., agrarian transformation, 
borderlands, and cross-border migration. The main research question focuses on 
agrarian transformation in the specific context of the borderlands. For this reason, 
practices related to agricultural livelihoods in the border are brought into question. In 
this regard, cross-border practices, state-village relations, and linkages between rural-
rural, and rural-urban migration are of specific interest.  
 
In this chapter, I detail the nine months of fieldwork I conducted in Thailand from June 
to August 2010, and from November 2010 to May 2011. The first section explains how I 
gained access undertaking a research in Lao PDR. Then, I describe my methodological 
dilemma and problematise the methodology employed. I question whether agrarian 
studies that focus on in-depth ethnographic fieldwork and village studies are sufficient 
to understand the nature of transnationalisation, mobility, and the diffusion of the 
borderlands. Here I explain how I employed multi-sited ethnography in this research. I 
will describe my methods which primarily consisted of in-depth interviews, 
conversations, participation observation, and the distribution of questionnaire. Finally, I 
will delineate my positionality in the fieldwork and outline ethical considerations.   
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3.2 Doing fieldwork along the borderlands of Northeast Thailand and Lao PDR 
My research aimed to examine agrarian transformation in the context of northeastern 
Thailand and the Lao borderlands. Particular focus was on cross-border agrarian 
relations and the livelihoods of the Thai-Lao border communities along the Mekong 
River.  Having noted that the majority of border and agrarian studies tended to 
undertake their fieldwork either in a single area or on the border of one country, I 
attempted to research practices relating to discourses of border control based on two 
crucial aspects. First, instead of thinking of borders in terms of solid lines and certain 
locations, I looked at borders as relational spaces and not simply as territorial lines 
separating two different areas or regions. Brambilla (2008) suggests that borderlands are 
spaces of interaction where social relations are articulated through historical, political, 
economic, and cultural relations. This led to the second objective to balance the research 
sites in both Thailand and Lao PDR to have clearer picture of the social networks across 
the border. So, my ideal research locations were one village on the Thai border and 
another on the Lao border. The nature of my research was of necessity dependent on in-
depth interviews, village studies, and fieldworks undertaken across the borderlands. 
Mukdahan Province in northeast Thailand and Savannakhet Province in Lao PDR were 
my focus areas due to the transnationalisation engendered by the opening of the 2
nd
 
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2007, the engagement with cross-border migration, and 
the shared of cultures, ethnicities and family ties (Pholsena, 2006, pp. 59-60).  
The core element of my research when I commenced my fieldwork was Agrarian 
Transformation in the borderlands. In order to determine the research locations at the 
community level, I commenced my preliminary fieldwork in February 2010 by 
conducting interviews with many government officials working in the Mukdahan City 
Hall.
11
 My aim was to collect some information about agricultural practices information 
and cross-border management. While most of the people I interviewed provided 
information about their responsibilities; for example, the Provincial Agricultural Official 
gave me data on rice farming and rubber plantations, and the Chief of Provincial Labour 
                                                 
11
The Mukdahan Provincial Governors, the Chief of Provincial Agricultural Officers, the Chief of 
Provincial Labour Office, and the staff at the Provincial Security Affairs Unit. 
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Office talked about the out-migration of the young generation from Mukdahan to 
Bangkok and the rising number of Lao migrants working in all of the service sectors in 
the city. Inside information came from a high ranking official working in Provincial 
Security Affairs about the local checkpoints along the Mekong River and the cross-
border employment involving Thai farmers and Lao migrants. He pointed out that 
because out-migration in Mukdahan was very high; it led to labour shortages in various 
sectors. Benefiting from the border location, the people of Mukdahan absorbed Lao 
migrants to replace Thai workers in local unskilled and labouring jobs, both legally and 
illegally. In the agricultural sectors, farmers living along the Mekong River resolved 
their labour shortage problems by hiring daily Lao workers across the border through 
the traditional checkpoints established along the Thai border villages under the 
supervision of the District and Provincial Governors.   
I travelled to a few villages in the provinces where the traditional checkpoints operated. 
I was looking for a village that had cross-border employment facilitated by the social 
networks of the Thai-Lao people living along the Mekong River. During a consultation 
with officials at the Mukdahan Provincial Governor’s Office, Ban Fangthai was chosen 
as my research site in northeastern Thailand because it had the most active traditional 
checkpoint. As well, its cross-border activities included cross-border employment in the 
rice paddies, and the big weekly market held on Tuesdays and Sundays. In terms of 
geographical location, I could see Ban Kaemkong, the opposite village, very clearly.  
During my preliminary survey in June 2010, I asked the villagers to take me on a boat to 
Ban Kaemkong. Some went fishing in the River and often joined in social ceremonies 
such as weddings and funerals. But no one wanted to take me because I was not             
a ‘local’. Finally, I asked one of the Thai government officials in Mukdahan Customs 
House to take me there by car as a one-day trip. We crossed the 2
nd
 Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge and took the local road, approximately 40 minutes from the bridge to the village. 
My first trip in Ban Kaemkong was only as a sightseer. I could not do much because I 
first had to apply for a permission to do my research from the Lao Government.    
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Sarah Turner (2010) observes that obtaining official research permission to do fieldwork 
in contemporary socialist countries – in Lao PDR, Vietnam and China, for example- is 
difficult and takes time. One main reason is because governments are cautious regarding 
foreign researchers who want to undertake long-term fieldwork (McKinnon, 2010). 
Besides research authorisation, foreign researchers must be accompanied by government 
counterparts and/or research assistants. Some foreign scholars acquired permission to do 
research in Laos through long-term engagement with numerous development project 
initiatives and academic institutions. In this way, they reduced the difficulties in dealing 
with the Lao centralised, politically controlled bureaucratic system (Barney, 2011; 
Daviau, 2010; Huijsmans, 2010). Wassana, a researcher who attempted to establish a 
connection with the University of Laos as her host institution, mentioned that it took 
almost 10 months to obtain research approach and an official visa. Such circumstances 
can be extremely stressful, especially for those on limited research funds (Sarah Turner, 
2010, p. 123). 
My case strongly relied on personal connections and considerable good fortune. Being    
a lecturer teaching in a university in Bangkok, I had a postgraduate student from Laos in 
my department. I contacted him via e-mail from Australia to ask about obtaining official 
permission to undertake research in Savannakhet Province. I was subsequently 
introduced to his friend who worked at Savannakhet Province City Hall and was 
pursuing a Master’s Degree in a university in Bangkok. After agreeing to be my 
research coordinator, he took me to the Lao Embassy in Bangkok where I submitted my 
project document to the Lao ambassador. Within two hours, I received a letter of 
permission.  
My Lao research coordinator understood how difficult it was to deal with the highly 
bureaucratic system in Laos. He was concerned that it would take a long time for the 
letter to reach the local authorities, the Savannakhet Provincial Governor’s Office, and 
the Saibuly District Office, the district where Ban Kaemkong is located. Having planned 
a home visit in the next two weeks, he made an appointment to see me in Savannakhet 
city and took my letter with him to get it stamped. When we met at his place in Laos, the 
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letter was ready to give to the Saibuly District Office. We went to submit the letter to the 
Head of Saibuly District together to get another stamp. But, this short cut to obtaining     
a research visa was unsuccessful. I had to be accepted by a research affiliation in Laos to 
obtain that type of permission. This required me to go to Lao and stay as a Thai tourist. 
This type of visa allowed me to stay in Lao for 30 days; then I had to cross the border 
back into Thailand and from there re-enter Laos.  
The completion letter of the granting of permission did not end there. I was still faced 
with many circumstances that made me realise the importance of personal connections 
and how fortunate I was to have been introduced to my Lao coordinator. Realising that 
the majority of the Lao migrants working in the paddy fields in Ban Fangthai came from 
Ban Laonua in Xeno District, I made a decision to include this village in my research 
site (see section 3.2 for a discussion on extending the research site to Ban Laonua). So, I 
had to revise my letter to Savannakhet Province and write another letter requesting 
permission from Xeno District. My Lao coordinator helped me through the whole 
process. Without him, to get everything done by myself would have taken a few months 
and to access another field site would have been impossible.   
Having a Lao staff member present during the fieldwork was another regulation for a 
foreign researcher. This process came with financial incentives for the Lao official 
involved: the appointed official was entitled not only to a daily allowance, but also to 
other expenses that were expected to be paid by the researcher including 
accommodation and food which in turn cost a certain amount of money (Daviau, 2010).  
In my case, the situation was the opposite because my Lao coordinator took care of me 
as his younger sister who came to undertake research alone in his country. He could not 
stay with me in the field all of the time because he had to return to study in Thailand. 
When I told him that I was self-financing, he understood and initially did not want to 
accept any money. He insisted upon helping because his friend who referred me to him 
was a close friend. However, I paid him some money on the days I needed him to 
accompany me to the field, plus his travel costs, food, and all of the expenditure 
incurred.   
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As many researchers have pointed out, having a government official accompanying one 
while conducting research tends to make one’s informants cautious vis-a-vis the answers 
and comments. In my case, my Lao coordinator initially escorted me to both villages, 
introducing me to the village headman as his fictive younger sister who was conducting 
research into agriculture and was keen to learn about livelihoods in Laos. His 
accompanying of me really helped to confirm my intention and status in the fieldwork, 
in particular in Ban Laonua where I accompanied some Lao migrants on my first trip. I 
was asked to show the letter of permission, and to pay some money to all of the village 
committee members. When I returned the second time, I asked my Lao coordinator to go 
with me and to introduce me again. Whenever I was questioned by the Lao police or 
soldiers, I contacted him and asked him to speak to the Lao officials directly. This was 
one of the advantages of the networking as discussed above.  
3.3 From one site to multi-sited research: From field sites in the borderland to the 
hinterland and the global city  
In his study of children’s migration undertaken in the Laos PDR,  Huijsmans (2010) 
states that methodological considerations in academic studies are not only shaped by 
academic factors, but are also determined by the particular research context. Similar to 
research conducted in the borderlands, unexpected circumstances that occur during the 
fieldwork – the circular movement of people and the compromised form of state-village 
relations – determine the methodology and highlight the limitations of previously 
planned methodologies.  
 
Agrarian studies conducted in Southeast Asia between the 1960s and the 1980s 
generally focused on empirical case from rural villages (Ganjanapan, 1984; Nartsupha, 
1986; Kemp, 1982; Potter, 1976; Robert, 1956). The latter were clear fix boundary units 
of administration, fully occupied by farmers, and located far from the city. Household 
analyses and ethnographic fieldwork were the dominant methods employed.  
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However, later research places analysis in relation to the wider contexts of the local and 
the global. Some question the meaning of the village community and the construction of 
community as a non-essentialist unit, thus moving away from simple analyses of village 
(Hirsch, 1993a; Rigg, 2013; Rigg & Ritchie, 2002). There is, however, a rising concern 
regarding villages and households as units of analyses in the contemporary era. Hirsch 
(2013: 397) points out that the changing world in which rural people’s live and the 
changed place of agriculture within it are the main factors generating the new empirical 
context for agrarian studies. Rural-urban interpretation through mobility and migration, 
he claims, lead to questions of households that are comprised of members who reside, 
live and work in different places and jobs. (Hirsch, 2013; Rigg, 2013; Rigg & 
Salamanca, 2009; Rigg & Vandergeest, 2012). This becomes a methodological 
challenge to the single-sited ethnographies of village communities that treat realities as 
bounded without investigating movement and flows.  
 
As suggested earlier, my initial research sites were Ban Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong. 
Initially, I anticipated that migrants from Ban Kaemkong would cross the river via the 
local checkpoints operated for daily workers in Ban Fangthai and nearby areas. My 
intention was to collect data across the border. This was based on an assumption that the 
classical method of collecting data in one single site could not cope with diffuse 
networks, diverse forms of mobility in the transnational location of the borderlands, and 
the spatial bounds of the social relations that constituted the everyday lives of those 
domiciles in the borders. As Hastrup and Olwig (1997) stated regarding discussion of 
the field, we should not primarily think of fieldwork as a locality, but as field of 
relations. However, I learned from my first period of fieldwork during the rice 
transplanting season in July 2010 that the Lao migrants not only came from Ban 
Kaemkong, but were also from many villages in the Lao hinterland. During my second 
period of my fieldwork during the rice harvesting season in November 2010, only 7 out 
of 120 Lao migrant workers were from Ban Kaemkong. The rest were from 8 villages 
scattered throughout the Lao inner areas. Of this group, 31 workers were from Ban 
Laonua, Xeno District, approximately 35 km from the river. These comprised the largest 
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migration group from a certain location. This implies that the rights of passage at the 
border not only belonged to the borderlanders. People living in the hinterlands could 
also cross the border with non-recognition of documents (Walker 1999). Based on the 
principal goals of the research which are to understand the livelihoods at the border, and 
on the notion of social and cultural networks across the Thai-Lao border, I followed 
some people from Ban Laonua to their home village and ultimately included this village 
as the third research site.  
 
The Lao migrants did not simply move between two locations; rather, they circulated 
between many locations. In January 2011, I returned to Ban Laonua where I learned that 
a number of migrants I met in Ban Fangthai had returned to their jobs in various parts of 
Thailand. After acquiring a few telephone numbers from the interviewed households, I 
phoned a number of Lao migrants who had returned to Bangkok, my initial objective 
were to greet and to visit them if I could. I visited these people a few times, and our 
great discussions gave me a broad understanding of the multi-locality of people’s lives 
and the integration of rural production, migration, farm and off-farm employment in 
Laos and in Thailand, between places and across scales. Recognising that migration in 
the context of the borderlands was distinctly unique, the adoption of multi-sited 
ethnography approach suited my research questions as well as my multilevel analytical 
framework as it both offered a broad understanding of transnational processes and 
linked the macro and micro levels of analysis (Falzon, 2009; Marcus, 1995, 1998). 
Marcus (1995) argues that a multi-sited ethnography is useful for the study of 
phenomena that cannot be accounted for by focusing on a single site. Mobile, 
ethnography has to get engaged with these movements.  This made sense of my study 
that was focused on human mobility. The multi-sited ethnography also enabled me to 
understand the relationships between agricultural livelihoods in the migrants’ 
homelands, agricultural land along the Thai border, and off-farm occupations in the 
cities. 
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3.4 Methods and Data 
This section illustrates how data was generated and analysed. Reflecting the nature of 
agrarian studies, a qualitative methodology was employed. In order to capture migration 
patterns, the research was multi-sited and combined various methods. I started by 
interviewing key informants at the provincial levels; then I conducted informal 
interviews and participant observation at the village level employing a work and talk 
technique. As well as both observing and joining in the villagers’ activities, I 
disseminated a questionnaire to elicit more systematic data. The methods employed, and 
the number of research participants and locations are shown in Table 3.1. 
  
Table 3.1 Key methods for collecting fieldwork data 
Methods 
 
Numbers  (N) Locations 
1) Interview Based Methods 
Formal interviews - Mukdahan Province 
Governors 
- Director of Mukdahan 
Province Agricultural 
Office 
- Director of Mukdahan 
Province Labour Office 
- Staff at the Security 
Affairs of Mukdahan 
Province  
- Chief of District Governor 
- Head of Community 
Development Department    
- Assistant to the Head of 
Savannakhet Province 
Governor  
 
 
Mukdahan Province 
and Savannakhet 
Province 
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Informal interviews - Village Heads, Ban 
Fangthai Mu 1,2,3 and 
Village Committee 
Members 
- Village Head, Ban 
Kaemkong, Lao PDR 
- Village Head, Ban Laonua 
and Committees 
- Thai Border Patrol Police 
- Lao Border Patrol Police 
- Thai-Lao cross border 
traders 
- Local expert on Ban 
Fangthai history 
- Priest, Ban Fangthai 
Church 
- Thai Businessmen in Ban 
Kaemkong 
- Previous Head of Saibuly 
District 
- School Teacher, Ban 
Laonua 
Mukdahan and 
Savannakhet 
Provinces 
2) Questionnaire Survey 
Household Survey - 100 out of 362 
households in Ban 
Fangthai 
- 50 out of 204 households 
in Ban Kaemkong 
- 50 households out of 213 
in Ban Laonua 
  
 
 
 
Ban Fangthai, Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua 
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In-depth interviews with Lao 
migrants in Bangkok 
- -    2 females and 1 male in a 
Western Restaurant  
- -    a family with 6 family 
members in the gas 
station  
- -    a female in a Northeast 
Thailand Restaurant 
Bangkok 
informal interviews by 
telephone with Lao migrants in 
Bangkok 
- -    a couple working as 
domestic workers  
- -    a female working in a 
massage shop 
- -    2 males working in a 
plant nursery  
 
 
Bangkok 
Informal interviews with Lao 
migrants on a bus trip from 
Bangkok to Mukdahan 
Province, the international bus 
across the Friendship Bridge 
- -    2 Lao females working in 
Bangkok and taking a bus 
to visit their home in 
Savannakhet 
- -    an elderly Lao lady 
coming to visit her 
daughter in Bangkok 
with her nephew and 
taking a bus to return to 
Savannakhet  
Roadtrip from 
Bangkok to 
Mukdahan, and from 
Mukdahan to 
Savannakhet  
3) Ethnographic based methods 
Work and talk: 
 - participating in rice 
transplanting and rice 
cultivation 
- helping women groups at 
village weddings and funerals 
-helping local traders to sell 
goods at the border markets 
-cooking with villagers in the 
kitchen 
 
 Recorded as fieldnotes Ban Fangthai, Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua 
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Everyday conversations 
-taking food to join breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner 
-following men group to go 
fishing in the Mekong River 
- attending religious ceremonies  
-joining Thai New Year Festival  
Recorded as fieldnotes Ban Fangthai, Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua 
Participating in village meetings 
and local festivals  
 
Recorded as fieldnotes Ban Fangthai 
 
3.4.1 Formal interviews 
Formal interviews, or interviews conducted based on prepared questions and 
appointments, were the main research methods conducted with a wide range of 
government officials in Mukdahan and Savannakhet Provinces. The interviews were 
mostly open-ended: I asked the informants for the facts and their opinions. The data I 
acquired from the formal interviews were mostly relevant to the prevailing socio-
economic conditions, security problems in the borderlands, and border policies at the 
provincial level. I recorded the interviews using a tape recorder, and transcribed them 
within the following days. 
3.4.2 Informal interview 
I mainly conducted informal interviews in the field with village heads and committees, 
resource persons in each village, police, soldiers, Lao people I met on the way from 
Bangkok to Mukdahan and on the local truck to the village, and cross border traders. 
These interviews helped me to acquire general information about the village history, 
customs, and traditions. They could be conducted anywhere, often in paddy fields 
during the workers’ lunch break, at funerals, in the border weekly market, during my 
trips to the village, and at the local checkpoint where the police and soldiers were 
working. I found that the informants occasionally gave different information at different 
interviews. Conflicting information was mostly related to conflict over rules and 
regulations; for example, regulations related to the local checkpoint. In my first 
interview with the village head of Ban Fangthai, he told me that villagers who hired 
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daily Lao workers had to confirm that their employees daily returned to Ban Kaemkong 
before 6 p.m. None of the Lao employees was allowed to stay over in Ban Fangthai 
because it was illegal.  However, after spending a few weeks in the village, I learned 
that most of the Thai farmers let their Lao employees stay over until the end of the 
cultivating season because the latter came from villages far away from the Lao border. 
So, in a subsequent interview, I asked the village head about the checkpoint regulations 
and the reaction of the local governors. He said that this involved the livelihood of the 
Thai people living along the Mekong River, who were facing labour shortages. So it was 
necessary to use Lao migrants to fill the labour gaps. He pointed out that the District 
Governor knew that Thai farmers let their Lao workers stay over in their places during 
the cultivating season but did not see the practices as affecting the state’s security. As 
long as the village could prove that there were not criminal offences such as drug and 
human trafficking occurring, the government officials would not intervene.  
I initially used Informal interviews to get to know the villages and to make myself of 
interest to them because they showed interest in and curiosity about my life and 
background. Common questions that they asked, for example; where do you come 
from?, what do your parents do?, are you married?. These kinds of informal and two-
way interviews also helped me to recruit the right informants. There were many cases 
where I opted to return to conduct in-depth interviews. For example, I conducted in-
depth interview with some Thai farmers to learn about their life histories and 
aspirations, I also conducted in-depth interviews with some Lao migrants I initially met 
in Ban Kaemkong. I interviewed them in their workplaces in Bangkok, eager to learn 
about their migration histories, their relationships with their home villages, and their 
expectations. I tried not to make our conversations too formal; and, I either wrote any 
kind of voice-recording. I wrote down the main points of the conversations while 
conducting the interviews or immediately afterwards. 
3.4.3 Participant observation: work and talk  
Mavasti (2004, p.8) argues that social research should be based on the stuff of the real 
world: interaction, interviews, documents, or observations of, and related to, the social 
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world that all agree is out there. One of the primary methods employed in ethnographic 
fieldwork is participant observation: it allows researchers to learn about the activities of 
the people being studied in a natural setting by observing and participating in their 
activities (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). However, the researcher must determine to what 
extent he/she will participate in the lives of the participants and whether to intervene in a 
situation.  Given that my study focused on agricultural livelihoods in the borderlands, 
which were shaped by cross-border practices, and regulations, migration, an everyday 
conversation in the form of work and talk proved out to be one of the most valuable data 
collecting methods for me. After commence my fieldwork in the rice transplanting and 
rice harvesting seasons, I learned that the best way to talk to people was to join their 
activities. As a tool for conducting participatory assessment of rural resources, the 
“work and talk” technique made people feel at ease and motivated to enter into casual 
conversation with me. Furthermore, this method allowed me to interact with the research 
participants not simply as research subjects but in a natural and non-threatening manner 
(Burns, 1994). 
 
In Ban Fangthai, valuable information emerged indirectly in casual conversations, often 
when socialising with groups of people and talking about daily life. I participated in 
their activities, e.g., helping women’s group with cooking and selling foods, and even 
went fishing.  Initiating conversations with people and joining in their activities made 
people keen to talk to me and often led to direct questions relevant to my research. At 
the same time, the villagers enjoyed teaching me how to plant rice, harvest the rice, and 
cook some local foods. Many people laughed when they saw I was very clumsy when 
trying to work with them in the rice paddy. For of many Lao migrants I met along the 
Thai border, it was common to see them simply shaking their heads and replying: “I 
don’t know” or not replying at all when questioned. And, because the Lao migrants were 
employees of the Thai farmers, attempting to conduct informal interview with them 
while they were working was inappropriate.  It became clear to me that if I joined them 
in the rice paddy and worked with them, they would feel more comfortable carrying on 
57 
 
conversation rather than directly asking them about where they came from, and how 
they crossed border.  
3.4.4 Questionnaire survey 
DeWalt and DeWalt (2002, p. 9) suggest that participation observation may help the 
researcher gain a better understanding of the context and phenomenon under study. But, 
more validity of the study could be acquired by the use of additional strategies together 
with observation, such as interviewing, document analysis, surveys, questionnaires, or 
other more quantitative methods. Questionnaire survey was the last tool I applied during 
my fieldwork to generate substantial data.  
 
Informal interviews and participatory observation not only helped me to formulate 
sensible survey questions, but also enabled me to become acquainted with people who 
were motivated to answer the questionnaire. But, this took more time and required more 
information than the everyday conversation or informal interview.  
 
Household surveys which took the form of questionnaire were carried out in Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban Laonua between January and March 2011. They involved 50 
households in each village (out of a total 204 and 213 respectively). I returned to Ban 
Fangthai in April 2010 and conducted survey involving 100 households (out of a total 
362 households). Two questionnaires were developed; the first to collect data from Thai 
farmers, and the second for Lao migrants. The questionnaires were designed in the 
English language, and translated into Thai (see Appendices). The questions addressed 
three main areas: 
 
1) Demographic and socio-economic profile  
2) Households’ migration experiences, reasons of migration, remittances, and the 
methods used to hire Lao workers 
3) Section on agricultural livelihoods and labour management  
 
58 
 
There were some differences between the compiled questions for the people in Thailand 
and in Laos. For example, the questionnaire for the Thai farmers focused upon 
households’ migration experiences, remittances, and the methods used to hire Lao 
workers. The questions for the Lao workers were relevant to their migration experiences 
in Thailand, remittances, and how and why they migrate to Thailand. One individual 
household member could answer the questions; but, in most cases, other household 
members were present and responded to the questions. I personally conducted all of the 
questionnaire surveys. Systematic sampling was employed. I selected one in every four 
houses in each village based on the site map I had drawn. Most of the households in Ban 
Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong were located along the main road, so I could easily draw 
the lines on the maps. However, it was more difficult in Ban Laonua where the 
households were located close to the centre of the village. I had to draw circles on the 
map indicating sampling one in every four households.  
 
Conducting a statistical survey of household economies and production in Laos 
presented two main challenges: (1) the representativeness of the sample; and (2) the 
accuracy of the statistical data. Although the survey was designed to obtain information 
on a household basis, balancing the informants based on age and gender proved 
difficult. Most of the informants available in the home were either middle aged (40 
years or more) or elderly. The younger people were working outside of the village.  
 
In addition, I found it challenging to collect some of the statistical data, in particular the 
total household monthly incomes and the property the villagers owned in the Lao 
villages.  Because the majority of my respondents were non-salaried, they did not record 
the amount of money earned per month. So, instead of trying to ascertain their monthly 
incomes, I had to guide them to calculate how much they earned per day from a certain 
activity, e.g., selling vegetables and catching frogs. Then I asked how many days per 
week they engaged in certain activities. In terms of the amounts of remittances, some 
households had more than three family members working in Thailand who sent 
remittances every two or three months. Some remitted money on a monthly basis. I had 
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to estimate and recheck each respondent to arrive at the correct figure. In the case of 
Ban Fangthai, some villagers stated that they did not want to give information about 
their cash incomes and debts. I opted to give them a range of numbers and asked them to 
indicate in which range their incomes fell. I also found calculating household economies 
extremely difficult. Some villagers lived in different homes. Other worked on their 
family farms, in particular in the Lao village where one farmland was often shared by 2-
3 families. I had to crosscheck all of the questionnaires in which people mentioned 
either their own land or the land that they were working on.  
 
Data from the structured questionnaires survey was tabulated in Microsoft Excel as a 
basis analysis for charts and Tables. The survey not only provided a deeper 
understanding of the demographic and socio-economic statuses of those in the three 
research sites, but also provided the foundation for further analysis of the pursuance of 
agriculture in each village based on land and labour availability and migration.  
3.5 Limitation of Field Research 
There were some limitations to my thesis; for example: (1) the validity and reliability of 
the data; (2) under representation of Lao state officials; and (3) following the Lao 
migrants to various destinations beyond Bangkok.  
 
As Le Compte and Goetz (1982) observed, the results of ethnographic research are often 
unreliable and lacking in both validity and generalisation. Reliability depends upon the 
extent to which studies can be replicated: validity is associated with generalisation. 
Unlike scientific research wherein the researcher can maximally control external 
variables, ethnographic research does not have this facility because it is carried out in a 
natural setting and is difficult to reproduce. Bryman (2012)  who discusses reliability 
and validity in ethnographic research somewhat differently from Le Compte and Goetz, 
wrote that the terms reliability and validity in ethnographic research could not be 
employed in similar ways to scientific research. The nature of ethnographic research 
concerns words and meaning and takes the view of the participant into consideration. 
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Bryman (2012) suggests that reliability, validity, and accuracy in ethnographic research 
are associated with an accurate and systematic methodology. 
  
Despite my best attempts to conduct my fieldwork, I had to bear in mind the nature of 
ethnographic research which due to being based on participant observation, oral 
histories and personal experiences can prove selective, biased, and incomplete. 
Replication is very difficult to achieve because events that occur in natural settings 
cannot be reproduced. In addition, my research involved investigating field sites in 
which no academic studies had been conducted previously. I could only draw upon 
existing data from government organisations on the basic socio-economic conditions. 
Other historical information came from the collective memories of the villagers.     
 
The second limitation was the under representation of Lao state officials at the district 
and provincial levels. As my research was related to state-village relations in the 
borderland, it was important to ascertain the perceptions of the state representatives 
regarding cross-border practices. To this end, I interviewed local village headmen, 
soldiers and border patrol police I met during my fieldwork, accompanied by a Lao 
government official who worked at the City Hall and functioned as my research 
coordinator. I encountered problems when interviewing state officials in Laos. Unlike 
the Thai government officials who I could interview by myself, interviewing the high-
ranking government officials in Laos required provision of an official letter. Also I had 
to take my Lao coordinator with me; but he could not accompany me at all the time as 
he was studying in Bangkok.  
 
A final limitation was relevant to the multi-sited methodology I employed. This was 
critical, particularly as researcher’s applying multi-sited methodologies may spend little 
time at each site and with each localised population. Marcus (1995, pp. 7-10) argues that 
the strongest point of an ethnography is the in-depth knowledge one acquires from 
spending time in the field and through getting to know people during one’s stay. In cases 
of multi-sited ethnographies, researchers learn to know people (objects) who are mobile 
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and/or spatially dispersed by ‘knowing’ a place through participant observation. In my 
case, I was unable to follow the Lao migrants who migrated to various locations in 
Thailand due to limitations of budget, time, and information. For these reasons, my 
interviews with Lao migrants in Thailand were limited to two particular locations only: 
the northeastern Thai borderlands and Bangkok.  In terms of limited information, many 
households in Lao did not have the phone numbers of their children working in 
Thailand. Besides, the Lao migrants changed telephone numbers very often. Although I 
collected 10 numbers from Ban Kaemkong and 12 from Ban Laonua, I could only reach 
6 in total.  Thus, my research may have inadvertently omitted groups from other areas 
who could possibly have related valuable experiences.  
3.6 Reﬂecting upon Positionality  
Positionality, in a broad sense specifies the power, privilege and biases or power 
structures that surround the subject (Madison, 2012). It may be exemplified through 
consideration of both the similarities and differences between researchers and the 
research participants, inclusive of race, class, gender, age, sexuality, disabilities as well 
as life experiences (Hopkins, 2007).  My research conducted in Northeast Thailand and 
Laos reflects both differences and similarities. In this section, I illustrate my 
positionality as a Thai female researcher undertaking research in her home country and 
in a neighbouring country with similarities of language and culture. Not only race, class, 
and gender shaped my positionality: my fieldwork location in the borderland also 
determined my legal and extralegal
12
 status.  
 
As a Thai female from Bangkok conducting fieldwork alone in rural northeastern 
Thailand and Laos, I faced challenges and enjoyed advantages in many ways. 
Fortunately, I did not experience language barrier problems because northeastern Thai 
                                                 
12
 According to Oxford Dictionary Online 2
nd
 Edition (2010), extralegal means something beyond the 
province of law, not regulate by law. In Nordstrom (2008), extralegal is a term designating the range from 
the illegal and illicit through the informal to the undocumented and unrecognized, the invisible realities of 
extralegal trade,  the illegal, illicit, informal; undeclared, unregistered, unregulated and all the movement 
of people and goods that takes place in the shadows.  
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language and Lao language are very similar. And because Thai televised dramas were 
very popular in Laos, so I could communicate in Thai to the Lao people. Unlike foreign 
researchers, many of whom have to depend upon interpreters, I could directly 
communicate with my research participants. Furthermore, my Thai female identity not 
only provided safety, but also allowed me to easily access my research participants. I 
visited many locations that foreign researchers, who ‘look different’ (have different eye, 
skin, and hair colour), and speak different languages could not access. I followed the 
Lao migrants easily, travelling in local boats and trucks, and travelled to and within 
Laos on my own without any trouble. On the first and second occasions, Lao border 
soldiers asked to see my documents and fee. But, after a few weeks, they got used to 
seeing me traveling back and forth and stopped checking my documents.  
 
The differences between male and female ethnographers have been detailed in previous 
studies; for example, Vera-Santos (1993, p.162) saw 'understanding, sympathetic’. 
Perrone (2010), who researched on drug-using behaviours in highly sexualised dance 
clubs, observed that female ethnographers can compromise safety and inhibit access to 
establishing rapport that can benefit the process of data collection. In Thai-Lao border 
region, my female identity helped my research participants to feel comfortable to talking 
to me. The village head of Ban Fangthai said to me: “It is lucky that you are female so 
you could travel anywhere without being suspect like a male”.13  
 
Additionally, my female identity enabled me to easily access fieldwork and to gain 
moral support of provincial and district organisations. Besides providing general 
information, many local government officials found safe places for me to stay during my 
fieldwork. I initially stayed with the village headman; but, knowing that I needed to stay 
for a few months, I started looking for a rental place. I finally rented a room at a local 
trader’s home. Her husband, a police officer worked in another district, and her daughter 
was studying and working in the city. So, she lived alone in a three bedroomed house in 
the village. In Ban Kaemkong, my Lao coordinator initially left me with the village 
                                                 
13
 Author’s fieldnotes, 17 April 2011.  
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headman, who helped me to find a room for rent in the village. When I arrived Ban 
Laonua with the Lao migrants, I was asked to stay in the house of a young couple who 
lived with their mother. I stayed there until my research was completed. Everywhere I 
went, old female villagers helped me to find a place where I could stay. They often said:  
“Poor you, you are a female conducting a research alone. You must miss your parents 
badly”.14   
 
However, there were a few challenges and dilemma associated with researching in 
northeastern Thailand and Laos. First, returning to Thailand, my home country, to 
undertake my fieldwork in the northeastern region and Laos was by no means returning 
home. The field sites were all rural and totally different from urban Bangkok where I 
was born and had always lived. I felt truly an outsider in my own country and had to 
adjust to staying in my three field sites.  
 
Being a single Thai female undertaking research alone posed a dilemma vis-a-vis how to 
position myself with the male villagers. Many researchers who have conducting their 
research in rural villages, state describe that they obtained a lot of information by 
drinking with villagers after work. As a non-drinking female staying in villages by 
myself, I was frequently asked to join drinking circles but I found a way of politely 
refusing, often making a joke of it. When I first arrived in Ban Laonua, the village head 
and 7 committee members invited me to drink beer with them. I made a joke “I am 
Buddhist and follow the five precepts. One of them talks about protecting ourselves 
from intoxicants causing heedlessness. How could you claim that you are Buddhist if 
you don’t follow the rules of morality?”. The village head laughed and replied that he 
could follow any rule except that one, so I replied in a humorous way: “Protecting 
yourself from intoxicants is very important because if your consciousness is gone, you 
can violate all rules of morality”. The villagers laughed a lot but they stopped 
encouraging me to drink with them. To counteract the problem of limited socialising 
with the male villagers, I joined in other activities in the daytime. I went fishing with 
                                                 
14
 Author’s fieldnotes 4 December 2010. 
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some of villagers, and if I made appointments with people in the evenings, I generally 
took someone with me; for example, a female I lived with in Ban Fangthai, the young 
son or daughter of the house owner in Ban Kaemkong, and the daughter of a lady who I 
lived with in Ban Laonua.   
 
In addition, my ethnographic fieldwork in rural northeastern Thailand and Lao raised 
my awareness of social classes and expectations that originated in my educational 
background and my habitus in general. In Ban Fangthai, because I was studying in 
Australia and was a lecturer at a well-known university in Bangkok, people expected to 
be rich. They saw me as a rich lecturer who must be earning good salary. Villagers often 
asked about my salary and my parents’ occupations. Fortunately, my work and talk 
technique proved helpful in these circumstances. When people saw me trying to learn 
how to work in the paddy fields and joining in as many activities as I could, some 
commented that they thought people who had a good education mostly had very 
comfortable jobs in air-conditioned rooms. My work and talk technique not only 
facilitated more acceptance from the communities, but decreased my positionality that 
was tied with my education background and Bangkok. Although they frequently asked: 
“You are educated people and must know more than us”, in time they learned that there 
were many things I did not know and for this reason needed their guidance. Thus, it 
became a two-way-learning process between the researcher and the communities that 
were being studied.  
 
The people in Laos had some expectations regarding my capacity to help them improve 
their lives.  Some asked me to take one of their daughters to work as a domestic worker 
in my home in Bangkok. Many asked about the benefit of my research, what they would 
get in return, and why they had to help me answer the survey if they stood not to benefit 
at all. Some said that I was only conducting research so that I could return to Bangkok 
and to earn a lot of money. They said I would not be able to understand the tough lives 
they endured as farmers; some even asked for money if I wanted them to answer the 
questions. While some foreigners conducting research in Laos (i.e. Daviau 2010, 
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Wasana 2012) faced problems of official controls; for example, a Lao officer was 
assigned to accompany them and villagers demanded to cooperate with the research 
officially, I too had to work hard to get the cooperation of my research subjects. As a 
way of appropriately answering when asked about the benefits of my research, I 
generally replied that I could not assure them that my research would help to improve 
their lives; but, it was a way of increasing Lao communities, understanding of rural 
hardship. I did not have enough money to pay the people who cooperated with my 
research. But, whenever I visited them, I took big bags of snacks, candy and pain relief 
balm. Inviting people and their children to snack with me, as well as bringing my simple 
food to share with them, were very good methods for starting conversations. I usually 
gave households that participated in the questionnaire survey a bottle of pain relief balm 
in return. I did not intend it as a gift for the people although one usually takes some 
offer. When interviewing villagers, I considered the pain relief balm useful for people 
who had to do hard physical work in the fields all day. A sense of humour was also 
crucial. In situations where people started to become bored, one female complained: 
“Why you ask so many questions? I am so headache”. I instantly gave her the pain relief 
balm and replied: “I know you might feel like this so I prepared a balm for you. Please 
smell and then think about what I have asked you”. The respondents laughed a lot and 
seem to enjoy answering subsequent questions.  
 
The last dilemma impeding my fieldwork was my extralegal status. Although I obtained 
an official letter of permission from the Lao government to conduct research in Bang 
Fanglao and Ban Laonua, engaging in ethnographic fieldwork among undocumented 
Lao migrants plus my journeys between the Thai-Lao borders placed me in extralegal 
circumstance at some stages. Without a research visa, any journey I made to Laos, that 
is crossing the border at the 2
nd
 Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in Mukdahan city, was as a 
tourist. As a Thai national, I could stay legally in Laos for 30 days for tourism purposes. 
So, with that in mind, I became a Thai tourist conducting a research in Laos. I regularly 
entered Laos, had my passport stamped and then return to Ban Fangthai by boat along 
with local villagers who went to shop in a local market on Sundays through the 
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traditional checkpoint. Just as the Lao migrants took advantage of language and ethnic 
similarities to the Thai people in order to stay extralegally in Thailand, I adopted the 
same method so as not to disappear from the Thai immigration system. I became an 
undocumented Thai citizen in my own country because my passport showed that I was 
still in Laos. Locked in the situation, I emulated the Lao migrants who crossed the 
Mekong River to return home after the cultivating season, I took the same boat and 
showed my legally stamped passport to the Lao border soldiers if requested.    
3.7 Ethical considerations 
Before conducting their fieldwork, researchers are required to submit an ethics 
application to a committee for review to ensure that participants in the research are 
informed and consent to participate in the research. Ethics, in practice, is a reflexive 
method that guides the researcher’s morality and enables her/him to be sensitive to the 
ethical dimensions of fieldwork (Turner 2010). In the following section, I delineate how 
research addresses the topics of consent, confidentiality, and sensitivity to the research 
topic.  
 
At the beginning of my research in Ban Fangthai, I planned to inform people verbally at 
village meetings about my research objectives and what I needed to do in the village. 
The village headman informed me that, however, village meetings were only randomly 
convened. Utilising information technology, the village radio broadcasted every 
morning at 6.00 a.m. If there is an urgent matter, the villagers contact each other by 
mobile phone: the network has covered the whole area for more than five years. Based 
on this information, I went to see the village head the next morning and used his village 
radio to introduce myself and my research. In terms of the two villages in Laos, I 
introduced myself through everyday conversations. I also encouraged the villagers to 
ask questions if they wanted further information when conducting the interviews, I first 
made sure of the willingness of the respondents to participate and always informed them 
that they could cease participation at any time. However, I did not distribute consent 
forms because it made little sense in the context of the rural areas wherein written 
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language rarely features in everyday lives of people. I built on the rapport I had 
established earlier. This enabled the villagers to understand my work and made the 
interviews more relaxed.  
 
Before leaving the field, I showed my participants the data I had collected from each 
research site. In Ban Fangthai, I spoke to the local priest
15
 and asked if I could use the 
meeting room in the church in which there was a projector and a computer. After the 
religious ceremony that the people in general attended every Tuesday night, I presented 
my research topic, and the photos I had taken. The villagers in Ban Fangthai were 
excited to see photos of Lao villages on the opposite side of the river. In Ban Kaemkong 
and Ban Laonua, I used my notebook to present data, along with pictures of the balcony 
of the house in which I lived. Approximately 20 people came to listen to my talk.  
 
Finally, but not less important, I had to consider issue of the security of the 
borderlanders and any impacts on the well-being of those among whom the project was 
take place (Donnan & Willson, 2010, p. 14) . Aware of the sensitivity of the research 
topic, e.g., migration patterns and illegal movement in the agricultural sectors, I 
anonymised my research locations and use pseudonyms in my research to ensure the 
safety and well-being of my interviewees. In cases where respondents did not want me 
to reveal their names and positions, for example, government officials who provided 
information on migrant policies in Mukdahan Province, I quoted only high rank 
government official.  
3.8 Conclusion  
This chapter addresses the methodological challenges and methods applied in the field. 
As well, it demonstrates my pre-fieldwork preparation, my expectations, and the reality 
and challenges I encountered when undertaking field research in areas far from home. 
 
                                                 
15
 Ban Fangthai is a catholic village with a large church in the middle of the village.  
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In this chapter, I reveal some of the unexpected circumstances that shaped my research 
methodologies, from my in-depth ethnography of a particular village to exploration of 
multiple locations. The natal villages of the Lao labourers in Ban Fangthai, together 
with their migration experiences, characterised the increasingly mobility of the people. 
Multi-sited ethnographies were undertaken in order to engage with these movements,   
Rather than limiting my study to two villages across the Mekong River border, I 
included another village and investigated the linkages of these multiple locations. This 
enabled me to access key informants and to make sense of Lao’s migration circuit.   
 
This chapter additionally details the range of methods employed, i.e., participant 
observation, formal and informal interviews and household surveys, and identifies the 
limitations of my field research. Finally, I reflect upon ethical considerations, and my 
positionality as a Thai female researcher from Bangkok undertaking research in 
northeastern Thailand and Lao PDR.  On many occasions, I travelled undocumented 
with local villagers, crossing the Mekong River by boat.  This showed that not only race, 
class, and gender shaped my positionality: my fieldwork location in the borderland also 
determined my legal and extra-legal status.    
 
In the following chapter, I will contexualise the study by exploring the historical 
changes that have shaped northeastern Thailand and Laos, and Thai-Lao development 
trajectories. 
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Chapter 4 
Contextualising Northeast Thailand and Lao Borderlands 
and Trajectories of Development 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses Northeast Thailand (or Isan)
16
 and Laos from a historical 
perspective. Focus is on political and economic developments: this will provide               
a substantial background to the relationships between Northeast Thailand and Laos and 
associated historical, cultural, social and economic aspects. Historically, the areas were 
once considered as the same polity under the rule of the Siamese King since 1828. In 
1893, the French colonialist army occupied Laos and forced Siam to withdraw from the 
left bank of the Mekong River. This saw Isan ultimately incorporated into the modern 
Thai state. These events engendered the ethnic, cultural and language similarities of 
northeastern Thai and Lao people and marked the spatiality of the border and migration 
patterns that I will discuss in Chapters five and six. 
After exploring cross-border migration from Laos to Thailand and its implications for 
agrarian transformation, the chapter then reveals the trajectories of development of 
Thailand and Laos that have led to economic disparities and migration. Prior to the 
1960s, Northeast Thailand and Laos were relatively similar. Both areas were farming-
focused and their economies lagged behind other areas. From the 1960s on, 
industrialisation in Thailand led to economic growth and urbanisation; but, Isan was left 
behind, marginalised from the benefits. Because Isan is the poorest region of Thailand, 
numbers of Isan people have migrated to work in labouring jobs in the industrial and 
service sectors in Bangkok and its vicinities. Some return to work in the paddy fields in 
the cultivating season. In the same historical period, Laos was the hidden arena in a 
‘Secret War’. It suffered extensive aerial bombardment by the United States in the 
                                                 
16
 The term ‘Isan’, which is of Pali-Sanskrit origin, means ‘Northeast’. People living in the northeast of 
Thailand interchangeably label themselves and are labelled by others as Isan, Thai Isan, Lao Isan, Thai or 
Lao, depending on the ethnic, political, social or familial nuances of any given situation (Hesse-Swain, 
2006, p. 257). In this thesis, I use the term Khon Isan which means people of northeastern Thailand, and 
Khon Lao to refer to people of Lao PDR.  
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latter’s attempt to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries and to rupture the supply lines 
known as the Ho Chi Minh trail.  The Lao government divided into two factions: the 
Communist Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government. Both the former leftists and the 
later rightists received external support for a proxy war from the Cold War superpowers, 
the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1975, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
established rule over the country, leaving Laos almost isolated from the global economy 
and the non-communist world until 1986 when the government announced its New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM), designed to re-orient to a market economy.  
Different paths of modernisation produce different political and economic 
circumstances. At the beginning of the new millennium, Thailand became an upper- 
middle income country. Now it is confronting the labour challenges of the upper middle-
income trap: eroding labour productivity, chronic labour shortages, a dwindling labour 
force and a declining fertility rate (Vasuprasat, 2010, p. 14). When Thailand and its 
neighbouring countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region began to formalise political 
and economic relations and regionalisation efforts in the mid-1990s, Thailand became 
the main destination for migrants from its poorer neighbours, namely Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, and Myanmar. These countries subsequently filled the labour gaps with jobs such 
as fishing and fish processing, construction, domestic service and tourism. 
In the contemporary era, while northeastern Thailand remains the country’s poorest 
region, living condition of the Isan people has significantly improved (Grandstaff, 
Grandstaff, Limpinuntana, & Suphanchaimat, 2008). Their migration pattern has 
changed from short moves to increasingly long  periods of being away doing non-farm 
work, a change which has resulted in labour shortages in the peak agricultural cycle 
(Rigg & Salamanca, 2009, 2011). Farmers living in the Thai border provinces who are 
aware of the availability of a labour force in Laos, welcome Lao seasonal migrants 
(Makpun, 2008; Taotawin, 2011). Aided also by the porous Thai-Lao border, language, 
appearance, and cultural similarities, farmers find it eases to employ Lao migrants in 
informal ways. The resulting migration dynamics and the association with agrarian 
transformation will be further examined in Chapters six and seven of the thesis.  
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4.2 Northeast Thailand and Laos from pre-colonial to post-colonial times 
This section examines Thai-Lao historical relations and concepts of border and 
boundary which prevailed throughout in the pre-vand post-colonial periods. In addition, 
it delinears the connection between people living in northeast Thailand and the Lao 
people, which has laid the foundations of cross-border practices and migration in the 
current era.  
4.2.1 The pre-colonial time 
The contested identity of people living in northeast Thailand, and their cultural, 
linguistic and historical association with the people of Laos, have been subjected of 
interest for many scholars (Keyes, 1966, 1967; McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004; 
Phongphit & Kevin Hewison, 1990). The term ‘Isan’ (Northeast), and ‘Khon Isan’ are 
used to describe the inhabitants of this region. Some northeasterners who had 
experienced intensive interpersonal relations with the Lao, who had made the 
connection between Laotians and north- easterners promulgated by the radio, or who 
simply were familiar with the term "Lao" because of its long history of use by the 
people on the right bank of the Mekong River, pen phulao, "being Lao," was indeed a 
possible ethnic identification (Keyes, 1966, p. 367) .  
Evans (2002) and D. E. G. Hall (1973) note that Thailand and Laos are countries that 
emerged from a complex regional history of empire-building. Around the 13
th
 century, 
the Tai-speaking people established the Sukhothai first capital of Simese state. Shortly 
after Sukhothai fell in the mid-14
th
 century, two new capitals were established; 
Ayuthaya, the Siamese kingdom in the central region of the peninsula, and Lan-Xang 
(Laos). The area of northeastern Thailand became a buffer zone between Lan-Xang and 
Siamese Kingdom. In 1350, King Fa Ngum of Lan-Xang was able to extend influence 
over some parts of what is now northeastern Thailand.  This era saw the first mass 
migration of Lao people to the northeastern region. It also saw the introduction of the 
Lao culture and languages.  
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At the beginning of the 18
th
 century, the Lao kingdom separated into three small 
kingdoms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champasak. The King of Ayuthaya extended 
his power to the surrounding kingdoms of Nan, Chiang Mai, Sipsongpanna, Sukhothai, 
some parts of Lan-Xang and of the Khmer kingdoms. All of Kingdoms were hostile and 
tributary to each other, and to Burma and China (Reid, 2009, pp. 38-39). In 1767, 
Burmese troops from the west completely destroyed Ayuthaya, leaving Vientiane a 
vassel state of Burma. The Thai state re-established by King Taksin following the 
Burmese conquest. 
Figure 4.1 Southeast Asian Kingdoms, CA. 1400-1600 
   
Source: Lockard (2009, p. 38). 
From 1779 on, Siam expanded its influence over all of the Mekong territories. The three 
Lao kingdoms (Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Champassak) were subordinated to Siam 
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as the tributary states. A rebellion led by the Vientiane King Anuvong in 1826 
represented a final attempt to promote Lao ethnic nationalism, on both sides of the 
Mekong, and to reconstitute the Lan-Xang kingdom. But, the Lao were defeated. The 
King of Siam subsequently removed large numbers of Lao across the Mekong to Isan 
where they could be controlled more easily. Isan was nominally ruled by Bangkok from 
1827 onwards. As a result of this involuntary resettlement, the vast majority of people 
living in northern Thailand today are of Lao descent and considered themselves to be 
close cultural relatives of the Lao on the opposite bank of the Mekong (Keyes, 1967). 
However, the northeasterners’ rejection of the domination of Bangkok culminated in the 
Holy Men revolts of 1902 (Keyes, 1967, 1977).  
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Figure 4.2 Kingdom of Ayutthaya and Its Neighbours 
   
Source:  Bhawan (2007, p. xvi). 
4.2.2 French colonisation (1893-1945) 
In the 19th century, a new strong power emerged from the European colonial countries, 
notably France and Great Britain. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893, signed under 
threat of a French ultimatum, allowed the French to expand their territorial influence 
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into Southeast Asia, thus halting Thai expansion.  As well as establishing the present 
areas of Thailand, the treaty also transferred the entire area of the left bank of the 
Mekong River, or (what is known as Laos today), to France. This saw Laos became as a 
territorial entity within French Indochina (See Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.3 Siam prior to the Franco–Siamese War, before 1893 
 
Source: Gibbons (1921, p. 84) 
 
 
 
76 
 
Figure 4.4 Paring Down Siam, 1911 
 
Source: Gibbons (1921, p. 84) 
Nationalism and the construction of nationhood in Thailand and Lao slowly developed 
in the 20
th
 century as a product of their integration with the modern world system. 
According to Winichakul (1996, p. 81), controversy over the question of what today 
may be seen as “sovereignty” over the left bank of the Mekong was not only critical to 
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the formation of the modern Thai state, but also to its misunderstood history. Before the 
arrival of European colonialists, Siam was a collection of people in a broad area within 
territory that was not clearly by demarcated boundary lines. Thus, Siam had different 
perspectives of its territories compared to those of the British and French. It accordingly 
negotiated for the surrounding frontiers. In the areas of what is contemporary Laos, 
Siam tried to claim the ownership of the space along the Mekong River. But, Europe 
claimed that it had to be decided whether a particular tributary was independent or an 
integral part of a colony of another kingdom, not somewhere between independent and 
dependent or possessed by more than one kingdom at the same time (Winichakul 1996, 
p. 88). This controversy underpinned the Franco-Siamese dispute. The confrontation 
ended by when French battle ships sailed up the Chao Phraya River to Bangkok and 
forced Siam to leave the east bank of the Mekong River to French colonial control. In 
1893, a treaty was signed in Bangkok established the Mekong River as the border 
between Siam and French Indochina. For Winichakul, this was the turning point 
regarding Siamese elites’ concern for territory, the land about which their ancestors had 
never worried and had even given away as gifts to ensure that most of the borderland 
would be securely under Siam’s sovereignty (Winichakul, 1996, p. 111). Subsequently, 
it became necessary for Siam to develop mapping technology to exemplified 
geographical boundaries of the nation, and construct Siam nationhood and nationalism, 
what Winichakul refers to ‘a geo-body’. He states that: 
[geo-body] describes the operations of the technology of territoriality 
which created nationhood spatially. It emphasizes the displacement of 
spatial knowledge which has in effect produced social institutions and 
practices that created nationhood (Winichakul, 1996, p. 16).   
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Figure 4.5 The Colonisation of Southeast Asia 
 
Source:  Lockard (2007, p. 120).  
Apart from the new geographical boundaries, the association with Western colonial 
powers accelerated cultural differentiation between Siam and Laos. Commencing during 
King Chulalongkorn’s (reign 1853-1910). However, the Siamese government faced 
problems of resistance from the Northeast vis-a-vis its attempts to exert stronger control 
over northeastern region. The government’s decree to eliminate slavery had adversely 
affected the local economy. Commissioners who had been appointed in the region, 
attempted to strengthen tax-collection and administrative control through the local 
nobles. The years 1901-1902 saw a large scale uprising central government named the 
"Holy Man's" rebellion. The holy man is a religious prophecy circulated among the 
people about an upcoming turmoil in which gold would turn into pebbles and pebbles 
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would turn into gold. Pigs and buffalo would turn into man-eating monsters and a 
tumultuous nature would wreak destruction on evil people (Toem, 1987).  Only the Holy 
Man who would be a just and righteous king for the people, would be able to help. At 
that time, many men claimed themselves as Holy Men in many provinces including 
Chaiyaphoom, Buriram, Korat, Roi-et, Nong Khai, Surin, and Nakhon Phanom.  
The largest rebellion was in 1902 in Ubonrachatanee Province when a monk from 
Savannakhet, Ong Man, appeared and claimed that he was the Holy Man. He set up his 
army of his thousands of followers and challenged the Siam Government by capturing 
Siam officials in the Northeast. The governement sent a number of soldiers to combat 
the situation but they were killed by the group of the rebels, a victory that enhanced the 
prestige of the Holy Man and attracted more followers. Finally, Siam sent troops to the 
Northeast to stop the rebels. They were ultimately were captured and executed while a 
few of the major leaders fled across the Mekong River (Murdoch, 1974).  
The Holy Man uprising can be interpreted in both economic and political terms. 
According to Keyes (1977), Siamese administrative control was seen as restrictive and 
invasive, particularly as officials from the central government often took part of profits 
from animal trading and taxation. The Holy Man’s rebellion gave new importance to the 
Northeast region. It urged the Siamese government to slow the pace of centralisation, 
and to gradually integrate the local nobility into the new bureaucracy which operated at 
the provincial level. By doing so, the government was able to prevent any further 
widespread rebellions (Phatharathananunth, 2002). In 1910,  the Siamese government 
expanded educational reform into the outer provinces to include the peasantry on 
commitment to the Thai state was emphasized through the teaching of patriotic songs, 
recitations of the king’s words  and standardisation of a central Thai language. These 
nationalist policies produced a widespread consciousness in the people of being Lao or 
Siamese. 
In case of Laos, scholars emphasise that the French had little to do with the forging of 
the sense of Lao identity (Evans, 2002; Jerndal & Rigg, 1998; Pholsena, 2004; Pholsena 
& Banomyong, 2006; Rigg, 2009; Stuart-Fox, 1993). Laos had become a component of 
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French Indochina for 60 years. According to Stuart-Fox (1993), the only Lao political 
entity that existed was the Kingdom of Luang Prabang which was protected by France 
rather than being tributary to Siam. The rest of Lao territories became dependent 
provinces administered by French officials as part of Indochina. In addition, Jerndal and 
Rigg (1998, p. 817) argued that prior to World War II, Laos became a residual, almost 
empty space within the wider political unit of Indochina. 
Figure 4.6 Contemporary Map of Southeast Asia 
  
   Source: http://www.aseanbriefing.com/userfiles/regions/asean/asean-map.jpg   
4.2.3 The post-colonial period (1945 to 1975) 
The pan-Thai ambition initiated by the Pibun Songkhram government in Bangkok was a 
turning point that forced the French government to rethink the sense of Lao national 
identity (Jerndal & Rigg, 1998; Rigg, 2009). The aim was to awaken in the Laotians a 
national spirit in the Laotian and to progressively achieve moral unity in the country. 
The principal instrument of this policy was the introduction of a Lao language 
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newspaper, ‘Lao Nyai (Great Laos)’, which began publication in January 1941. 
However,  Evans (2002, p. 80) contends that: the content of the paper was never allowed 
to stray beyond French policy; nor was it to become explicitly nationalist. It most 
important function was to instill in its readers a sense of Lao space and to create a sense 
of identity across this space.   
The history of Laos during 1945-1975 was marked by the turmoil. Supporting by Japan, 
Lao declared of independent from France in September 1945 and enjoyed the 
independence for 6 months, then was ruled by Japan. At the end of the World War II, 
Japan was defeated. Laos survived without being absorbed by Siam or integrated into 
Vietnam, and finally achieved independence from France in 1954. However, a further 
tragedy saw Laos divided by civil war for more than two decades. Faced with poverty 
and the reality of geography which placed Laos in the middle of the Cold War, Laos 
opted for neutrality. But, neutrality proved impossible. The US started pouring aid 
budget into Vientiane ostensibly for development, but its programme gave rise to 
corruption and an unwarranted growth in the power of the military. At the same time, 
the Lao communist movement opposed any alignment with the US, supported by the 
North Vietnamese was growing up. A series of military coups and counter-coups in 
Vientiane in the early 1960s allowed the Lao communists to take more role and made 
significant inroads into the Royal Lao Government's control of the country. When 
America began its air war in Vietnam, Laos became caught up in the Vietnam War. In 
1975, Laos was finally reunified and emerged as a communist country. 
The next section will illustrate the different paths of state-led modernisation taken by 
Thailand and Laos as a basic factor contextualising the different appertaining the 
different of Thai-Lao borders and economic disparities.   
4.3 Political Economic Development of Thailand and Laos after the 1970s 
In this section, I will draw on the trajectories of political economic development in 
Thailand and Laos. Particular focus is on the disparities between Bangkok, northeast  
Thailand, and Laos, state-led modernisation, and the rural transformation in Thailand 
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which commenced in the 1960s. The rise of socialism in Laos in 1975 resulted in a 
centrally planned economic system replacing the private sector and private enterprises, 
and in strict border control along the Mekong River. Across the Mekong River, 
Northeast Thailand underwent little economic change due to the area being the site of 
political struggle between the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the government. 
As well as being Thailand’s poorest region; it was located relatively close to Indochina, 
where decolonisation under the banner of revolutionary struggle was occurring.  
 
The landmark period came in the late 1980s when Northeast Thailand and Laos 
underwent change from sharing relatively similar landscapes to others characterised by 
difference. During this period, Thailand achieved remarkable economic growth, which 
marked a shift from an agrarian to an export-driven industrialising economy. At the 
same time, the end of Indochina war in 1975 enhanced regional cooperation and saw the 
re-opening of the Thai-Laos border. Migration to Thailand had become the means to 
generate income for many Lao. The Thai economy required cheap labour in various 
sectors, whereas Laos offered few job opportunities other than subsistence farming.  In 
addition to the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme that forged links between Laos 
and its neighbouring countries through international bridges and highways, there was a 
rapid rise in the number of Lao economic migrants in Thailand. 
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Figure 4.7 The Northeast (Isan) Region 
 
Source:  http://www.mobot.org/MOBOT/moss/Thailand/geo.shtml  
 
4.3.1 The Industrialisation of Thailand from the 1960s and the lagging behind of the 
Northeast   
Prior to the 1960s, Thailand was predominantly an agricultural economy. Under the 
Sarit government
17
, with the support of the United States, its industrial promotion policy 
was implemented in the early 1960s. The country’s attempt to become industrialised 
                                                 
17
 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1908–1963) was Prime Minister during Thailand’s military government 
from 1958 to 1963. 
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was characterised by focus on food processing within which domestic agricultural 
products were excellent resources for industrial investment. The availability of local 
labour, combined with abundant natural produce, enabled the country to increase 
production and to shift to manufacturing or processing products for export purposes. 
From the 1960s on, the Thai economy firmed its foundation by investing in physical 
infrastructure which led to economic growth in the later period. 
 
However, the growth of Thailand was predominantly in Bangkok and its vicinities: the 
rural areas remained largely agricultural and offered limited employment opportunities, 
especially in Northeast Thailand which has always been synonymous with poverty and a 
backward rural setting. The underdevelopment of the Northeast was variously 
attributable to its poor environment, unreliable rainfall, and lack of irrigation (Long, 
1966; Parnwell, 1988). In 1962, per capita income in the Northeast reached only $US 45 
compared with approximately $US 100 for the remainder of the country [National 
Statistical Office 1964 cited in Long (1966)]. However, another important factor that 
determined the backwardness of the Northeast had its roots in history; that is, in the way 
that the Thai state treated the Lao ethnicities. As Gustafson (1994) states:  
 
Northeast Thailand was in a sense an "enclave" which was far removed from Bangkok 
and in large measure ignored by both Bangkok and Laos. The interaction of the 
aristocracy with the Northeast would have been difficult at best. In addition to the 
physical obstacles were the social inhibitors. The inhabitants of the Northeast in the 
early days were either political dissident from Laos or war captives who were forcefully 
resettled in the Korat Plateau by the conquering Siamese in the early 19th century. It 
seems likely, as a result, that what trade there was, if any, in the Northeast at that time 
was of a narrowly focused and internal nature. 
 
Gustafson (1994), further notes that Northeast Thailand was transformed by Thailand’s 
modernisation under Bangkok’s control. Isan people’s sense of being subordinated and 
marginalised was ongoing and continually expressed. Between the 1960s and 1970s, the 
region had become a popular site for the Communist Party of Thailand and the leftist 
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politicians. Thus, it became the matter of security for Bangkok to develop Northeast 
Thailand which was remote and relatively isolated from Thai society. The economic 
development of the region in the form of the construction of the Friendship Highway 
and the establishment of Khon Kaen Province as a regional hub in the early 1960s was 
driven largely by political considerations based on a significant volume of military and 
monetary support from the US (McCargo & Hongladarom, 2004, p. 221). Wilson (1966, 
p. 349) contended that a principle motive for the development programmes in the 
Northeast was the threat of a rural insurgency, which was basically rooted in the 
following characteristics of the Northeast Region: (i) its ethnic distinction from central 
Thailand and similarity with Laos; (ii) the appeal of Lao separatism; (iii) the existence 
of non-Thai ethnic communities, such as Vietnamese and Cambodians; (iv) the isolation 
of substantial parts of the population from government authority; (v) the relative 
economic deprivation of the region; (vi) the susceptibility of the Lao border to 
infiltration by hostile elements, Thai or otherwise; (vii) the availability of weapons from 
Laos; (viii) the occurrence of certain number of acts of violence which are interpreted as 
having political motives; and (ix) a history of political dissidence. Few villages were 
irrigated effectively, dry season unemployment was high and labour migration had 
become deeply entrenched.   
 
The budget allocation for development the Northeast region was also considerably low 
in comparison to that of the central region. According to Muscat (1994, pp. 139-140), 
the per capita development budget for the Northeast Thailand was only two-thirds of the 
allocation to the central and the per capital allocation under social development budget 
was only 30 per cent of the central’s in 1975. As such, the major programme driving of 
development in Northeast Thailand was the investment in infrastructure that linked the 
isolated Northeast Thailand to other parts of the country rather than economic 
opportunism in the region.   
 
One of the major results of the underdevelopment of Northeast Thailand was the large-
scale out-migration to the country’s urban centres. The expansion of transportation 
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intensified the possibility of the northeastern populations being incorporated into the 
national and global economic and political systems. As inhabitans of the country’s most 
populous region, the northeasterners became the main labour supply for Thai 
industrialisation. During the economic boom that occurred between the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, 1.1 million northeastern Thai population aged between 15 and 30 years 
moved out mostly to Bangkok (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995). Northeast Thailand 
provided the highest number of migrants. The six largest migration streams to Bangkok 
between 1985 and 1990 were from Ubon Ratchatani, Nakhon Ratchasima, Roi Et, Khon 
Kaen, Si Sa Ket, and Burirum (Perjaranonda et al., 1995, p. 184). However, this was the 
seasonal migration pattern. The majority of the northeastern Thai population remained 
house registration and formal residents in their home provinces, typically returned for a 
few weeks to take part in labour-intensive agricultural work, and for harvesting or for 
holiday times (Guest 1998).  
4.3.2 Laos as a socialist country in 1975 and the post-socialism in 1985 
In 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao succeeded in taking control of the country, officially 
closing the international borders and isolating the country from the world community. 
Having for years been subjected to French imperialism, civil war, and the Indochina 
war, the country now strove to be independent and to reconstitute its territories.  
However, newly introduced socialist economy which led to the limited human mobility 
and private trade, resulted in people withdrawing from the marketplace and relying 
heavily upon subsistence production. During this period, the Lao economy was probably 
less built around urban trade and industry than it was in the 19
th
 century (Rehbein, 
2007). In effect, communism did not neccessarily constitute a higher stage of economic 
development; rather, it provided an alternative route to modernisation. The supposition 
was that socialist project of rural collectivisation and forced industrialisation would 
provide the underdeveloped nations with the means to catch up to the advanced nations; 
but, it was not achieved.  
 
Employing its socialist regimes, the Lao government set out to stabilise the post-war 
socio economic and political conditions. In a bid to create a modern industrial economy 
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by bypassing capitalism, the government placed controls on the market and individual 
commerce, nationalised the industries, and launched a collectivised agricultural 
programme (Stuart-Fox, 1996). Evans (2002, pp. 191-192) stresses that agricultural 
collectivisation programme was implemented to serve two main reasons: to generate 
economic surplus that would finance state and development; and for political reason. In 
the worlds of Evans (2001 p. 192):  
 
Communist orthodoxy claimed that the productivity of agriculture could only be raised 
through economies of scale (by analogy with an industrial model), and this could only 
be achieved by collective ownership of the means of production. Cooperatives, they 
argued, could maximise the use of modern inputs into agriculture. The second main 
reason was political. Although the LPRP had immediately set about recruiting members 
and sympathisers at the village and district levels in the former RLG zone, and 
established them in positions of leadership there, the degree of control was still deemed 
insufficient. By drawing peasants into cooperatives they would lose their 
‘individualistic’ (‘capitalistic’) economic base of resistance to the new regime and the 
cooperatives could slowly come to be not only an economic form of organisation in the 
rural areas, but also a key political structure.   
 
However, the collectivisation plan was unsuccessful. Two years after communist 
revolution, the Lao economy was even worse than it was during the final years of the 
civil war (Evans, 1988). The years between 1976 and 1978 were miserable for the Lao 
people due to drought and an economic recession. In early 1979, the government put 
efforts into raising the agricultural output; but the regime’s policies was instead 
compelled people to try to escape the ‘bamboo curtain’. According to Stuart-Fox (1993),  
families whose breadwinners were in re-education camps sold what they had to survive, 
then crossed secretly to Thailand. Between 1975 and 1980, approximately 300,000 
people (ten per cent of the population at that time) fled from Laos across the Thai 
border. (Reddy, 2009, p. 14).  Some left Laos because of dislike of communism, others 
because of the rapid decline in their living standards. Many amongthem were former 
rightist army personnel, police officers, teachers, technicians and civil servants who 
constitute the educated cohort. In 1974, the end of US aid led to the collapse of the Lao 
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urban economy. Unlike in Cambodia, the mass terror of the Khmer rouge was not 
practiced in Laos. Reddy (2009, p.15) states that the porous nature of Thai-Lao border 
provided relative ease of escaping communist Laos across the Mekong River into 
Thailand. 
 
Lao PDR’s planners recognised that the construction of socialism would take time and 
require, the Lao communist party to abandon its programmes of rural collectivisation.  
In 1986, after ten years of isolation, the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was 
implemented as a mean to facilitate market-oriented policies that would encourage 
foreign investors. NEM had three main pillars which were: (i) macro-economic stability 
and fiscal adjustment; (ii) private sector encouragement; and (iii) public sector 
reorganisation. To implement this plan, many facets of the Lao economy were 
decentralise, but the central authorities continued to control the policy guidelines which 
comprise (Rigg, 2005, pp. 19-20):  
 
 A move to a market determination of prices and resource allocation  
 A shift from central planning to guidance planning 
 An elimination of subsidies and introduction of monetary controls 
 An alignment of the domestic currency with the market rate 
 A decentralisation of control to industries and lower levels of government 
 The encouragement of the private sector 
 The encouragement of foreign investment. 
 
However, after two decades of reform, Laos was still one of the least-developed 
countries in the world. Its landlocked geographical location, which underpinned its lack 
of access to market, education and transportation, was but one of the factors that 
contributed to poverty. Only one quarter of the country’s urban population stood to 
benefit from the centrally located liberalisation of internal trade and industry. The 
remainder of the people who lived in poor rural areas, predominantly relied on 
agriculture and natural resources for their survival.  
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Closely related to the economic development in Laos was the state-led modernisation in 
Thailand. In the next section, I will depict Thailand in the same period and how lives of 
the villagers on both sides of the northeastern Thai-Lao border shifted from similarities 
to urbanisation in Northeast Thailand.  
4.3.3  Green Revolution and Commercial Crops in the Northeast 
In the 1960s, Thailand diversified its agriculture based on the green revolution: 
improved high-yielding varieties of rice, irrigation or controlled water supplies, 
improved moisture utilisation, fertilizers and pesticides, and associated management 
skills. The World Bank played a key role in promoting cash crops in Thailand. Among 
the organisations set up at the Bank's recommendation was Thailand's National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which oversaw all public 
investment planning. Following its establishment in 1959, NESDB became a major 
promoter of cash crops grown for export (Moulton, 2008, p. 15). New cash crops 
including sugar cane, tapioca, and corn among various other crops came to challenge 
rice and rubber. In Central Thailand, traditional subsistence farming was incrementally 
replaced by cash cropping and an export-oriented industrial monoculture. Farmers not 
only began adopting improved varieties, but also had to adopt the rice farming 
technology package developed for the Green Revolution. This included application of 
chemical fertilizers, intensive pest control with pesticides, and efficient water 
management through irrigation. In addition, the Thai government encouraged the use of 
new rice species, pesticide and chemical fertilizers. To this end provided credit and loan  
to the farmers through the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 
and the Farmers' Group (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995).  
 
In Northeast Thailand, the Green Revolution came equipped with government policies 
for regional integration and economic development, the aim being to stem the expansion 
of communism. The Friendship Highway, which was completed in 1957, connected the 
region to Bangkok. It facilitated the introduction of the new rice species, the new 
technology of rice growing, and new cash crops such as maize, kenaf, and eucalyptus. 
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However, the people in the Northeast continued to grow staple crop of glutinous (sticky) 
rice, primarily for subsistence consumption.  
 
According to Rigg (1985), the Green Revolution  have failed to recognise the special 
problems facing farmers cultivating wet-rice in marginal rain-fed conditions in 
Northeast Thailand. Because the region is located on a semiarid plateau, rainfall in 
Northeast Thailand is inconsistent. Not only do periodical droughts, sandy soils. Amd 
substantial salt deposits constitute as the main ecological and agricultural problems, but 
the flat terrain of the plateau also often flooded in the wet season. A combination of 
these effects created difficult conditions for rain-fed agriculture and the Northeast 
Thailand population that were largely dependent on rice farming as the primary sources 
of income and food. Also, it forces the Northeast people to take on different jobs, for 
example, temporary employment in Bangkok, outside of the country as seasonal 
agriculture workers.  
4.3.4 Migration and Rural Transformation in Northeast Thailand 
For nearly three decades, from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, a time when Laos was 
absent from the global community, Thailand was experiencing a period of intensively 
industrialisation and modernisation. The intensifying migration flew from the Northeast 
to Bangkok and other urban cities had made a significant contribution to the social 
assimilation of the Northeasterners with other regions.  Muscat (1994, p. 285) argues 
that migration has broken down the prejudice that Central Thai formerly held toward 
Northeasterners and the old sense of inferiority among the Northeasterners who used to 
accept Bangkok’s judgment that Isan culture was backward. Migration also minimised 
their sense of self-identity as a disadvantaged and deprived ethnic group (Parnwell & 
Rigg, 1996). 
 
Various academics have researched the impact of migration on rural transformation in 
Northeast Thailand especially the changing patterns of households and farming systems. 
Many have suggested that majority of households are likely to have at least one member 
living outside of the village, who rarely returns home and no longer solely relies on an 
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agricultural income (Grandstaff et al., 2008; Rigg & Salamanca, 2009, 2011; Shigetomi, 
2004). In 2008, approximately 82.4 per cent of Northeast Thailand households had 
extended their income generating activities beyond their farm gates (National Statistical 
Office, 2010).    
 
Migration is also an important factor associated with the rise of households’ incomes.  
Guest (1998) who investigated the changes in household incomes in Northeast Thailand 
between 1992 and 1994 and the proportion of remittances to the households, argued that 
remittances contribute to an increase of household incomes. This was consistent with 
other studies that explored the the benefits of internal migration for household income in 
Northeast Thailand. Invariably, remittances result in poverty reduction, improvement of 
family living conditions, and better development outcomes (Boonyamanond & 
Punpuing, 2009; Piriya, 2011). In terms of international migration, Jones and 
Kittisuksathit (2003) stressed that migration benefited both the macro- and micro-levels 
of households located in the Northeast, the poorest region of Thailand. Their study 
compared households with international migrant and the households with domestic 
migrant. Remittances from international migration were higher than from domestic Thai 
workers. But, debate surrounded the negative consequences that could result from 
inward remittances that are used mainly for consumption purposes and less for 
investment. The effects of Thai out-migrants on domestic investment can be considered 
in a more positive way when taking into account the migrants’ new experiences, skills, 
and savings, that enable them to set up their own businesses. The re-studies of villages 
in Northeast Thailand conducted by Rigg and Salamanca (2011, 2012) show the 
livelihood changes that occured over the 30 years since the villages’ economies became 
attached to work away from the villages, and how people have come to depend on 
economic opportunities  outside of farming. In addition, various forms of re-investment 
in the village have been facilitated through remittances and by migrants. 
 
However, higher reliance on non-farm incomes does not mean that the agricultural 
sector has declined. Amare, Hohfeld, Jitsuchon, and Waibel (2012) point out that 
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temporary out-migration is a labour-diversification-based livelihood strategy. Migrants 
who send remittances to their home villages ckonsider themselves as members of their 
respective rural households, regardless of their duration of absence, frequency of home 
visits, or place of official registration. Furthermore, households in Northeast Thailand 
hold on to their lands as a safety measure due to low quality and vulnerable employment 
conditions. Grandstaff et al. (2008) contend that agriculture remains a major source of 
income among farm household. Although income from agriculture is far less when 
compared to non-farm income, half of the population in the region still engaged with 
farming; but, they integrate their farm and off-farm work. Nowadays, more people 
working part-time off-farm. Thus, agriculture has become a part-time occupation for 
many households. The percentage of northeastern households whose incomes mainly 
deserve from outside support (24 per cent) is about twice as high as in the rest of 
Thailand. 
 
Some scholars point out that what has changed in Northeast Thailand is the type of 
agriculture being practiced and farm labour management. Cooperative labour 
arrangements no longer function as an effective economic mechanisms were replaced by 
hired-wage labour since the 1960s (Ganjanapan, 1984; Shigetomi, 1998). The National 
Statistical Office (2010) reveals that by 2008, 77 per cent of the farmers in Northeast 
Thailand employed agricultural workers on an occasional basis. Only 0.3 per cent of 
farmers employed permanent agricultural workers. And, even though domestic labourers 
were still available, their supply failed to meet the high demand during the peak periods. 
In fact, meeting labour supply became increasingly stressful as local populations 
switched to off-farm occupations. This became the major reason why some farmland 
were left idle or were farmed inefficiently, rented out, or disposed of. The farmers in the 
border provinces of Northeast Thailand generally absorbed immigrant labour from Laos 
or Cambodia to fill the labour gaps (Rigg & Salamanca, 2011).  
4.3.5 Commercial Agriculture in Lao PDR 
Following the declaration of the NEM policy in 1985, the Lao government launched a 
national campaign to modernise agricultural production and transform of the subsistence 
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agriculture into a commercialised form of market-oriented approach. In the upland 
areas, the government discouraged shifting cultivation and encouraging people in the 
uplands to resettle in the lowlands. It promoted commercial agriculture, e.g., rubber 
plantation, and opened for investment - and gave rubber concessions to - foreign 
companies from neighbouring countries, in particular Thailand, Vietnam, and China. In 
the Lowland areas, projects aiming to develop irrigation systems and water management 
were implemented to improve the local water resources. Agricultural input including 
fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds were also initiated to intensify the growth of agricultural 
products. These innovations undoubtedly changed the Lao people’s traditional 
livelihood and engage them in commercial agriculture or to work as agricultural wage-
labourers (Fujita & Phanvilay, 2008; La-Orngplew, 2012). 
 
One of the move rewarding aspects of economic integration with Laos was economic 
growth. Lao PDR’s real GDP growth in 2011 was 8.6 per cent, compared to 8.4 per cent 
in 2010 (World Bank, 2011a, p. 2). However, economic growth is also stimulates 
inequalities and disparities. At present, agriculture remains the most important sector 
and employs the majority of the Lao population. However, Lao agriculture is still reliant 
upon traditional methods; hence the low levels of mechanisation and technology.  
Research conducted in many areas of Laos revealed that the country’s rice yield remains 
low, and that households cannot produce enough rice for household consumption. 
Access to credit and agricultural input continues to be limited. This has become one of 
the push factors that motivated the Lao people to move to Thailand seeking higher 
incomes  (Manivong Vongpaphane, Cramb , & Jonathan Newby, 2012; Syviengxay, 
2008). In Northern Laos, the land concessions given to foreign companies for rubber 
plantations have  overwhelmingly  been villagers’ swidden fields and crop fields. 
Consequently, most people living in plantation project areas have lost their swidden land 
(Barney, 2008, 2009). Many villagers desperate to earn money, work as labourers for 
the plantation companies. Rigg (2005) highlights that in the older days, many Lao 
households were poor due to being separated from the market. Commercialisation and 
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marketisation have produced a new poverty because increasing numbers of landless 
people have opted to escape poverty through migration.  
 
In the next section, I will contextualise Northeast Thailand and Laos in the 
transnationalisation era, which was intensified by the Mekong Sub-region Programme. 
The current market integration not only brought a new pattern of dependency and 
inequality between Thailand and Laos, but also intensified the influx of migrants from 
Laos to Thailand. 
 
4.3.6 Northeast Thailand and Laos in an Era of Transnationalisation in the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (1990s-present) 
The end of Indochina war in the late 1970s marked a new era of peace and stability and 
manifested a regional rapprochement in Southeast Asia. In 1988, Chartchai 
Choonhavan, the Thai Prime Minister, launched a policy to turn ‘battlefields into 
marketplaces’ that would shape Thailand’s border relations and its broader economic 
and political relations with its neighbouring countries (Battersby, 1998-1999; Hirsch, 
2009). One of the major forces driving this transformation of regional integration was 
the Greater Mekong-Subregional (GMS) Cooperation Program, which involved 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and China’s Yunnan Province. Launched 
in 1992, the GMS Cooperation Program entailed massive-scale development along the 
Mekong River and its tributaries to generate economic cooperation in the region. The 
current transnationalisation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region contexualises a new 
phase of Thai-Lao relations that could be summarised as two key points. 
 
The first point is the changing of cross-border control. During the period of communist 
occupation in Laos from 1975 to 1986, Laos subsequently isolated from the global 
community. One of the underlying reasons was the closure of Thai-Lao border, from 
open to strict control. The border policies of both countries were primarily based on 
security concerns.  Between 1987 and 1988, Thailand and Laos engaged in a 100 day 
war. Factions of a syndicate that was felling timber across a vaguely defined section of 
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the border between Thailand and the Lao province of Sayabouri precipitated the 
fighting. Battersby (1998-1999, p. 484) maintains that the conflict arose out of the 
expansion of Thai logging operations into areas where Thai and Lao territorial 
sovereignties were blurred.   
 
After the conflict over the Sayabouri border was settled, Thailand and Laos began to 
seek opportunities for economic cooperation. Seizing upon new diplomatic and 
commercial opportunities, and declaring a policy for transforming the battlefields into a 
maketplace, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhawan visited Laos in November 1988 and 
signed an agreement with Lao Prime Minister, Kaysone Phomvihane. The plan was to 
build the first Friendship Bridge across the Mekong River connecting Nong Khai 
Province, Thailand, and Vientiane, Laos’ capital city. One month later, Thailand and 
Laos agreed to form a joint border committee. Under the auspices of the Thai and Lao 
interior ministries, several provinces established frameworks for local level consultation 
over customs and immigration. 
 
In 1992, a ministerial meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched projects  
to integrate and promote the socio-economic development of the peoples of the four 
Mekong riparian countries (Laos, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam). The East-West 
Economic Corridor (EWEC), which was a project of the meeting, aimed to reduce 
poverty in the region by supporting the development of rural and border areas. The 
central component of the EWEC was the 1,450 km road connecting Da Nang in 
Vietnam on the eastern end, with Moulemein in Myanmar on the western end, cutting 
across central Lao PDR and north and northeastern Thailand. The Second Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge, which was also a project of the EWEC, has greatly accelerated the 
flow of people, capital, goods and services across the Mekong River (Warr et al., 2009).   
 
Research undertaken in the borderland areas of the GMS notes an increase in economic 
activity caused by improved transport links, and a reduction in the number of political 
and bureaucratic barriers; but, the policies for labour migration are exceptional (Latt, 
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2013; Pitch, 2008). The policies and regulations pertaining to labour migration in the 
GMS were developed in 1992 in the forms of unilateral and bilateral agreements. As a 
main receiving country for migrants in the GMS, Thailand’s migration management 
plan was approved by the cabinet in 2004 with the objectives of seting up a 
comprehensive system of migration management that would integrate the efforts of all 
relevant government agencies. Subsequently, that, the Thai government signed MoUs 
with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar to regulate how citizens of each country can 
work in the other seven points: (1) organizing a formal system for potential migrants to 
apply from their countries of origin  to come and work legally in Thailand; (2) ensuring 
that employers enforce national labour standards for both Thai and foreign workers; (3) 
intercepting people crossing national borders illegally; (4) arresting all involved in 
facilitating illegal migration; (5) repatriating illegal migrants to their countries of origin; 
(6) publicizing the organisation of the labor migration system among workers, 
employers and government ofﬁcials; and (7), following up and assessing the 
effectiveness and relevance of the system (World Bank, 2006b, p. 63).  
 
However, the signing of the MoUs and the discourse on open national borders for 
regional cooperation and prosperity in the GMS, were usually considered by 
International Development Organisations as problematic because they came with new 
forms of regulations and restriction (Gainsborough, 2009; Latt, 2013; Walker, 1999). 
While the international agreements in fact facilitated the travel of professional people 
and tourists, they excluded the mobility of unskilled migrants, otherwise known as the 
mobility of the marginal (High, 2008). Such mobility, in effect, resembled more of a 
migration circuit than a notion of flexibility (Ong, 1999). In Thailand, labour migrants 
were required to register themselves: the cost for each migrant was a minimum of 2,500 
baht. Latt (2012, p. 165) argues that migrant registrations helped guarantee minimum 
wages and rights to protection; but there were still many difficulties for migrants to 
legalise their status. Financially, they needed to register with the government for a 
temporary stay; the fee which was 3,800 baht, was very high for the average migrant 
worker whose monthly income was around 2,000–3,000 baht for farm workers, and 
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4,000–6,000 baht for domestic and construction workers. After spending most of their 
incomes on living expenses, the fees become a challenge, especially if a migrant had 
dependents, e.g., elderly parents or a pregnant wife. In addition, migrants became tied to 
their employers and had to pay 1,000 baht fee any time if they wanted to change their 
jobs and places of work. Face with these difficulties, only half of the migrants registered 
under the system. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (2011)  reported that in 
2011, there were 1,950,650 registered immigrants workers in Thailand. These included 
905,573 from Myanmar, 106,970 from Lao PDR, and 235,521 from Cambodia. 
However, these numbers did not include illegal migrants who had crossed the border 
illegally or entered the country legally to work but had overstayed because it was 
extremely difficult to acquire this data, particularly about about Lao migrants. Even 
though the Lao constituted the smallest group of migrants in Thailand, it was very 
difficult to distinguish a Lao migrant from a Northeastern Thai because their language, 
appearance and cultural practices were very similar. Consequently, the real number of 
Lao immigrants was likely higher than the number reported by the Thai government. 
 
Second, transnationalisation in the GMS exacerbated socio-economic disparities, and 
the identity differences between Thailand and Laos. The saying ‘brotherhood countries 
(or Ban Phi Muang Nong – the home of the elder brother, the land of the younger 
brother)’ was widely used to portray the historical and cultural ties between the two-
nations. It implied that in a hierarchical sense, Thailand was an elder brother and Laos a 
younger brother (Pholsena, 2006, p. 57; Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006, p. 61). This 
saying, in addition, referred to the development context of the two countries: it had 
connotations of modernity and tradition and suggested that as far Thai-Lao historical 
relations were concerned, Thailand was powerful and a more sophisticated society 
compared to Laos. At present, Thai people view Laos’ society and culture as 
comparable to Thailand’s before modernisation and globalisation (Reynolds, 1998).  
 
According to an ADB report, all of the GMS member countries have experienced 
progressive economic development. In 2005, all of the countries achieved impressive 
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growth, with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam registering the highest recorded growth 
since the start of the decade (Asian Development Bank, 2006).  In 2011, Laos has seen a 
reduction in its poverty rates from 46 per cent in 1993 to 26 per cent in 2008 (Mekong 
Migration Network (MMN) and Asian Migrant Centre (AMC), 2013) . The per capita 
income is on the rise. In 1992, Laos’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was only 
$US 278. In 2011, the range was $US 1,204. In addition, its poverty incidence decreased 
dramatically from 56 per cent in 1998 to 34 per cent in 2011 (Asian Development Bank, 
2012, pp. 1-2) . However, many challenges and economic and income disparities 
persisted. Mekong Migration Network (MMN) and Asian Migrant Centre (AMC) (2013, 
p. 52) revealed that even though the service sector accounted for 42 per cent of the 
economy in 2011, the largest portion of any sector, Lao PDR’s poorest 20 per cent relied 
almost entirely on agriculture as their means of income.     
Compared to Laos, Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) is 
four times higher.  In 2011, only 11.52 per cent of Thailand’s inhabitants were surviving 
on less than $US 2 per day (World Bank, 2011b). While in Lao PDR, the most updated 
population figure in 2008 showed that those living below international poverty line of 
$US 2 per day was 66 per cent. But, income inequality in Thailand is also problematic. 
Geographically speaking, Bangkok comprises the most prosperous part of Thailand, 
whereas northeast Thailand has the lowest income distribution although economic 
growth of northeast region has been widespread.  Thailand, although classified as an 
upper middle-income country, is now confronting the labor challenge of the upper 
middle-income trap: eroding labour productivity, chronic labour shortages, a dwindling 
labour force, and a declining fertility rate (Vasuprasat, 2010, p. iii).  The country 
therefore welcomes migrants in order to help meet its labour challenges.   
Tranationalisation in the GMS links the less diverse economy of Laos to the more 
diverse economy of Thailand and, in the process spurs migration. While the Thai 
economy requires cheap labour in various sectors, Lao PDR offers an inadequate 
amount of job opportunities other than subsistence farming. Rice-based agriculture, the 
dominant agricultural system, accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the country’s 
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total cultivated areas (USDA, 2011).  However, Laos’ engagement with migration is not 
only economic driven: cultural forces relative to consumerism and materialism are 
influencing the migrants (High, 2008; Inthasone, 2007; Rigg, 2007). Influenced by Thai 
media (television, radio, newspapers and magazines), Lao people yield to the strong 
appeal of Thai cultural products and modernity (Pholsena, 2006, p. 58). The contrast 
between Laos and Thailand has become more visible through television. As Mills 
(1999)  demonstrates in her research into the migration of northeastern Thai females, the 
factor underpining the motivations of young women to migrate was not only economic 
necessity: the desire to participate in modern life in the city was also a main driving. The 
northeastern females’ perception of Bangkok, modelled upon television depictions, 
instructed them vis-à-vis what is modern and what is beautiful. The way to create a new 
identity as a modern female was to migrate to Bangkok. These kinds of aspirations to a 
modern life have shaped individual migration decision-making processes in Laos: 
migration has been rendered relatively easy by connected transportation and 
transnationalisation between Thailand and Laos.  
Studies of migration in Laos demonstrate the advantages that Lao migrants enjoy 
compared to Burmese and Cambodian migrants. The cultural and language similarities 
between Thailand and Laos provide additional convenience and comfort to migrant 
workers. They help them adjust living in Thailand and make working with Thai people 
easier. However, such commonalities are not sufficient to eliminate their migrant status. 
Economic migrants in Thailand earn more money than they would in Laos; but, they 
have to contend with poor living conditions. And, if they have entered Thailand 
illegally, they have to negotiate with the police by paying money to protect them from 
being deported to Laos. In sum, issues of inequality and vulnerability are a large part of 
transnationalisation. As Rigg and Wittayapak (2009) explained, the regions and areas 
connected to the mainstream economy are likely to narrow inequality at some scales, 
while widening inequality at others.  
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4.4 Conclusions  
This chapter has provided an historical background of Northeast Thailand and Laos in 
each period, from the same political entities to the establishment of national boundaries 
in the 19th century, and the trajectories of development of Northeast Thailand and Laos 
from the 1960s onwards. The chapter delineates (a) how nationalism has been 
constructed; and, (b) how it has fostered differentiation between northeastern people and 
the Lao people. While industrialisation and economic growth led by the manufacturing 
and services sectors started to emerge in Thailand in the mid-1970s, around the same 
time, Lao became a socialist country isolated from the global communities. Even though 
Northeast Thailand has remained the poorest region, the living conditions of the Isan 
people have significantly improved through from off-farm opportunities and migration 
(Grandstaff et al., 2008). 
Apart from providing historical perspectives of Northeast Thailand and Laos, the 
chapter explores the relationship between the two countries in an era of 
transnationalisation led by the Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme in the 1990s. 
Many international organisations have reported successful of economic development in 
all of the GMS countries. This chapter, however, highlights the economic disparities and 
modernisation aspiration that spur migration from neighbouring countries to Thailand. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss how the porous Thai-Lao border has shaped 
migration and how can a porous border constitute state-village relations. 
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Chapter 5 
Compromised Margins: state regulations, local checkpoints, and everyday life at 
the northeastern Thai-Lao borders 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two, I demonstrated the links between the borderlands, state policies and 
human mobility. Borderlands are sites where a range of unique forms of state practices 
and everyday life have merged. In this chapter, I will problematise the tensions between 
state regulations and cross-border employment that occur in Northeastern Thai-Lao 
borderlands in the cultivating season, and several practices peculiar to agricultural 
livelihoods.  How did this illegal cross-border employment evolve? What were the 
views of the local villagers and the local state authorities? And, how can state-village 
relations in the context of borderland be explained?  
 
According to Abraham and Van Schendel (2005, p. 4), there is a distinction between 
what the state considers to be legitimate (legal) and what the local people consider 
legitimate (licit). Quoting the practices of the cross-border traders and the armpit 
smugglers as examples, they argue that the difference between illegal and licit is based 
on both scale and objectives. While transnational crime occurs on a large scale and for 
particular purposes, micro-practices are not driven by the logic of organisational and 
unified purposes. I will explore the concept of licitness to explain how some illegal 
practices in the borderland are acceptable, and what are the conditions that support the 
making of licitness? In this case, it was not merely the fact that borderlanders  
considered their cross-border employment to be legitimate: the local state authorities 
also turned a blind eye and opted not to confront the local people. The local state 
authorities claimed that they needed the cooperation of the local borderland residents to 
conduct surveillance of the border. Although hiring Lao seasonal migrants was illegal, it 
was not considered a criminal practice.  
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The reaction of the local state authorities gave rise to another question on state-village 
relations in the borderland. Walker (1999) notes the overemphasis of the centre-
periphery paradigm of borderland studies. According to this paradigm, the periphery are 
viewed as passive, and relationships between border communities and the centre were 
analysed within the rhetoric of domination. Walker’s study also provides a critical 
discussion of borderland studies that generally emphasise the conflict between 
borderland residents and state officials. After conducting case studies of boat and truck 
operators, female traders in long-distance trading, and timber exporters in the 
borderlands, he concludes that the borderland residents in fact actively participate in and 
collaborate with the regulation of borders. Drawing on Walker’s study, I question my 
research on the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands and the dispersed practices of the 
state as well as people’s practices and their negotiations with the state. 
 
In this chapter, the focus is on the livelihoods of the borderland residents in Ban 
Fangthai (northeastern Thailand) and Ban Kaemkong (Lao PDR). Drawing on my 
ethnographic fieldwork, I will illustrate how some illegal practices were carried on and 
viewed as licit traditions. I address elements of state-village relations, and show how 
local state officials and villagers were involved in the scope of compromise relations 
based on the following two dimensions: 1) state officials and villagers shared mutual 
interest in cross-border practices; and, 2) the embeddedness of the state in society. Using 
the concept state-in-society (Migdal, 2001), I will show how the state and the people 
became allies; that is, the state was assimilated into society. Many of the state officials 
in the borderlands are local people who negotiate between their own interests as local 
boderlanders and their official roles of protecting the state’s interests. These negotiations 
make the borderlands, as the state’s margins, areas of compromise. In addition, they 
substantiate the non-unitary form of the state’s power.  
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5.2 Everyday lives at the Northeast Thailand and Lao borders in the past: Ban 
Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong  
My interest in undertaking research in Ban Fangthai endued from a conversation I had 
with a high ranking government official who works for Security Affairs of Mukdahan 
Province. During an interview about general security issues in the Thai-Lao border 
areas, he told me about the everyday lives of the farmers living along the Mekong River. 
He said, the farmers employed illegal wage-labourers from Laos due to the out-
migration of local people to the urban sectors that had resulted in domestic labour 
shortages. When I asked him about illegal employment and security concerned, he said: 
 
The Mukdahan Governor understands that the farmers need labourers to work in their paddy field 
in cultivating season. We agreed to establish a checkpoint in the village based on Thai-Lao 
historical and cultural ties. We control the movement of the Lao people by limiting the time of 
arrival and leaving, and prohibit them to stay overnight in Thai border areas. The checkpoint is 
operated locally by the village committees and is closely patrolled by the District and Provincial 
Governor. By this way, we can assure that the rules are followed and we can keep security along 
the border.
18
 
 
Eager to see what the local checkpoint and the village looked like, I first entered Ban 
Fangthai village for my preliminary fieldwork on 5 June 2010. Two staff members from 
the Security Affairs Section drove me to the village and introduced me to the village 
head and village committee members. They showed me the local checkpoint located in 
the middle of the village nearby the Mekong River.  A cursory inspection of the 
checkpoint revealed that it was just a small hut bearing many signs informing the public 
that this was a place for mooring boats and a regular checkpoint where fishermen could 
anchor their boats. I saw many fishing boats anchored in the river; some could be seen 
mid-stream, but it was difficult to identify whether they were Thai or Lao boats. The 
Mekong River was not very wide; so the village opposite the river bank was clearly 
discernible. It was the Lao Mekong River village named Ban Kaemkong and came 
                                                 
18
 Interview, the high ranking staff member of the Security Affairs Section, Mukdahan Province, 18 May 
2010. 
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under the administration of Saibuly District, Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR. The 
environment around me looked so peaceful. There was no-one at the checkpoint. It was 
not as I had imagined a border village would be strictly controlled by state officials. 
 
In the next section, I will describe the everyday lives of the peoples in Ban Fangthai and 
Ban Kaemkong. Approaching the subject of the borderlands through the interplay 
between state regulations and local cross-border practices, I will refer to  Walker (1999) 
who structured Thai-Lao borderland history as a ‘three-phase version’ – from open to 
close and then open again. I will demonstrate the villages’ histories in the following 
different periods; the free movement in the early period of modern national borders, the 
restricted borders during the Cold War, and the globalisation period. 
5.2.1 The early connection 
  
My father was a boat driver owning a big long-tail boat that was able to contain 20 people/trip or 
more. When I was seven years old, my parents took me on the boat with many kinds of product 
from the village such as vegetables and non-timber products travelling to Savannakhet City with 
many villagers to sell to the Laos and many foreigners living there. We left the village early in 
the morning. It took only two hours to travel downstream. I remembered that they were very rich 
and had plenty of money.  My father organised this type of trip 2-3 time/week. At that time, 
Mukdahan city and the Thai districts along the Mekong River were relatively rural areas 
comparing to Savanakhet City where there were many beautiful buildings and many rich people 
who had purchasing power living there.
19
    
  
Mrs Nang, my oldest key informant in Ban Fangthai, was 74 year-old. The daughter of 
the area’s richest landlord, who used to own a big long-tail boat that commuted between 
Ban Fangthai, Mukdahan City and Savannakhet City, she revealed incidents in her 
childhood from memory. Her stories told of the free movement of people, and their 
freedom to engage in small-scale cross-border trade. Mrs Nang’s memories conjured up 
of a glorious Savannakhet City under French colonial administration. Compared to Ban 
Fangthai 70 years ago, Savannakhet under French administration was rich and had 
                                                 
19
 Interview, Mrs Nang, 25 November 2010  
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considerable purchasing power. Ban Fangthai, on the other hand, was a small village 
under Mukdahan district control.
20
  It was considered a real margin of Thailand based on 
its location and economic opportunities.  
 
Village profiles published by the District Governor demonstrated the relation between 
Ban Fangthai and other villages along the Thai border and the border villages of Lao 
PDR. Documentation revealed that the people of Ban Fangthai originally either moved 
from Ban Naam in Nakhon Phanom Province or from the current Savannakhet Province 
of Lao PDR.21 When I interviewed many senior people in the Thai and Lao border 
villages, i.e., Ban Fangthai, Ban Wan, Ban Naam, Ban Kham, Ban Saitong, Ban 
Kaemkong  and Ban Naam Aoy (see the map below), they all referred to their original 
village of Ban Naam, and to the re-settlement of their ancestral generation in the current 
villages due to agricultural expansion and disease. In the very old villages, e.g., Ban 
Kham, Ban Saitong and Ban Naam, all of the original villagers had the same last 
name.
22
 The historical ties between the Thai-Lao people living along the Mekong River 
were evident in their old temples and religious ceremonies. Phra That Phanom temple 
and its holy pagoda (chedi) which was built in the sixteenth century by the Lao King 
Setthathirath of Lanxang are located 15 km from Ban Fangthai. To honour the temple, 
thousands of people make pilgrimages during the festival held every February. 
According to Jaithaing (2002, pp. 114-115), Phra That Phanom is the spiritual symbol of 
the Thai-Lao people. In the older days, people living in the remote areas walked up to a 
week or a month just to have a chance to pay their respects to the holy chedi. Located 5 
km in the southern direction of Ban Fangthai is Wat Prasri Maha Bodhi that was built in 
the seventeenth century by a prince who ruled Kantabuly District in Laos, along with a 
number of people, he migrated to this area and established a new village.   
                                                 
20
 Previously, Mukdahan was a district under Nakhon Phanom Province. The district became a province in 
1982. 
21
 The history of Thai-Lao people can be traced back to the 6th century B.C. when areas of the Northeast 
Thailand and Laos were known as Si Khottaboon Kingdom. Most of the Isan people are of Lao descent. 
They migrated to Isan from areas that are now part of Laos between the mid-fourteenth and the late 
eighteenth centuries. See the history of Northeast Thailand and Lao in Chapter two. 
22
 Interview, Head of Sub-district, 10 July 2010. 
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Unlike the surrounding villages, Ban Fangthai is a Roman Catholic village. Oral history 
provided by the village committee members in Ban Fangthai
23
 and village document 
published by a local temple in Ban Fangthai in 2009
24
 stated that the ancestral 
generation migrated from Ban Naam in 1905, the period marking the abolition of 
slavery in Siam. Approximately fifteen families were accused of being devil spirits 
taking human forms and were forced to move away. Together, these families established 
a new village named “Ban Fangthai”. Upon their arrival, villagers were informed that 
the Catholic priest in Chiang Kwang District in Laos could exorcise the devil spirits; so, 
they invited the priest to visit the village. The priest successfully helped the villagers 
who in reality were suffering from cholera. From then on, the villagers in Ban Fangthai 
adopted Christianity. However, their adherence to a different religion did not give any 
impact on cross communal and cross river ritual ceremonies. The Roman Catholic 
peoples of Ban Fangthai regularly participated in the Buddhist ceremonies held in both 
Buddhist villages in Thailand and Laos: the Buddhist villagers acted reciprocally. While 
I was staying in the village, I attended many social and religious ceremonies including 
weddings, funerals, the Christmas service at the church in Ban Fangthai and the 
Buddhist robes presentation ceremony (Thot Kathin). I met participants from many 
villages in the Sub-district and in the Lao borderlands. Connections and networks of 
local people have been maintained across village administration, and also across the 
national boundaries.  
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 Interview, village committees of Ban Fangthai, 8 July 2010. 
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 ‘125 years Ban Fangthai’, pamphlet published by the Church of Ban Fangthai 
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Figure 5.1 Thai-Lao Villages along the Mekong River near the Research Sites 
 
*This map is only for illustrative purposes and does not represent the actual location of the villages. 
 
Information about the history of the establishment of the Mukdahan Immigration 
Office25 shows that prior to 1927, Thai-Lao people were able to cross the Mekong River 
without documents. In 1935, the Thai government established a checkpoint in Nakhon 
Phanom Province based on a Thailand and France agreement signed in 1927 on the 
passage of the Mekong River. Mukdahan, which at that time was a district under 
Nakhon Phanom Province, was dependent on the same agreement but the small villages 
along the Thai borders in Mukdahan district were considerably marginalised from 
economic opportunities and the state centre. Mrs Nang stated: 
 
It took one day on a boat trip to Savannakhet city or took two days walk. The area on 
the opposite side of the riverbank that is currently Ban Kaemkong was only a small 
village. Only a few families moved from Thai side and established homes near the river. 
                                                 
25
Information inscribed on the board in front of the Mukdahan Immigration Office 
THAILAND LAOS 
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My father had a friend who moved there so I regularly followed him to visit his friend 
and attended tradition ceremonies such as funerals and other religious ceremonies.
26
 
 
Mrs Nang stated that her father’s boat ride service ended when the Thai government 
built the road to the village, at approximately the time she had her first son in her early 
20’s between 1965 and 1970.  
 
This section has exemplified the movement between the two Mekong River banks. 
These activities are not only motivated by local cross-border trade, but are also built 
upon the historical and cultural ties. In the next section, I will outline Ban Fangthai’s 
relationship with villages in Laos in the restricted period due to the civil war in Laos and 
the communist insurgency in Northeast Thailand. 
 
5.2.2 The restricted border (1940-1988) 
Political instabilities and a series of wars between 1940 and1988, interrupted the cross-
border activities in Ban Fangthai. In 1940, Field Marshal Pibunsongkhram,
27
the Thai 
Prime Minister who promoted the country’s nationalism undertook “the campaign for a 
return of the lost territories” (Ivarsson, 2008, p. 60). He pressed the French colony in 
Indochina to return the territories that Thailand lost when the French drew the borders of 
Siam with Laos and Cambodia, forcing a series of treaties between 1893 and 1904. The 
Franco-Thai dispute led to the expulsion of foreign missionaries and pressured Roman 
Catholics to abandon their faith in Christ. This oppressive regime extended to the 
Catholic Church in Ban Fangthai. Seven Songkhon villagers sacrificed their lives 
proclaiming their belief in God: they were ultimately shot by the Thai police in the 
village graveyard in 1940.   
 
                                                 
26
 Interview, Mrs Nang, 25 November 2010  
27
 Prime Minister and virtual military dictator of Thailand from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to 1957.  
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After the cessation of World War II in 1945, the onset of the Cold War and the 
establishment of a communist regime in North Vietnam and Communist insurgencies in 
Thailand’s neighbouring countries spread the fear of communist rule over Southeast 
Asian countries. Thailand, allying with the United States, entered into the war against 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)’s insurgency in the North, Northeast and some 
parts of the South. The United States turned Thailand into an important operational base 
for the wars in Indochina. At the time, many villages in the Mukdahan District 
functioned as bases for the CPT, in particular the hinterland villages that were 
surrounded by forest and were difficult to reach. When the Communist Pathet Lao took 
control of Laos in 1975, it was believed that the victory of the Communist Party in Laos 
would destabilise the Northeast and open Thailand to direct attack by the communist 
forces (Thomas, 1986). In response, the Thai government imposed very strict regulation 
along the Mekong River border and officially closed Thai-Lao borders. As well, the 
restrictions were imposed on commercial exchange in the major towns and on inter-
provincial trade and travel.  
 
During this period, the Thai-Lao border remained open to residents who were willing to 
take risk from possible violence along the border. A group of rural traders in Ban 
Fangthai continued their trading activities. Walker (1999, p. 58-59) points out that the 
Thai-Lao borders were supposed to be closed but many areas remained dynamic with 
cross-border trade and investment. He also notes that strict state regulation of trade 
created opportunities for women enabling them to build on the commercial and social 
experience they gained during the war years (Walker, 1999, p. 153-155). Women in Ban 
Fangthai worked as cross-border traders between Ban Fangthai and Savannakhet 
Province, selling vegetables and non-timber products and made a profit from smuggling 
goods and cattle across the Mekong River through their networks in Ban Kaemkong. 
One of the traders, Mrs Daeng, a 56 year-old villager of Ban Fangthai said: 
 
I knew many traders in Ban Kaemkong and also made friends with Lao soldiers. I had a group of 
friends to paddle the boat containing cigarettes, rice and dried  food across the river in the night 
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time. For the cattle, we could take only a small number, perhaps one to two cow or buffalo. My 
boat was once shot at by a Lao soldier on the way back from Laos. The garlic in the boat was 
sunk so I made a loss from that trip. However, I did not give up and went on with my business 
since the return from smuggling was good. I was very tempted to take a risk.
28
  
 
In 1979, the Lao government established Ban Kaemkong, a new village opposite to Ban 
Fangthai, as the centre of administration of Sibulay District. One of the earliest settlers, 
Mrs Pheng, an 84 year- old lady and the oldest person living in Ban Kaemkong during 
the period of my fieldwork, said that in the old days, Ban Kaemkong used to be a 
location where many Thai fishermen built temporary shelters for fishing activities. 
Later, approximately sixteen families moved permanently into the area, including Mrs 
Pheng’s family that moved from Ban Naam in Nakhon Phanom Province. After the 
settlement, her family still regularly returned to visit relatives in Ban Naam. Mrs Pheng 
said that food, medicine and assistance exchanges across the river were common 
practices, including travelling across the river to help her relatives working in Thai 
paddy fields. The landscape of Ban Kaemkong - its rocks and hills, limited the amount 
of land available for paddy fields. For this reason, the villagers engaged in fisheries 
rather than in rice production. Cross border marriages and the formation of families 
across the river were common practices among the Thai-Lao peoples and had never 
been problematic in the past.  
 
Many new settlers in Ban Kaemkong were also families of government officials from 
various parts of Laos, who moved to the area to work as government officials, e.g., local 
public heath staff, soldiers, police, and local governors. The numbers of villagers 
continued to increase consistently; in time, Ban Kaemkong  became the centre of 
administration with  strict control of cross-border movement.   
 
In 1980, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda
29
 introduced a government order, 
"66/2523", encouraging CPT cadres to defect. He granted amnesty for former cadres, his 
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 Interview, Mrs Daeng, 20 November 2010.  
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 The Prime Minister of Thailand from 1980 to 1988. 
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action leading to the decline of the CPT in Thailand. Responding to the Lao-Thai 
relationship that was gradually developing, Mukdahan Provincial Government allowed 
the Lao people to cross the border for healthcare. This sharp change in attitude was 
concomitant with the Lao’s adoption of the slogan of Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking), 
which signaled the country’s comprehensive reform and embracing of a market-oriented 
economy. In the 1990s, the ThaiPrime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan
30
 announced a 
policy to convert the Indo-China battlefields to market places. This resulted in the 
official re-opening of the Thai-Lao border and the re-establishment of formal 
relationship between Thailand and Laos. 
5.2.3 Re-connection through the market space (1990s-present) 
At the end of Cold War in the 1990s, cross-border activities between Ban Fangthai and 
Ban Kaemkong flourished due to the increasingly peaceful Thai-Lao political relations. 
Cross-border trade, border weekly market and religious ceremonies were important 
factors re-uniting the people living along the Mekong River.  
 
As Roman Catholics, the people of Ban Fangthai were obliged to attend Mass every 
Sunday from 7.00 a.m. to 8.00 a.m. All of the villagers gathered at the church, which 
was located in the middle of the village near the Mekong River. This had long been a 
traditional practice of villagers in Ban Fangthai. After attending Mass, villagers 
regularly went to shop at the few grocery stores adjacent to the church. Local traders in 
Ban Fangthai and nearby villages also brought their goods to sell in the public space 
near the church, which in time became the site for the Sunday weekly market. In the late 
1980s, the Lao people living on the opposite side of the river were allowed to cross over 
to shop at the Ban Fangthai weekly market. The security regulations at the time were 
operated by the border patrol police. The official cross-border regulations were operated 
in the village level.  
 
                                                 
30
 The Prime Minister of Thailand from 1988 to 1991. 
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In 1995, the new, large church that was built near the Mekong River became a sacred 
place for Ban Fangthai’s Catholics. The rising numbers of people attending Mass 
resulted in the expansion of the Sunday Market, and the addition of a weekly market on 
Tuesday afternoons. The market was formalised when the church, supported by the 
Tambon Administration Organisation (TAO), utilised the courtyard adjacent to the 
church and charged a rental fee of ten baht per day. There were significantly increasing 
numbers of vendors and customers came from the city and nearby areas with a greater 
variety of products, including various kinds of fresh foods, consumer products, clothing, 
and miscellaneous goods. Generally, the market looked the same as other Thai markets. 
But, the difference was in its diversity of products, vendors and activities. Many Lao 
traders could be seen sitting on the ground, selling various kinds of non-timber products 
including honey, mushrooms and bamboo shoots. 
5.3 The contemporary cross-border regulations  
The end of Cold War in the 1990s and the era of globalisation were triumphs of market 
expansion and capitalism. Some scholar argues that the nation states have lost their 
power completely (Ohmae, 1990). The fact that the world is globalised means the end of 
the nation states especially through what is termed the “Borderless World” (Ohmae, 
1990, p.172). State borders that were commonly thought to be closed and subject to 
considerable restriction during the Cold War period are now viewed as open due to the 
flows of trade, people and technology across national boundaries. However, these 
intensive cross-border flows have given rise to many forms of transnational crime, for 
example, drug trafficking and human smuggling, both of which have benefited from 
globalisation. Over time, they have become common security challenges for states 
around the world (Mittelman, 2000). 
 
Activities in Ban Fangthai involved not only economic but also social activities. Many 
of which were informal or illegal. The weekly market was a place for people living 
along the Mekong River to trade, shop, meet, chat and update their social lives. Since 
the number of Lao people who had migrated to work in Bangkok and its vicinities had 
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increased dramatically over the previous decade, Ban Fangthai Market was a place 
where Lao people could access remittances from family members working in Thailand. 
A form of kinship connection underpinned the Lao migrant workers’ transferring 
remittances through the Ban Fangthai villagers’ bank accounts; usually, they asked their 
families in Laos to cross the river to collect the money on Sundays. Furthermore, the 
weekly market was an original space for cross-labour employment. Often when they met 
each other in the weekly market, local Thai vendors would ask their Lao customers if 
they were looking for work or knew someone who would like to take a wage labour job. 
In this way, the Thai-Lao villagers’ good connections were utilised to legitimate 
informal cross-river employment during the cultivating season.  
 
Further important components of cross-border movement were illegal practices 
including immigration, drug smuggling and human trafficking. According to the Office 
of Narcotics Control Board (2012), incidences of drug smuggling and methamphetamine 
epidemics in Thailand escalated  in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, the number of drug 
cases rose sharply to over 200,000 cases per year (Office of Narcotics Control Board, 
2012).  Northern and Northeastern Thailand were the major regions in which drug 
trafficking was occurred, in particular, the border provinces of Thailand, i.e., Chiang 
Mai, Chiang Rai and Mehongson in the North and Leoi, Udon Thanee, Nong Khai, 
Nakhon Phanom, Mukdahan, Amnajchareon and Ubonratchatanee in the Northeast. All 
were well-known as sites of drug trade. 
 
Faced with increasing use of drugs and a rising incidence of addiction, in 2003, the Thai 
government launched its War on Drugs policy with new mechanisms for improving 
cross-border surveillance and tightened enforcement measures along the border zones. 
High ranking Mukdahan Provincial Governors, who were in charge of border security, 
provided an overview of border control in Mukdahan. The province had an international 
checkpoint at the Friendship Bridge, a temporary checkpoint in Don Tan District, and 
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another six local checkpoints in villages spread along the Mekong River Bank including 
the local checkpoint in Ban Fangthai.31 
 
Although Ban Fangthai was the hub of cross-border activities in Wan Yai District, the 
scale of cross-border trade was too small to establish a temporary checkpoint that would 
require additional government budget and resources to manage. So, the village became   
a local checkpoint, officially called a ‘traditional checkpoint [Dan Prapenee]’.32 The 
head of Sub-district, who was involved in the establishment of the checkpoint at Ban 
Fangthai stated that he was called to attend a meeting with the Provincial Governors of 
the Northeast borderlands, several District Governors, all of the heads of Sub-districts 
along the borders, and representatives of the Thai Royal Navy. This meeting launched    
a new strategy for border control. Included in the strategy were requirements to restrict 
the boat mooring area, and to record and report on the movement of Lao people entering 
Thailand. Local police volunteers and the border patrol police were required to monitor 
all cross-border movements and to record the names of all Lao people who crossed the 
border on Sundays and Tuesdays. The village committee agreed to charge all of the Lao 
people who entered Ban Fangthai a five baht fee. The fee was recorded and used to 
support community activities and to purchase coffee, drinks and miscellaneous items for 
village committee members, who conducted voluntary surveillance at the border during 
the night shift. All cross-border activities and border security issues had to be reported 
to the Wan Yai District Governors and the Mukdahan Provincial Governors. The border 
control policy, and regulations introduced by government authorities were printed and 
attached to a big steel board near the river bank. The main objectives of the regulations 
were: to limit the number of those eligible to use the checkpoint to borderland residents 
living in the Thai-Lao borders; to limit the time for crossing the border  between 06.00 
a.m. and 18.00 p.m.; to zoning the boat mooring areas, and to ensure that no border 
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 Interview, two staff of Mukdahan Provincial Governor who were in charge of provincial security, 18 
June 2010 
32
 According to the Ministry of Interior, a traditional checkpoint is a checkpoint established based on the 
long relationships and spatial history of local borderland residents who might be relatives. It involved 
maintaining cross-border practices over a long period of time until the practice became traditional. The 
traditional checkpoint only operated for social and religious ceremonies on occasion.    
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activities violated Thai laws. However, no conditions related to cross-border 
employment appeared on the sign; so, the villagers gained the impression that 
employing Lao workers during the peak cultivating season was legitimate. But the Thai 
farmers, in fact had to report their employment of workers to the village head and 
undertake to return their workers to Laos daily before 06.00 p.m. Lao workers were not 
permitted to stay overnight in Thai border areas except in cases of emergency as 
determined by the village head.  
 
  
Figure 5.2: The checkpoint in Ban Fangthai - Village committee members noting the Lao people’s 
names and charging five baht fee when they entered the checkpoint at Ban Fangthai en route the weekly 
market on Sunday mornings. Many Lao people also took this route to their wage-labour jobs in Thai 
paddy fields. 
 
Parallel to the establishment of a checkpoint in Ban Fangthai, the local checkpoint in 
Laos was established. Village committee members in Laos were required to record the 
names of all of the Lao people who crossed the river to shop at the weekly market or to 
work in the Thai border areas. Having heard about the five baht fee charged for crossing 
into Thai territory, the Lao local authorities in the borderlands decided to charge those 
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who used the local checkpoint in Ban Kaemkong to cross to the weekly markets in 
Thailand. This fee was utilised by Lao officers, including the border patrol police, 
village committee member and soldiers, who conducted voluntary surveillance at the 
border. 
 
The village head of Ban Kaemkong confirmed that the Lao government authorities had 
acknowledged the rule of cross-border employment that only permitted daily movement 
across the border. Workers were not permitted to stay overnight. When asked why Lao 
people had to pay a fee to leave their country, the village head replied: 
 
This money will be distributed among border patrol police, village committees, and border 
soldiers. We work to protect people’s security so when they go to work in Thailand and earn 
money, this is a cost that they have to share with the officials.
33
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The checkpoint in Ban Kaemkong - The Lao people reporting themselves to the border 
patrol police in Ban Kaemkong and paying 5,000 Kip fee (20 baht) to cross the Mekong River to work in 
the paddy fields in the Thai borderlands. 
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 Interview, Mr Anurak, 16 July 2010.  
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5.4 The making of licit cross-border employment 
In his article ‘Presidental Address: Maps in the mind and the Mobility of Asia’, Ludden 
claims that: 
 
Modernity consigned human mobility to the dusty dark corners of archives that document the 
hegemonic space of national territorialism. As a result, we imagine that mobility is border 
crossing, as though borders came ﬁrst, and mobility, second (Ludden, 2003, p. 1062).  
 
But, Abraham and Van Schendel (2005) argue, human mobility is typically categorised 
in relation to fixed state boundaries. The state regularly performs as a screening agent 
that controls what can legally flow and what cannot. Based on this assumption, cross-
border practices are built on Thai-Lao historical ties, including the employment of Lao 
workers for agricultural purposes, would be considered illegal. In this section, which 
deals with the interface of legality and illegality, I examine how cross-border activities 
are maintained and negotiated to become socially acceptable. I will present the views of  
local people and state officers vis-a-vis transnational movement, and look at how the 
state laws and regulations governing the borderland have been re-negotiated by state 
officials and the local people.   
5.4.1 Transnational movement: the views from local people 
As well as travelling for trading, social and cultural purposes, people living in the Lao 
border region also travelled to villages on the Thai bank to work in the paddy fields. 
Initially, the Lao people came to help their relatives and friends in Thailand and for rice 
distribution in the cultivating season. Here I will provide an example from Ban Phong 
Kham, a nearby village adjacent to Ban Fangthai. During my fieldwork, several 
villagers in Ban Fangthai suggested that I should go to see the well-known family of 
Mrs Jit, a 40 year-old sub-district health officer living in a village near Ban Fangthai, 
who owned a big house facing the Mekong River. My first visit fortunately coincided 
with the family relatives gathering for their house merit; so, I met many elderly people 
living in Ban Kham and nearby villages. In addition, I met ten Lao people from Ban 
Nam Aoy and Ban Savang, who had brought sticky rice to join the ceremony. Mrs Lek, 
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Mrs Jit’s eldest sister gave a brief description of relationships between her family and 
the Lao people as follows: 
 
My family has known people living in Ban Savang and Ban Nam Aoy since the parental 
generation. My great grandfather moved from Ban Nam Aoy to settle down here. We have 
maintained relationship with our relatives in Laos through social ceremonies including weddings, 
funerals and religious ceremonies. Some years, when they lacked food, they came to my house 
and ask for rice. When the next cultivating season came, they returned to help working in the 
paddy fields. At present, I have to pay money to hire the Lao people, not my relatives but 
anybody from the Lao villages. In my family, it was only me who took care of the agricultural 
land. One of my younger sisters is 48 years old but she has been sick and regularly needed to see 
the doctor while Jit is the youngest, but she has high education and works for the government. I 
have a son who works in the city. I am too old to work alone and it is so difficult to get domestic 
labourers.
34
 
    
From the 1980s, labour-shortages occurred in the Thai agricultural sector due to 
industrialisation and out-migration. These shortages also became acute in Ban Fangthai.  
However, the border location and the post Thai-Lao tension period allowed Thai farmers 
to benefit from cheap labour from Laos. By coming in contact with each other at the 
Sunday and Tuesday weekly markets, the Thai farmers could offer agricultural jobs to 
the Lao, or ask them if they had friends who were available for work.  
 
During the 1990s, the number of Lao people crossing the Mekong River to Ban Fangthai 
market has continuously increased. A man who was village head between 1995 and 
2009 estimated that more than 200 Lao people came to the market on Sundays during 
the period he held the position.
35
 At the same time, the employment of Lao people in the 
paddy fields became commonplace in the villages near the Mekong River. During the 
cultivating season, Thai farmers waited for the boats carrying Lao workers from the Lao 
side to dock so that they could recruit daily workers. Farmers sometimes competed to 
get Lao workers during the peak season by offering higher wages. Asked how he 
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 Interview, Mrs Lek, 7 July 2010 
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 Interview, Mr Sanguan, 30 June 2010. 
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confirmed that all of the Lao workers returned to the Lao side after finishing their work, 
the former village head replied: 
   
We followed the rules of the checkpoint. Everybody who stepped on Thai border had to report 
their name to me. It was the Thai farmers’ responsibility to send all of the Lao workers back. I 
confirmed that no one remained in the evening after work.
36
 
 
On the 2
nd
 of  July 2010, Mr Sanguan came to see me at the house where I was staying. 
He mentioned that a group of Lao people had arrived at the checkpoint: I was surprised 
as it was Wednesday and the checkpoint was supposed to be closed. Following Mr 
Sanguan to the checkpoint, I saw eight Lao people stepping ashore from long-tail boats. 
A few villagers from Ban Fangthai were discusssing how to divide the Lao workers; that 
is how to allocate them to each paddy field. After the Lao workers were divided into 
four groups, they followed the Thai farmers in different directions. I wrote down the 
names of Thai landowners and their home locations, and asked if I could follow them to 
the paddy fields to talk to the Lao workers. It was then that I learned that I had 
misunderstood the following points. First, regarding the practices and regulations at the 
Thai border, the checkpoint only formally operated on Tuesday afternoons and Sunday 
mornings. There was no one in charge of surveillance of the border during the peak 
cultivating season as most of villagers were working in their paddy fields. Lao workers 
travelling from the other side of the Mekong River could cross through the local 
checkpoint in Ban Fangthai anytime with the help of friends or relatives. Second, the 
Lao workers actually came from several villages located along the Mekong River and 
the hinterland of Laos, not from Ban Kaemkong. Asked where their Lao workers came 
from, many Thai farmers generally said that they were from Ban Kaemkong. Similarly, 
the Lao workers always referred to Ban Kaemkong or replied that they were from the 
opposite side of the river (Fang Lao). Third, since many of the workers came from 
remote villages in the Lao hinterland, they could not return home in one day so they 
needed to stay overnight in Ban Fangthai. What appeared contradictory was the fact that 
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 Interview, Mr Sanguan, 30 June 2010. 
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state agents, i.e., the village heads and district government officials, also employed and 
allowed their Lao workers to stay overnight illegally. These circumstances ranged from 
trifling – where no government representatives at either the local or district level, 
inspected the border during the peak cultivating season – to more significant. Many Thai 
farmers allowed their Lao seasonal workers to stay overnight either in their homes or in 
small huts in the middle of their paddy fields.  
 
I gained a clearer picture of cross-border employment in Ban Fangthai during the 
cultivating season. I returned to the village in late October 2010. Difference from my 
preliminary fieldwork, the villagers mostly remembered me and knew I was a student 
who had come for purposes of research. For this reason, they talked to me more openly. 
Many let me access their paddy fields, where I talked to their Lao workers during lunch 
times. I either had lunch with them, or went to their homes in the evening to interview 
them. Usually, they were watching Thai TV dramas. My observations and interviews 
revealed the Thai farmers’ perceptions of their cross-border employment strategies. 
Most of them knew that it was illegal; but, there could be some degrees of flexibility and 
compromise given that the extant cross-border practices in terms of travel, marriage, 
trade and employment had been observed for a long time by both sides. However, these 
went under the two conditions which are (1) the Thai landowners had to guarantee that 
state officials, i.e., the district and provincial government, and immigration officials 
could not obviously notice the number of Lao people in the village, and (2) the Thai 
landowners had to send all of their workers back to Laos after work.   
 
When I asked if any Lao migrants tried to escape to other areas after they had completed 
their work in Ban Fangthai, the majority of the Thai farmers said that it was almost 
impossible as there were three checkpoints along the way to Bangkok. However, my 
interviews with the Lao workers revealed that some who came from a village not far 
from the Lao border and who had Thai relatives managed to proceed to Bangkok. They 
paid money to the bus driver and the bus attendant to hide them from the police, either 
in the truck under the bus or by dropping them off to hide in the forest before arriving at 
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the checkpoint. The bus driver would pick them up later. Most of the Lao workers 
preferred to save money to get a passport so that they could cross the border at the 
official checkpoint on the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. They did not want to risk being 
arrested by the Thai police.  
 
Abraham and van Schendel (2005) argue that the borderlands are the grey areas of 
legality and illegality. What is considered legitimate practices or licitness are rooted in 
the borderland and often brought into play alongside state laws. These local practices are 
often invoked as a replacement for state laws if these do not comply with what is 
considered legitimate with livelihood of the borderland people. In the northeastern Thai- 
Lao borderlands, residents were subjected to state regulations; but, some opted not to 
obey certain laws that were not in their interests. The majority of Thai farmers in Ban 
Fangthai who hired Lao migrants knew that keeping their Lao workers in their houses 
was illegal; but, they did not see themselves as criminals. The village head and village 
committee members also hired Lao migrants and let them stay at their places. From their 
perspectives, hiring Lao migrants was not only a licit practice; it was also a necessary 
part of their agricultural livelihoods. In the words, one of the village committee 
members stated: 
 
Without them, who would work for me? We depend on the natural rain. When it comes, we have 
to finish rice transplanting as soon as possible. I do not have any children at home to help. There 
are only two old people in my family: my wife and I. If I could get Thai labourers, I would not 
hire the Lao one even their wage rate is cheaper. I do not want to risk of being arrested by the 
police. Although letting the Lao workers stay in the village is acceptable among villagers here, I 
have to hide them away and not to make it obvious.
37
 
 
With regards to the Lao workers, the majority of them were non-borderland residents, 
trapped in illegality in both Thailand and Laos. However, they did not see themselves as 
involved in crime since their intention was only to get paid-jobs. The lack of wage 
labour jobs in their home villages drove them to seek work elsewhere. Similar to the 
Thai farmers, the Lao workers claimed local acceptance of the long relationship and 
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brotherhood of the northeastern Thai-Lao people. The non-borderland Lao did not have 
any relatives in Thailand. They used their friends’ and neighbours’ networks to ensure 
that they would not be arrested, and would get higher paid jobs in the Thai borderland. 
None of them had experienced arrest by the Thai or Lao police when they illegally 
crossed the border to work on agricultural land. Nonetheless, serveral people reported 
having to pay bribes when they returned to Laos. Ha, a 14 year-old girl from Ban Sivily 
said: 
 
My family made a loan 5,000 baht to the broker to send me to Chonburi Province last year. I 
worked as a domestic worker in a factory and earned 500 baht/month. I had worked there only 
two months and was arrested by the Thai police. They sent me back to Laos. I am in debt and 
need to return those 5,000 baht to the broker. My friends in the village told me to come to work 
in the paddy fields in Thailand to earn money. It is safer but we have to be careful of the (Thai 
and Lao) police. Some of my friends were caught by the Thai police. A lot of them were caught 
by the Lao police. They did not take us to the jail but they usually took the wage we earned. I had 
a friend whose entire wage was taken by the Lao police when she returned to Laos after 
cultivating season.
38
    
  
The Thai villagers stated that only one landowner had been arrested by the police for 
hiring Lao workers. The first arrest occurred when a woman had a big fight with her 
neighbour. The latter reported the woman to the police saying that she let a few Lao 
workers stay in her house. The arrested landowner had to pay two hundred baht fee, and 
was ordered to send all the workers back to Laos. Then, the police let her go home.39 
Generally speaking, the villagers did not face arrest. Their practice of hiring Lao 
migrants generally known only by their neighbours and relatives. They did not talk 
about it openly as they were afraid someone might tell the police. When I first 
commenced my fieldwork in June 2010, I introduced myself and told the villagers to let 
me know when the Lao workers arrived. A few of the villagers, who recognised me and 
understood that I was a student conducting research, obliged with some information. 
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 Interview, Ms Ha, 16 November 2010.  
39
 The local police’s and the government officials’ view on this issue will be mentioned in the next 
section.  
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The majority were silent so I went to each paddy field to see for myself. The Thai 
landowners confessed that they did not trust me. As far as they were concerned, I could 
have been a spy from government office. By the time I returned to my fieldwork in late 
October 2010, the villagers had grown used to me and showed more trust. Many people 
informed me about the arrivals and the lengths of stay of the Lao migrants. And, to 
ensure their safety, several landowners asked me not to talk about their paddy fields and 
the Lao workers to anyone after our interviews.  
5.4.2 The view from the state 
Schoenbergerand and Turne (2008), Sturgeon (2007) and Walker (1999) point that the 
degree of state enforcement in the borderland was normally pragmatic, flexible and 
loose, and that the role of the state in governing the borderlands was intensified by 
border conflicts. The situation in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands followed the 
same direction. Even though both the Thai and the Lao local state officials knew about 
the illegal cross-border employment, they claimed that it was simply the people’s 
livelihoods. As long as there were no criminal problems such as drug or human 
trafficking or international conflict between the two countries, the state officials turned   
a blind eye and shared mutual benefit from local cross-border practices. 
 
At the end of cultivating season, I returned to interview the District Officials, the high 
ranking staff at the Provincial Security Affairs Section, and one of the high ranking 
Provincial Governors of Mukdahan Province, of whom had provided me with 
information about the rules and regulations at the local checkpoint before I commenced 
my fieldwork. I was reluctant to talk to them about what I had learned in the field since I 
was not sure how they would react and of possible impact on the local people. They 
questioned me how I felt seeing so many Lao migrants in the village. They expressed 
their concern regarding the many illegal practices in the borderlands, including the 
staying on of the Lao workers during the cultivating seasons. They said they had chosen 
to turn a blind eye as it was a borderland where anything could happen; and, this 
practice was not considered criminal as it posed no threaten to the country’s security. As 
the high ranking staff of the Provincial Security Affairs Section said: 
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We have to ‘turn a blind eye’ [ao huu pai naa, ao taa pai rai: lit. ‘take ears to the ricefields, take 
eyes to the swiddens’] and be flexible with the law. It is the way local borderlanders manage their 
agricultural livelihoods. Hiring Lao workers is a necessity since majority of rural young 
generation has moved to Bangkok. Not only agricultural sector, the whole service sectors of this 
province are using Lao migrants. Thailand and Laos are brotherhood countries. How can we stop 
their practices that have been maintained for hundreds of years?
40
  
 
During my 2
nd
 interview, I asked if I could see the documents on rules and regulations 
pertaining to the operation of the local checkpoint. But, all of the state officials said they 
did not have any. They added that they all knew that the law was blind to the cross-
border practices, but they allowed relatively minor offences to occur in exchange for 
local cooperation in terms of observing drug trafficking and human smuggling in the 
borderlands. The high ranking staff of the Provincial Security Affairs Section 
questioned: 
 
How could we have such document since our job is protecting the laws? If we have something 
written on paper saying that we allow the Thai farmers to hire the Lao workers through the 
traditional checkpoint, it means we support people’s illegal practice.41 
 
In the District Governor’s view, the state officials had to be flexible in many ways, 
especially regarding what was relevant to the people’s livelihoods, because they needed 
the cooperation from local people. He stated:  
 
The Thai border along the Mekong River is very porous, how could we protect the border and 
prohibit the movement across the river? To maintain border security, we need local people to 
help us with surveillance of the border. All news on drug and human trafficking comes from 
local borderlanders. Hiring the Lao workers to work in their farmland and keeping them during 
the cultivating season are not as dangerous as drug and human trafficking. If the villagers 
become un-cooperative, it would be more difficult to work and control border security. If we use 
more strict strategies such as prohibiting all cross-border movement, villagers will still attempt to 
                                                 
40
 Interview, a staff member of Provincial Security Affairs Section, 14 January 2011.  
41
 Ibid.  
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get the Lao workers and smuggle goods across the river. It could have serious consequences 
since all practices would be done behind our backs.
42
  
 
Equally important are the perceptions and reactions of the Lao state officials. According 
to Huijsmans (2010, p. 106), cross-border migration to Thailand was not in any sense 
addressed by the Lao government because Lao PDR for long had policies either aimed 
at keeping people in place, or moving people to a particular place (resettlement). Over 
the past decade, cross-border migration and mobility between the Lao PDR and 
Thailand has started to receive much attention but either presented as an issue of human 
trafficking which needs to be combated, or as an issue of irregular migration which 
needs to be brought under state control (Huijsmans, 2010, p. 106-107). After Laos 
became a member of ASEAN in 1997, the Lao Government Authorities found difficult 
to ignore evidence of irregular Lao migrants working in Thailand. The Lao government 
had to accept the cross-border migration of Lao nationals as a reality and had to enter 
into bi-lateral discussions on migration as one of the consequences of a wider politico-
economic agenda of regional integration. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
employment cooperation between Thailand and Laos was agreed in 2002. However, the 
position of the local authorities regarding cross-border employment was ambivalent, 
particularly as arrests and fines were rare. Huijsmans’s research, undertaken in a non-
border village located not far from Vientiane, the capital city of Laos, showed that the 
constant bribing of Lao and Thai border controllers sustained undocumented migration.  
 
Unlike the Thai border, that had checkpoint regulations, the checkpoint and fee in Ban 
Kaemkong were mediated by the social relations of involved individuals. While the 
residents of Ban Kaemkong were requested to pay twenty baht to cross to Thai border, 
the outsiders had to pay a different rate varying from twenty to a hundred baht or more. I 
learned more about the informal systems of border crossing in Laos by travelling with 
Lao migrants back to the Lao border at the end of the cultivating season. Non-
borderland residents, who lived in villages other than Ban Kaemkong, were required to 
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 Interview, the District Governor, 14 January 2011. 
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pay a border-crossing fee between 100 and 200 baht. Asked why the non-borderland 
residents had to pay the extra fee, one of the Lao soldiers replied: 
 
This is the cost of passage. They will have to pay since they are not villagers of Ban Kaemkong  
and are not legally allowed to cross the border to work. If they went to shop in Thailand on the 
weekly market days, we would get usual rate of twenty baht. But, they went to stay on the Thai 
side for several nights. If they travelled daily, they would have to pay twenty baht per day 
anyway.  The amount 100 baht is a lump sum fee.
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Although the Lao officials recognised that travelling to work in Thailand through the 
checkpoint was illegal, at the same time they view it was acceptable. They said they 
knew that there were a few wage-labour jobs available in Laos compared to availability 
across the Thai border. Money proved a means of compromise between state officials 
and villagers under this informal cross-border arrangement: it enhanced the state 
officials’ opportunities to benefit as they facilitated local villagers migration from Laos. 
During my fieldwork, I asked the Ban Kamkong village headman why the Lao 
government did not control border security by establishing the formal checkpoint in Ban 
Kaemkong , he replied: 
 
Lao is a poor country. We are not ready in terms of staff and budget. We all know that a lot of 
Lao people illegally travel to work in Thailand but it is the necessity for them to go to get income 
for their households. This is uncontrollable. However, it is their task to pay for an extra-security 
cost to the state officials. If something happens in Thailand such as they are arrested, it would be 
Lao officials who go to get them back.
44
 
5.5 The Scope of Compromise in State-village Relations  
In the previous section, I have demonstrated why many cross-border activities, although 
illegal according to the state law, continued to be maintained. The main reason was that 
because local borderland residents and the government officials viewed them as licit.  
Furthermore, there is the mutual benefit of both the Thai and Lao states; hence, the 
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 Interview, the Lao Soldier, 4 December 2010. 
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 Interview, Village Head of Ban Kaemkong, 4 December 2010. 
127 
 
Thai-Lao people decide to allow this particular combination of legal, illegal and licit to 
persist. This scenario not only offers the chance to explore the fragility of state power 
and to question the exercising of state regulations, but also reveals that state-village 
relations are not antagonistic relations.  
 
In Southeast Asia, the compromise between the state and pesants has been noted in the 
state formation process. De Koninck (1996) who examines the mutual advantages for 
states and peasants in the agricultural expansion process, alludes to the relationship that 
links peasantry and the state in the production, integration, control, and administration 
of territory as ‘the territorial compromise’. He further suggests that the states send 
peasants out to the peripheries and then protect them, thus asserting control over these 
regions but having to compromise with the peasants vis-à-vis massive deforestation in 
order to gain advantage through monitoring peasant production and expansion, even 
though it could possibly jeopardise the state’s own territorial legitimacy (De Koninck, 
1996). In their article titled ‘Agricultural Expansion as a Tool of Population 
Redistribution in Southeast Asia’, De Koninck and Dery (1997, p. 2) argue that the very 
formation of numerous states, the gathering of the pieces that comprise them and the 
colonisation of their borderlands have relied at least partially on the peasantry, or on a 
process of peasantisation. By "planting" or "sowing" peasants, and then "protecting" 
them, many states have secured their peripheral and border areas, by extension 
contributing to the integration or even assimilation of minority peoples. 
 
State-village relations in this thesis invite a degree of compromise and negotiation. In 
addition, it becomes evident that the consolidation of state borderlands has relied on the 
cooperation of the people who support state border control and security while at the 
same time turning a blind eye to licit cross-border practices. Similarly, the villagers have 
relied on the state to administer the borderlands and to oversee security matters; i.e., 
drug and human trafficking. 
 
128 
 
Borderlands are traditionally recognised as marginal; that is, as distanced from state 
power. But, this may be an erroneous view of the state and it marginal territories. This 
thesis reveals that while the state unarguably operates at the local level, its modes of 
order have a scope of compromise. Again, the degree to which the state undertakes to 
compromise differs somewhat between Thailand and Laos. In effect, the Thai authorities 
are more capable of negotiating with their local state officials than their Lao 
counterparts. This chapter points out that in the seemingly exploitative situation in Laos, 
people are still able to negotiate crossing the border. 
 
Previous literature on borderland anthropology disaggregates state power and its 
dispersion practices from the state centre and its margins (Das & Poole, 2004; 
Gainsborough, 2009; Horstmann & Wadley, 2006; Walker, 1999). In northeastern Thai-
Lao borderlands, the state’s dispersion practices are based on the mutual benefit of both 
the state and the people. While Thai state officials seek to ensure the collaboration of the 
borderland residents, the Lao local state officials enjoy the benefits of informal cross-
border fee collected from non-borderland residents who work as wage-labourers in 
Thailand. Cross-border migration from Laos to Thailand, in this case, is based on 
collaboration between local state agents and Lao villagers. By avoiding the control of 
the central government, both parties profit. The above cases reflect expectations of how 
the state should perform for its own citizens; that is, how it should exercise state 
functionality and state power in the borderlands. By compromising, both the officials 
and the borderland residents stand to gain: they can enjoy the benefits that accrue by 
renegotiating the extant regulations. This in turn shows that both the Thai and Lao, 
recognising their limit at the frontier, have opted to compromise in the case of certain 
extant practices.  
 
The state and the villagers’ practices in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands urge for 
the re-consideration of the state-village relations in the borderlands. The anthropology of 
borderlands applies many politically-based frameworks; for example, it emphasises the 
influence of the state on the local people and the strategies that the border people 
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employ to maintain their cross-border way of life (Flynn, 1996; Makpun, 2008; 
Martínez, 1994). However, the results of scholarly fieldwork in the research sites reveal 
the aspect of the state that relies on people’s collaboration. Some scholars stress that 
many illegal practices occur due to the state officials’ involvement, and that while the 
states declare some practices illegal, they themselves are often involved in said practices 
(Abraham and Van Schendel 2005; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Walker 1999).   
 
This thesis suggests that certain practices in the borderlands occur because many state 
officials are also local borderland residents. Hence, there is a conflict of interest. They 
are required to mediate between the government and the locals, are responsible for 
enforcing the laws and regulations in the borderlands, and at the same time benefit with 
the farmers who own the farmland and employ Lao labourers. Previous research into 
Thai villages depicts Thai village heads as people ‘in between state and 
citizenry’(Bowie, 2008), ‘synaptic leaders’ pressured by both village and state 
authorities (Moerman, 1969), engaged in a role sanctioned at both the national and local 
levels (Keyes, 1970). Walker (2012) suggests that the old-style politics of the rural poor, 
which were characterised by rebellion, revolution or resistance, have been shifted to 
peasants’strategy to engage with the state to gain advantage from the state’s 
development policies. The state plays a key role in addressing these challenges through 
an array of subsidies, welfare, and community development schemes. Modern peasant 
politics in Thailand are motivated not by an antagonistic relationship with the state, but 
by a desire to draw the state into mutually beneficial transactions. These factors have 
ultimately supported the potential for the degree of compromise in relations between 
state officials and borderland residents. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have draw on my experiences in Ban Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong to 
show how particular everyday practices in the Thai-Lao borderlands are considered licit 
and how they provide insights into the scope of compromise vis-a-via state-village 
relations. As regards a common understanding of the state as an institution extending 
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power from the centre to control the borderlands, I argue that there is a room for the 
local people to negotiate given that the state has to actively collaborate with the 
borderland residents.  
In the first section of this chapter, I demonstrated the nature of state power and its 
relations to the national borders. While the security of state and good governance is 
formally ensured by adherence to states’ law and order policies, diffusion at their 
borders can pose a threat to nation-states. The case of northeastern Thai border reveals 
that both the state and the local borderland residents have their own narratives to support 
the prevailing illegal cross-border activities. Each tries to differentiate between legal and 
illegal, ultimately declaring them licit. The narratives of long historical ties, 
brotherhood, similarities in language and culture, and requirement for the state officials 
to collaborate with the local people are reasons to make the everyday practices at the 
border licit.  
 
Second, the chapter examines the particular factors that facilitate the scope of 
compromise inherent in state-village relations. In Thailand, these factors include the the 
state officials’ dependence on the local people for surveillance of the borders, and the 
growing interaction between the state and the villagers. While the Village Heads, police 
and government officials in the local level are servants of nation states, many of them 
are also farmers who hire wage labourers, evidence of the synergetic relations that 
obtain between state and society.  In Laos, cross-border activities include the illegal 
movement of seasonal agricultural workers. Both the villagers and the state authorities 
share a mutual economic interest in those illegal cross border practices. In addition, 
villagers in Ban Kaemkong, and other villages, who cross the Mekong River to find jobs 
in Thailand, attempt to justify their activities as a mean of livelihood improvement, 
activities that have effectively blinded the law. The informal tax they have to pay upon 
their return to Laos is justified as a fee for keeping the local border police quiet and for 
protecting them from being caught by the state officials.  
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Third, the chapter proves that nation-states can be flexible. They employ different 
modes of order to consolidate their control over populations and territories (Das & 
Poole, 2004; Lukasiewicz, 2011; Walker, 2009a). In the case of this thesis, the 
borderland region under local scrutiny practices and state-village interactions fall 
between legal, illegal, formal and informal patterns. The chapter additionally 
demonstrates the diversity of state practices and how the state treats its territories 
differently according to position, location and context. In this sense, the borderland is 
subject to the unusual regulations compared to other areas of the country. The spatial 
character of the borderland and state-village relations produces a particular pattern of 
migration and rural transformation, that I will be address in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
 Mobile Lao-Isan Livelihoods 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I exemplified the geo-politics of the Northeast Thailand and 
Laos and argued that historical tie, the border geography, and the mutual benefit that 
accrues to both state officials and people by legitimating the illegal cross-border 
employment by Thai farmers of Lao labourers. These arrangements ultimately enhance 
the scope for compromise in state-village relations, and the illegal but licit local cross-
border practices in the marginal areas of the state.  
 
My intention in this chapter is to examine how labour migration has become inscribed 
on the lives of the peoples of Ban Fangthai, Thailand, and Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua in Lao PDR. I will also explore how the Thai-Lao border locations complicate 
the migration patterns, which are distinctive due to the border proximity, cultural and 
language similarities, and historical ties. Ellis (2000) classifies labour migration into the 
following four types: (1) the seasonal migration or temporary movement occurring in 
response to the agricultural calendar, that allows people to move during the low season 
and to return in the peak period; (2) circular migration that occurred in response to the 
demand for labour but might not engage with the agricultural reasons; (3) permanent 
migration or long-term migration; and  (4) international migration, that is, temporary or 
permanent movement to work in another country. While research into migration in Laos 
in general focuses on the movement of Lao people to urban areas in Thailand, resulting 
in an abundance of data vis-a-vis rural-to-urban cross-border movement, I will contend 
that the flows of people between the rural and urban areas are nonlinear. Lao people, in 
fact, move across rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban sectors, establishing further 
connections with many areas beyond Bangkok, e.g., provinces in southern and eastern 
Thailand. The geographical locations and porous Thai-Lao borderlands offer good 
opportunities for people to move with very little difficulty.  
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The quantitative data presented in this chapter were collected from interviewees 
domiciled in Ban Fangthai, Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua. In each village, I 
conducted survey with 25 per cent of the total households, which equalled 100, 50 and 
50 households respectively. The questions included in the questionnaire were not only 
designed to elicit data from the individual interviewees, but also to collect information 
about their household members in terms of ages, occupations, incomes, remittances, 
migration experience, employment, and, their relations with their respective families.   
I will begin the chapter by detailing the migration history of the villagers of Ban 
Fangthai and the area’s transformation from a sending to a receiving migrant 
destination. I will then explicate the migration situation in Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua to show how the complex migration patterns in Laos are determined by 
geographical location, village economic development, and government policies. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the legality for the Lao migrants’ journey between 
their seasonal migration to the Thai borderlands and their long-distance migration to 
Bangkok and its vicinities. 
6.2 Mobility into and out of the margin  
This section provides information about migration in Ban Fangthai and the village’s 
shift from a sending to a receiving landscape. Before the 1990s, Ban Fangthai was only 
a small village located far from the urban cities. The villagers engaged in temporary 
migration to Bangkok and other urban cities of Thailand during the non-cultivating 
season seeking alternative off-farm incomes. Thus, not only did cheap, unskilled labour 
support urban industrialisation, but workers opted for international migration to the 
Middle East countries.  The section reveals that Ban Fangthai functioned as a labour 
sending village to both internal and international destinations.  
However, while out-migration from Ban Fangthai to urban cities resulted the labour 
shortages in the agricultural sectors, the the marginality of the village did not contribute 
to agricultural marginalisation. After the re-opening of the Thai-Lao border in the 1980s, 
the villagers of Ban Fangthai benefited from seasonal labour, most notably the illegal 
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migrants from Laos. The second part of this section demonstrates how Ban Fangthai 
shifted from being a labour supplying village to being a labour sending and receiving 
landscape.   
6.2.1 Ban Fangthai as a sending landscape   
Migration and mobility have been identified as important features of rural livelihoods 
(Kelly, 2011; World Bank, 2006a, 2008). Regarding Northeast Thailand, a number of 
scholars wrote that by the early 1980s, migration and non-farm work had become a 
crucial source for income of the people (Grandstaff et al., 2008; Maneemai, 2012; Rigg, 
2007). Their observations were valid for Ban Fangthai too, where domestic migration to 
Bangkok and its vicinities had been common practice.  
The results of the data survey conducted as part of this study in Ban Fangthai in 2011 
show that out of 100 households, 58 had at least one family member who had migrated 
to work out of their home village for a period of time (see Figure 6.1). The reasons for 
migration included household poverty, the unreliability of rain-fed agriculture, 
population pressure on land, and the low level of industrialisation in the northeast 
region. Of the 42 households without any family member working outside of the village, 
almost half of them (i.e. 22 households) had at least one return migrant. Three 
households had a family member practicing long-distance migration to the Middle East 
and who had been away for between three to five years. The remaining householders 
had left the village for between three to five years but had returned to establish a family 
in Ban Fangthai. 
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Households with 
family member(s) 
currently 
engaging in 
migration
49%
Households with 
family member(s) 
practicing 
seasonal 
migration when 
the survey was 
conducted
9%
Households 
without any 
family member(s) 
currently working 
out of the home 
village 42% 
(include 
households with 
return migrants) 
Figure 6.1: Numbers of Households with/without Family 
Member(s) Engaging in Migration in Ban Fangthai
Source: Author's surveys, 2011
 
The ages of the migrants were another notable feature of the survey data. More than half 
of the interviewed households (N=58) had at least one family member currently working 
outside of the village. Almost one third (i.e. 16 households) were parental households 
who stayed behind to look after their grandchildren because the father or mother of the 
children was working in Bangkok or another city. In terms of households currently 
without migrants (N = 42), the majority were single families with children of school 
age.  
 
There was a significant different in the forms of migration, reflected by the age 
dynamics. The parental generation migrated for part-time jobs, their aim being to save 
enough money to supplement the household income and helped sustain their rural way 
of life. Some spent a few years outside of the village, or might go abroad to Middle East 
countries for some years, working and saving a sum of money to invest in a small 
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business in the village while working on the farm at the same time. The survey also 
revealed that the respondents were increasingly seeking off-farm jobs, both inside and 
outside of the villages. Their earning accounted for the main source of household 
income, coupled with remittances from family members who had moved into industry 
and services outside of the village.  
 
Mr Tia’s experience provided a good example of the migration patterns and age 
dynamics of migration in Ban Fangthai. The owner of 25 rais of paddy field, ten rais of 
cassava and five rais of rubber, Mr Tia lived in Ban Fangthai with his wife. When 
approached to help pay his parents’ debt, Mr Tai migrated to work in Saudi Arabia at 
the age of 35, leaving his wife and children behind in Ban Fangthai. After living as        
a migrant worker in Saudi Arabia and Iraq for 3 years, he returned to Ban Fangthai with 
sufficient money to pay his parents debts, to build a new house, and to buy more 
agricultural land. But, his investment in his children’s education was minimal. He said:  
 
‘They preferred to leave school to find jobs outside of the village. Nobody wanted to work on the 
farmland’.45  
 
Mr Tia’s 32 year- old eldest daughter was working as an in-house staff at the Roman-
catholic school in Bangkok. The second daughter was having a family and work for her 
husband’s business. Both girls had graduated from Mor 3 (Grade 9). His youngest son, 
who graduated Mattayom 6 (Grade 12) worked on a casino ship running between 
Bangkok, Phuket, Malaysia and Singapore. All of Mr Tia’s children earned more than 
10,000 baht per month. They regularly transferred money to Mr Tia and his wife 
(approximately 5,000-7,000 baht per months). Mr Tia and his wife worked the farm on 
their own and used their children’s remittances to invest for labour, fertilizer, and other 
costs incurred by farming. Like other households in Ban Fangthai, Mr Tia faced 
difficulty finding labour, especially during the rice cultivating season when all of the 
local domestic labourers in village worked on their own rice farms. The out-migration of 
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 Interview, Mr Tia, 22 April 2011. 
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the younger cohort had also contributed to the severe labour shortages in the peak 
agricultural season, this being one of the factors that has changed Ban Fangthai into a 
receiving migrant destination. 
6.2.2 The receiving landscape 
Grandstaff et al. (2008) points out that throughout the 1990s, the numbers of 
Northeastern people working in agriculture declined consistently: people were taking 
less time off from their off-farm work to return home for transplanting and harvesting. 
Those who found themselves facing long hours and hard work in the paddy fields, opted 
to remit money home to pay for hiring others who could do this work instead. 
Cooperative labour arrangements no longer functioned as an effective economic 
mechanism: they had been replaced by hired-wage labour since the 1960s (Douglass, 
1983 ; Ganjanapan, 1984; Moerman, 1968; Sharp & Hanks, 1978). And, although 
domestic labourers were still available, the supply did not meet the high demand during 
the peak periods. 
In Ban Fangthai, reciprocal labour arrangements have been replaced by a wage system 
for sometimes. The majority of interviewees emphasised that they did not have time to 
cooperate with others; and, they found it troublesome to have guest labourers because 
they had to prepare meals for them. Some said they started hiring labourers when their 
parents divided their land and left them to manage the agricultural work on their own. 
Only eight out of the 100 interviewed households practiced semi-reciprocal labour 
exchange with relatives who lived in Ban Fangthai and nearby villages, saying that they 
still had to pay comparable daily wages to those of the usual labourers. In addition, they 
had to prepare meals for all of the workers. After completing the work on their own 
farms, the landowners then had to go work as labourers in their relatives’ farms when 
they earned the same rate of daily wage in return.  
Labour shortages have caused the majority of farmers in Ban Fangthai turned to depend 
on wage labour from Laos. Of the 100 interviewed households, 96 had hired Lao 
seasonal workers at least once. Eighty-eight households regularly hired Lao seasonal 
workers every year, including 2010, the year in which the fieldwork was conducted. 
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Only four households had never hired any Lao workers; and, one of them was landless. 
Another had a small piece of land (less than three rai) that was managed by their family.  
The method employed to hire Lao workers from across the Mekong River revealed the 
transition of cross-border relations between the Thai-Lao border residents. In the past, 
the villagers of Ban Fangthai had sought help from relatives and friends living in the 
Lao villages along the riverbank. Little attention was paid to the equivalence between 
what one gave and what was returned, thus, achieving an exact balance between the two 
transactions was rarely pursued. A labour debt might be repaid in different ways: for 
example, products from harvesting in a year later. However, the nature of labour 
management in Ban Fangthai and the relationship between the Thai and the Lao 
villagers transformed into a more strict monetary exchange in the form of daily wage 
after the officially re-opening of the Thai-Lao border in the late 1980s.   
 
My in-depth interviews with a few Thai villagers revealed that prior to the new 
millennium, most of the Lao workers came from Ban Kaemkong and other nearby 
villages located along the Mekong River.  Consequently, it was practical for them to 
cross the border on a daily basis. The number of Lao labourers from the above villages 
dropped significantly over the last decade: they were replaced by workers from villages 
in inner Laos.  Because it is difficult for them to travel back and forth between their 
villages and Ban Kaemkong daily, the majority of the Lao workers stayed in Ban 
Fangthai until the end of the cultivating season. They lived either in their employers’ 
homes or in temporary shelters located in the middle of the paddy fields. In the 2010 
harvesting season from late October to the middle of December, out of a total of 120 
migrants, I met only seven migrants from Ban Kaemkong and another twelve migrants 
from Ban Savamg, another border village not far from Ban Kaemkong (see Table 6.1). It 
should be noted that two of the seven Ban Kaemkong villagers were relatives of Ban 
Fangthai residents; so, they regularly crossed the river for trade and family visits.   
 
The nature of labour management in Ban Fangthai, and the relationship between the 
Thai and Lao villagers were transformed in line with a number of conditions. As shown 
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in Table 6.1, in the early 1980s, domestic labour was manageable given that the majority 
of the parental generation of Ban Fangthai undertook seasonal migration during the 
agricultural off-season. Only a few households hired Lao workers from across the 
Mekong River. But in the late 1990s, the officially re-opened border, together with 
industrialisation in Thailand and the out-migration of the younger generation, stimulated 
labour shortages. Half of the respondent households commenced hiring Lao workers in 
the first decade of the 2000s while loose reciprocity was replaced by the more strict 
exchange in the form of daily wage.  
 
Table 6.1 Years of commencing hiring the Lao workers, 
Number of households (N = 88) and original migrant sending villages in Laos 
 
Year of  
commencing  
hiring Lao  
workers 
Number of households 
that  commenced to hire 
Lao workers in each 
period of time 
Original migrant sending villages in Laos 
Prior to the 1980s 10 Ban Kaemkong, Ban Hin Nam Aoy, Ban 
Tung Hua Chang, Ban Savang  
1990s 13 Ban Kaemkong,Ban Savang, Ban Don 
2000s-2010 50 Ban Kaemkong,Ban Savang, Ban Lhak, 
Ban Don, Ban Laonua  
After 2010 15 Ban Kaemkong,Ban Savang, Ban Lhak, 
Ban Don, Ban Som Sanouk, Ban 
Laonua, Ban Phonh, Ban Dong, Ban 
Tham,  Ban Lhao, Ban Na, Ban Sa Ath 
Total 88  
 
Source: Author’s survey, 2011 
 
Table 6.1 shows the movement of Lao people in particular decades. Prior to the 2000s, 
most of the Lao workers came from villages located along the Mekong River so it was 
practical for them to cross the border on a daily basis. The number of Lao labourers 
from Ban Kaemkong dropped significantly over the last ten years. The workers were 
replaced by people from many villages located far from the borderlands. But, due to this 
remoteness, it was difficult for them to travel back and forth on a daily basis. For this 
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reason, majority of the Lao workers stayed in Ban Fangthai until the end of cultivating 
season.   
 
Table 6.2 shows the names of the Lao villages that were home to the 120 Lao workers I 
met during my fieldwork between October and November 2010. The approximate 
locations of the villages in Laos illustrated in Figure 6.2. Out of these workers, the 
largest migration group was 31 people from Ban Laonua, Xeno District, Savannakhet 
Province, which is located approximately 50 km from the river border.  
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Table 6.2  Lao migrant workers in Ban Fangthai between October and November 2010,  
by original villages and gender 
 
Village Names 
Approximate 
distance from the 
Mekong River 
Gender 
Total 
Village Location in Lao 
PDR 
Remarks 
 M F 
Ban Kaemkong 
The border village 
0 7 7 
Xaibouri District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Daily  workers 
Ban Savang 
The border village 
approxminately two 
km from Ban 
Kaemkong 
0 12 12 
Xaibouri District, 
Savannakhet Province,  
Daily  workers 
Ban Laonua 
Approximately 50 
km from the Mekong 
River 
21 10 31 
Outhoomphone  District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Phonh 
Approximately 50 
km from the Mekong 
River 
9 14 23 
Outhoomphone District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Lhak 
Approximately 20 
km from the Mekong 
River 
3 15 18 
Outhoomphone  District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Som Sa Nouk 
Approximately 15 
km from the Mekong 
River 
6 2 8 
Outhoomphone District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Don 
Approximately 40 
km from the Mekong 
River 
11 1 12 
Outhoomphone District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Dong 
Approximately 15 
km from the Mekong 
River, the village is 
located opposite That 
Phanom District, 
Nakhon Phanom 
Province 
4 0 4 
Khammuan District, 
Savannakhet Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Ban Tham 
Approximately  two 
km from Ban Dong 
1 4 5 Khammuan Province 
Temporary stay 
workers 
Total 
- 
55 65 120 
 
- 
 
- 
Source: Author’s survey2010  
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Figure 6.2  Location of the villages in Laos estimated from discussion with Lao workers 
  
 
*This map is only for schematic purposes and cannot represent the actual location of the villages.  
 
Overtime, Ban Fangthai changed from a sending to a receiving migrant destination. 
Having long been seen as marginal areas of development, it was accepted by current 
critical perspectives that Northeast Thailand had experienced some degree of economic 
growth (Grandstaff et al., 2008; Rigg & Salamanca, 2011). Such broad perspectives may 
have relevant to Ban Fangthai in terms of the improvement in the village’s living 
conditions due to remittances and, the availability of economic opportunities across the 
border.  
 
THAILAND LAOS 
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The fact that families were hiring Lao workers implied a higher demand for labour to fill 
the labour gap. At the same time, it showed that villages located in the peripheral area of 
Northeast Thailand had become sites of job opportunities for the less dynamic economic 
areas in Laos. In the next section, I will examine the sending migration landscape in 
Laos. Particular focus will be on two villages: Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua.  
6.3 Everyday Mobility in Lao PDR 
Rigg (2001) observes the misperception that Laos is a relatively immobile society, a 
misperception rooted in the various factors that constrain human movement, e.g., limited 
physical infrastructure and government policies aimed at mobility control. This 
paradigm of immobility may have its genesis in the period spanning 1975 to 1986 when 
the Lao government restricted and controlled both internal and inter-national mobility. 
In fact, between 1975 and 1980, approximately 300,000 people (ten per cent of the 
population at that time) migrated from Laos across the Thai border to escape from the 
communist regime (Stuart Fox, 2008, p. xii). Some left Laos because of the rapid 
decline in their living standards (Reddy, 2009, p. 14).  Many among them were former 
rightist army personnel, police officers, teachers, technicians and civil servants who 
constitute the educated cohort. The implementation of NEM in 1986 elicited the new 
forms of migration which have rendered short and long distance international migration 
considerably easier, in particular migration in the border provinces which is reportedly 
on the rise. This includes out-migration in Ban Kaemkong where people tend to engage 
in long-distance migration rather than seasonal cross-border migration.  
  
In this section, I will draw attention to the migration situation in two Lao villages 
located in the borderland and hinterland respectively.  I argue that migration to Thailand 
has become a part of the villagers’ lives in both social and economic terms. In addition, 
short and long migration to Thailand can occur at any time in any area of the Thai-Lao 
border as part of everyday migration.  Given these circumstances, I found it difficult to 
generalise the Lao people into the categories of returnees or ongoing migrants. 
Likewise, to divide current migration situation in Laos only as international rural-to-
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urban migration significantly limits one’s understanding of migration, both in individual 
and collective terms. 
6.3.1 The demise of daily cross-border movement from Ban Kaemkong   
The main reason why only a small number of people from Ban Kaemkong crossed the 
Mekong River to find labouring jobs in Ban Fangthai lay in the off-farm opportunities 
available both within and outside the village. A survey of the villagers’ main occupation 
revealed that almost half of the residential households (80 out of 194 households) were 
government officials’ households, which did not have any social connections to the 
people in Thailand. In-depth interviews with fourteen government officials’ households 
revealed that only four of these households had at least one family member who had 
ever worked in Ban Fangthai. These interviewees, who were mostly female, had 
followed their neighbours’ decisions to avail themselves new experiences in Thailand. 
The Lao workers were generally from a small number of local families that had relatives 
or friends living along the Thai border. As of 2010, the remaining cross-border seasonal 
workers in Ban Kaemkong constituted of less than ten households that were either 
relatives of Thai farmers, newcomer residents who were landless, or widows.  
According to the survey, only five females from residential households still crossed the 
river to Ban Fangthai in search of agricultural jobs. Seventeen out of 36 residential 
households had at least one family member who had travelled to work in Ban Fangthai 
at least once in their lifetime. Fifteen out of those those seventeen residential households 
had a member who regularly travelled to work in Ban Fangthai over the last ten years 
but had already ceased mobility. Twenty-one households in the survey had at least one 
family member who had traveled to work in Ban Fangthai at least once in their lifetimes 
but had stopped going because they were busy working in other jobs. 
 
Job diversification within Ban Kaemkong began in the 1990s for a number of reasons, 
ranging from the re-opened Thai-Lao border for trade and investment, the establishment 
of fertilizer and sugarcane factories by Thai business companies, and land privatisation 
for cash crops such as sugarcane and rubber. These innovations led to the second phase 
of immigration of outsiders to Ban Kaemkong. Not only did villagers in the nearby 
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villages come to find laboring jobs, but also Thai businesses brought educated staff, 
technicians and some Thai labourers to work in the sugarcane plantations. Several 
villages surrounding Ban Kaemkong became transformed into sugarcane plantation 
zones. 
 
Immigration by outsiders resulted in the emergence of businesses such as grocery stores, 
local restaurants and karaoke shops that were owned by local villagers. The majority of 
whom were relatives of government officials. Among the local businesses, the biggest 
grocery store in the village was owned by a lady who had previously worked as a district 
health officer and decided to become a local trader in the early 1990s. Similarly, three 
restaurants and karaoke shops located along the village’s main road were owned by the 
wives of government officials, the village head, and the local governor respectively. At 
the end of the road near the fertilizer factory, another two restaurants were operated by 
the wives of local policemen and soldiers. Some residents also operated small grocery 
stores, but the variety of goods was not as high as in these shops operated by 
government officials or their wives. These more diverse economic opportunities in time 
generated greater incomes for the villagers.  
 
The opening of the border in the late 1980s additionally spurred the out-migration of the 
young generation. Due to the improved economic conditions in the village, people were 
able to contemplate long-distance migration to inner Thailand. Furthermore, due to Lao 
PDR’s topography and the poor condition of the roads, it was easier and cheaper for Lao 
migrants to cross the border into Thailand than to migrate to Vientiane in search of 
work. Out of 50 households interviewed, 38 had at least one family member working in 
Bangkok and other cities as long-term migrants. Only six households stated that their 
family members circulated regularly between their village and Thailand. Economic 
factors and material needs such as money, jobs, house renovations and consumer goods 
were the main factors driving migration. In addition, the influence of friends or 
neighbours who had successfully received significant remittances also propelled 
migration. As some scholars have suggested along with the lure of better economic 
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opportunities in Thailand, consumerism and materialism were also very important to the 
Lao villagers (Barney, 2012; High, 2008; Rigg, 2007). Young Lao people in the main 
disinterested in working in low-paid farming jobs. And, although they often had the 
chance to work in fertilizer and sugarcane factories, the young cohort rejected such 
opportunity because it was deemed too labour-intensive, e.g., packing fertilizer and 
working on sugarcane plantations. As well, wages for these jobs were low: 80 baht per 
day. Ms Sun, a 23 year-old female, who moved to Bangkok when she was seventeen 
years old and currently works in a restaurant in a suburb of Bangkok, talked about her 
life in Bangkok: 
 
I can earn up to 10,000 baht per month but I spent a lot of money as well. There is plenty of food 
to eat and many places for recreation in Bangkok. I love to go to the department stores. Staying 
in my home village was so boring
46
. 
 
Migration and economic development in Ban Kaemkong transformed the village into 
both a sending and a receiving area, similar to Ban Fangthai. While the young labour 
force tended to migrate to Thailand, the vacuum they left was filled by groups of 
migrant; for example, Lao villagers from many villages in Lao hinterland to serve as 
labourers in the sugarcane plantations who either engaged in daily migration if they 
lived in nearby villages, or in temporary migration from one up to three months, staying 
in camp sites in the middle of the sugarcane plantations.  
 
Daily and temporary migration also occurred in Ban Kaemkong during the rice 
cultivating season when domestic wage labourers could not meet the demand. Families 
that still worked in their farms had to recruit labourers from their surrounding villages in 
the Lao hinterland. Many workers heard of job opportunities in Ban Fangthai through 
Ban Kaemkong villagers. The telephone network across the countries allowed many Lao 
people living along the border access to Thai numbers so that they could contact people 
in Thailand. One regular procedure I noted during the rice cultivating season was people 
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 Interview, Ms Sun, 17 July 2010. 
147 
 
calling from Thailand early in the morning, followed by Ban Kaemkong villagers riding 
their motorbikes and shouting for people who wanted to go to work in Thai paddy fields. 
Among people who rode the motorbikes around the village were boat riders, who 
benefited from the boat fee extracted from the Lao passengers.
47
 However, from what I 
learned, it was very little chance of encouraging people living in Ban Kaemkong to go 
with the exception of the females mentioned earlier. Those villagers who received 
orders from Thailand had to go further than Ban Kaemkong area or call Lao people 
living in other villages to let them know about the wage jobs along the Thai border. 
These activities subsequently led to a variety of Lao migrants; and, the distance from 
their home villages to the Thai border did not determine their journeys to the borderland 
as soon as they had made contact with people living along the border. The furthest home 
village of migrants in Ban Fangthai in 2010 was Ban Phonh, which was more than 30 
kms from the Lao border. However, the furthest location of migrants’ original village 
that I became aware of in Ban Kham, a village near Ban Fangthai, was Phin District, 
which was located almost at the Lao - Vietnamese border.  
6.3.2  Circular migration of the hinterland populace in Ban Laonua 
Migration in Ban Laonua entailed complex patterns of movement. Located in the 
hinterlands, the lack of industrial and commercial opportunities deprived the local 
residents of many job opportunities.  Therefore, the majority of households still worked 
in the agricultural sector. After benefiting from the re-opening of the Thai-Lao border, 
people moved to find jobs at both Thai border and in the inner areas.  Where they went 
depended largely upon whether they could afford to pay the travelling costs of short or 
long distance migration. However, the young generation in this remote village could not 
easily move away from agricultural work, unlike the majority in Ban Kaemkong, 
because it was difficult to find labourers to fill the labour gap during the peak 
agricultural season. Consequently, some migrants returned home during the cultivating 
season. All types of migration – seasonal, circular, rural-to-urban, and rural-to-rural both 
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 The fee for people travelling from Laos to the weekly market on Tuesdays and Sundays was 40 baht for 
the roundtrip; but the fee varied in accordance with the social connection of the people who want to cross 
the border. Lao migrants from villages in the hinterland had to pay more, e.g., 50 to 100 baht per ride or 
200 baht for the roundtrip (see Chapter five on border passage).  
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domestic and international - were found; and, many times villagers’ movements fell into 
more than one category.  
In June 2010, for the first time I saw twelve Lao migrants from Ban Laonua working in 
the paddy fields of the deputy village head of Ban Fangthai. When I returned to the 
village during the rice harvesting season in November, the total number of migrants in 
this village had increased to 31, the largest number among Lao migrants from other 
villages that year. Group and individual interviews in Ban Fangthai revealed that more 
than half of the migrants from Ban Laonua who went to work in Ban Fangthai in 
November 2010 had come for the second times or more (see Table 6.3). Four had 
recently returned from Phang Nga and Phuket Provinces in Southern Thailand, eight had 
returned from Bangkok, and the rest were moving between Bangkok and the border 
provinces in Northeast Thailand, e.g., Ubon Ratchatani, Sakonnakorn and Nakorn 
Panhom Provinces. Asked about their next work destination, five people replied that 
they would return to their wage labour jobs in Bangkok and other industrial cities of 
Thailand, mostly to work in aluminium and furniture factories and on construction sites. 
The rest were unsure when they would return to Bangkok because they wanted to take a 
short break in their home villages until they were ready to leave again or had to leave 
because of lack of money. Their movements were thus unpredictable.  
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Table 6.3 Information about migrants from Ban Laonua who went to work in Ban Fangthai 
between October and November 2010 
Age 
come 1st time come 2nd time or more 
M F M F 
13-15 2 2 2 0 
16-20 3 1 0 2 
21-30 1 4 3 1 
31-40 1 0 2 1 
41-50 2 0 0 0 
51-60 0 1 3 0 
Total  9 8 10 4 
Grand Total  17 14 
Source: Author’s Survey, 2010. 
 
I gained more in-depth information about the degree of geographical scope and its 
impact on migration patterns when I returned to conduct my ethnographic fieldwork and 
a survey in Ban Laonua between January and February 2011. My survey of 50 
households revealed that the case of Ban Laonua exemplified complex migration that to 
date has been understudied. In general, scholarly research into migration in Laos focuses 
heavily on the pattern of international migration to urban areas in Thailand. But, in the 
case of Ban Laonua, the movement of people fell into all categories of rural-to-
urban/rural-to-urban, internal/international, and seasonal/circular migration. The 
village’s remote location brought to fewer opportunities for economic development; so, 
only a few labouring jobs were available in the village. Most of the families in Ban 
Laonua were engaged in the subsistence agriculture; hence, migration was the strategy 
people employed to earn money. The young cohort, who migrated to Thailand, practiced 
circular migration because the majority of them found it difficult to find wage labourers 
to replace their absence during the peak agricultural season.  
Drawing on the migration experience of 50 households in Ban Laonua, 38 had at least 
one family member currently working in Thailand. Fifteen of them reported that their 
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family member practicing circular migration or moving between their home village, the 
Thai borders, Bangkok, or other provinces in Thailand. Interestingly, I interviewed four 
villagers who were between 51 and 60 years of age. They had migrated to work in the 
paddy fields in many villages along the Thai border through connections with their 
relatives. These people named the Thai border villages as follows: Ban Fangthai, Ban 
Kham, and other Thai border villages in Nakhon Phanom Province. Asked about the 
names of the Thai farmers in Ban Fangthai that they had ever worked for, they 
mentioned a few names of landowners who were widely known among the Lao people. 
In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with seven people aged between fifteen to 
40 years, who had experienced working along the Thai border and in other areas of 
Thailand including Bangkok.  These people could be categorised as ‘unpredictable 
migrants’ as they could not provide information about their yearly life calendars and 
their times and places of work. Their migration lives could not be categorised seasonal 
nor as return migrant. They moved back and forth between farm work and labour jobs in 
Thailand. In line with their unpredictable timelines, they might opt to return home to 
work on the farm; it was not their regular practice. And, nothing confirmed that they 
would return to work on the farm every cultivating season.  For example, some may 
have returned home last year to do rice transplanting in response family demand. Then, 
they left the village without working on rice harvesting. These people might return again 
in one or two years time to undertake agricultural work.  Figure 6.2 shows the complex 
patterns of migration and the replacement of Lao seasonal migrants in the Thai 
borderlands. In addition, it reveals the overlapping patterns of rural-to-rural and rural-to-
urban migration as the Lao migrants proceed to Bangkok and urban cities.  
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Figure 6.3 Migratory Routes of the Northeast Thailand People  
and the Lao People***  
 
*** Map boundary data supplied by the Mekong River Commission. All other map data are by the 
author. 
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In sum, migration to Thailand has become a common livelihood strategy in both Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban Laonua. However, the patterns of migration in these two villages 
were diverse. While many households in Ban Kaemkong had become increasingly 
engaged in non‐farm employment, people in Ban Laonua typically still grew rice and 
diversified their income through migration. The differences in location, accessibility, 
and local employment opportunities determined the migration patterns.  
In the next section, I will discusses the geography of legality of migration between Laos 
and Thailand. While working in the Thai borderland area during harvest seasons was 
illegal but licit, the workers’ movement to other more distant areas without 
documentation was strongly illegal. Case studies will be drawn from migrants’ 
individual biographical notes regarding their movement across and between borders and 
sectors. 
 
6.4  Landscape of legality   
As already suggested in Chapters two and five, Abraham and Van Schendel (2005) 
identify the distinction between legal/illegal and licit/illicit. They claim that legality is 
related to what the state regards as legitimate in a legal sense, while licit is what people 
involved in transnational networks and activities regard as legitimate in a social sense, 
even though it may be illegal.   
In this section, I will discuss the relationship between the specific area of migration and 
the landscape of legality. In an attempt to identify the complex migration trajectories of 
the Lao people, and the interface between illegal and licit, I will focus on the 
biographical narratives to show how Lao migrants negotiated to stay in Thailand, and 
the differences between working in the agricultural sectors along the in Thai borderland, 
and in off-farm sectors in Bangkok. My discussion will provide new perspectives of 
migration between Laos and Thailand and how this illegal but licit transnational labour 
migration is carried on. 
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I met Whai, a 28 year-old man working Mr Nguan’s rice farm during the rice 
transplanting season in July 2010. He was very shy and reluctant to talk to me during 
our first meeting. I met him again in November 2010 during the rice harvesting season 
and learned that he was the head of the migrants from Ban Laonua. He had earlier been 
in contact with a few Thai landowners and encouraged his neighbours to migrate with 
him. This time, he remembered me and seemed to feel more comfortable talking to me.  
I first came to Ban Fangthai with my neighbours when I was 18 years old and came to work 
twice a year in rice transplanting and rice harvesting seasons because no wage jobs were 
available in the village. Over the last three years, the demand for labour in Ban Fangthai had 
increased. I always get a phone call from Mr Nguan, Ms Lao, or Mr Srinuan to bring more 
people from the village with me. We took a truck to Ban Kaemkong and paid 100 baht to cross 
the Mekong River. Generally, we stayed for two to three weeks until the end of cultivating 
season.
48
  
This glimpse of Whai’s story illustrated the stories of Lao migrants from many Lao 
hinterland villages. They headed for the Thai border for agricultural work, hoping to 
earn large amounts of money and to stay temporarily for a few weeks. Most of them 
were undocumented migrants who came to Thailand by crossing the Mekong River. 
Some crossed during the night time or in the early morning, hoping to escape the Lao 
border police. Many negotiated the border crossing by paying money for the Lao 
soldiers; and, they typically paid a higher boat fee than the normal rate (the local rate 
was 40 baht per ride but these migrants paid 100 to 300 baht). When crossing the River 
back to Laos, these workers had to pay the bribe again. However, they all said that it 
was worth paying to get a chance to earn money in the Thai borderland. Even though 
they knew it was illegal to cross the border and to stay overnight across the Thai border, 
they viewed it as acceptable since getting a wage job was important for their livelihoods.  
Whai was an example of a Lao who had never migrated further than the Thai border 
areas. He was afraid to go and did not have enough money to pay for the travelling cost 
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 Interview, Mr Whai, 17 November 2010. 
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and the broker. Upon completion of his work on his farm in Laos, Whai moved to Ban 
Fangthai and other villages along the Thai border. He said:  
I have never been to Bangkok and never wanted go to. Many people go and remit much money 
home but a lot of them are caught by the police and are deported home too. Many make a loan 
with the brokers and are deported before they earn enough to pay debt. They have to stay in debt 
or make more loan to go again. Working in Thai border is more secure because I know the Thai 
farmers. I have never been arrested here. However, I need to stay away from the Thai and Lao 
police. Upon returning to Laos, I have to pay them to go home. Some people have to give them 
the whole wage but it is never happened to me.
49
  
Whai’s story was a cameo part of the migration landscape of the Lao people. Socio-
economic change, along with the new opportunities from regional integration 
complicated, the migration patterns from Laos to Thailand. These patterns even circular 
occurred at the interface of legality and illegality as I will demonstrate in the following 
narratives.  
I met Mr Rae and Mrs Perd, a young couple aged 29 and 23 years respectively in the 
paddy fields in Ban Fangthai in November 2010. I struggled at first to determine 
whether they were Thai or Lao. Their characters and the way they dressed looked 
fashionable, and their Thai accents were excellent. Having spent eight years in Bangkok, 
they had seldom returned to work in the farm until this year, when Perd’s mother called 
them to come back to Laos due to the lack of labour in the village. The absence of the 
young generation in Ban Laonua led to labour shortages. Upon completion of work on 
their own farms, they moved to Ban Fangthai, following their neighbours who regularly 
sought jobs in villages along the Thai border.   
During my stay in their home in Ban Laonua, I learned that their families had a long 
migration history with Thailand. Perd’s father who migrated to Thailand approximately 
twenty years ago with his friends. Initially, he worked on a construction site in 
Chantaburi, a province in eastern Thailand, and returned home for the peak period of the 
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agricultural calendar. Ten years ago, he got a job in a restaurant in Rayong Province, 
also in eastern Thailand. So, he took Perd, his eldest daughter who was fifteen at the 
time, with him. Perd started working in Rayong and moved to work in a restaurant in 
Bangkok through a connection of her father’s employer. During the five years she spent 
in Bangkok without a work permit, she returned home once a year during Song Kran or 
the Thai and Lao New Years Festivals. Three years ago, she married Rae, a male also 
from Ban Laonua, but they had never met each other in the village in Laos as Perd 
moved out long ago. They got to know each other through friends. Rae moved to 
Bangkok at the age of twenty to work in an aluminium factory. His family had two sons 
so, he left his younger brother at home to help his parents in the paddy fields.  
In February 2011, when I returned to the village to conduct my fieldwork, I found that 
Perd and Rae had left for Bangkok with a numbers of young migrants I had met in Ban 
Fangthai. Some families kindly gave me the telephone number of their family members 
working in Thailand and insisted me to visit them. I also learned that some people were 
currently working in another border village not far from Ban Fangthai.  
Upon returning to Ban Fangthai, I called the Thai employer and asked if I could meet 
the above people.  I met seven Lao people from Ban Laonua, who had been hired 
temporarily for fifteen days to prepare the land for growing rubber. This work gave 
them 1,500 baht wage. Food and accommodation were provided by the employer. Five 
out of this number were people I had met during rice harvesting season in November 
2010. Two of them had worked in Bangkok before but did not want to go there at the 
moment. One who had been travelling around the Thai borderland agreed to work in any 
jobs offered by the Thai employers. These people crossed the border via the River. Their 
employer collected them from the pier in Ban Fangthai and sent them back using the 
same method.  Asked why they went no further than the Thai border, Lek, a 25 year-old 
migrant said: 
I try not to go far away from home. I did it when I was younger and was arrested. I was deported 
to Lao. My family had to pay money to get me from the police. I had worked around Thai border 
for many years so I knew many Thai employers. Next month, I would go to That Phanom 
156 
 
District to work in a grocery shop. I can ensure that I would be paid and am safe from the 
officials compared to go to Bangkok where I have to pay more money and may be arrested.
50
   
Pan, another migrant aged 29 years stated: 
I have been working in Thailand since I was 15 years old. I moved around in Phang Nga, Phuket 
and Bangkok. I was once cheated by a Thai employer, who promised to pay me, but he did not. 
After working for him for a few months, he sent me to the police. I was deported to Laos but I 
found opportunities to return and worked until I married my wife. We returned home because she 
was pregnant. Working in Thai border is another way to earn money where cases of arrest or 
cheating are rare.
51
  
The two above interviews resonate with the illegal but licit landscape. For these two 
migrants who experienced long-distance migration and arrest, working in the licit 
landscape of the Thai border was more secure.  
Returning to Bangkok some weeks after, I went to a Western restaurant in one of the 
most popular tourist areas of Bangkok to see Perd and other three migrants from Ban 
Laonua. One of them was Lhai, a sixteen year old boy who I had met twice before in the 
paddy field in Ban Fangthai in June and November 2010. He was working as a kitchen 
hand, grilling steak and making spaghetti. Perd and Lhai said they wanted to collect 
money to buy a new land and to do housing improvements. They could not say whether 
they would return to Ban Laonua again in the next rainy season or not. All depended on 
their parents, who would ask them to go home or tell them to stay. Perd and Lhai had 
travelled without documents for many years and had never been arrested. However, in 
2011, they paid 3,000 baht to do a passport and crossed the border via the Friendship 
Bridge as a tourist. This allowed them to stay in Thailand legally for 30 days. Both of 
them did not have work permit, so they had to be very careful when they wanted to go 
outside of their workplace and had to hide themselves from outsiders.  
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 Interview Mr Pan, 12 February 2011. 
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In order to gain broad perspectives of the lives of Lao migrants, I phoned another six 
Lao people from Ban Laonua, who were in Bangkok at the time. I made appointments to 
meet two of them at their work places. One of them was Mart, a 30 year-old female, 
who I had met in person in Ban Laonua in February. Mart regularly went to work in a 
Thai-Isan restaurant in Bangkok upon completion of the cultivating season. She had two 
sons in Laos but left them to stay with her elder sister. Her husband was a long-term 
migrant working on a rubber plantation in Nakornsrithammarat Province in southern 
Thailand. Besides seeing Mart, I met Kham and six of his family members including his 
wife and four children between fifteen to 28 years of age. All of them worked in a gas 
station not far from Mart’s working place. Getting paid around 150-200 baht per person 
per day, Mr Kham and his family were reluctant to return home in the rice transplanting 
season in the next few months. They said that rice production the previous year was 
terrible due to drought. Staying in Bangkok provided them with a chance to earn more 
money. I also talked to the owner of the gas station and learned that he preferred to 
employ Lao workers because they understood each other and most trustworthy 
compared to Burmese and Cambodian migrants. To get the Lao workers, he asked a 
friend in Laos to recruit labourers for him.  
Prior to the 1990s, the majority of Lao people crossed the border illegally with brokers. 
At present, while some still migrate illegally, the majority enter the country legally 
using Lao passports but overstayed and ignored to register themselves to the Thai labour 
system.  Familiar with working and travelling in Thailand, they pay money to brokers to 
get passports. Even though they are permitted to stay for only 30 days, in practice, most 
of them overstayed varying from three to four months to a year. Some migrants might 
return to Laos monthly to reissue their passports. This provided them with a chance to 
help their families by working on the farms in the harvesting season. Some opted to 
return, that is to overstay in Thailand but they had to be careful of the police. When they 
wanted to return home, they could acquire for a certification of Lao citizenship from the 
Lao Embassy in Bangkok and bribe the Thai and Lao police at the checkpoints along the 
way.  
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From my observation, the appearance of the Lao migrants and the way they spoke made 
it very difficult to distinguish whether they were Northeastern Thai people or Lao. 
However, all of the Lao migrants said the police could distinguish them.  Mr Kham, who 
had been caught by the Thai police a few years earlier said that the police just asked to 
see his identity card. Refusing to be put in jail, Mr Kham asked his employer if he 
would pay 3000 baht for the police, asking him to deduct the money from his wages in 
return. Asked what would have happened if had he refused to pay a fee to the police, Mr 
Kham said: 
I prefer to pay for the fee the Thai police to keep staying here. It was a chance to earn  more 
money. If I did not pay and was sent back to Lao, I would have been arrested by the Lao police. 
My family in Lao would have to come to collect me and pay for the fee anyway.
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Conversely, Lao workers who stayed in Thailand legally and had long-term stay rights, 
did not travel home very often. Their employers both registered and paid for their work 
permits; therefore, they did not have much freedom to move and change jobs compared 
to the illegal migrants. Armed with telephone numbers from families in Ban Kaemkong 
and Ban Laonua, I contacted four people who agreed to talk to me. Two were a couple 
working as domestic workers. One was a teenager aged 18 years, working as gardeners 
in the plant nursery not far from Bangkok. Another was a female who worked in a 
massage shop. Their employers kept their passports and other documents as a form of 
guarantee, making it more difficult for them to travel. They regularly sent remittances to 
their families and kept in touch by phoning their parents.  
Interviews with Lao migrants who moved only in and around the Thai borderlands, and 
with the above-mentioned Lao migrants in Bangkok showed some of the paradoxes 
between short-distance migration along the Thai border and longer-distance migration. 
First, while both groups were illegal migrants, they experienced different levels of risk. 
The further the distance travelled, the more the risks of being arrested and/or be cheated. 
Levels of legality depended on location. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, moving across 
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the Thai-Lao borders and working in the paddy fields were considered licit. In contrast, 
travelling to many destinations in Thailand, and working without work permits were 
considered illegal. Second, all of the case studies mentioned above demonstrate the 
multi-layered aspect of mobility in Lao PDR, and the people’s migrant status in 
Thailand. In the case of the Lao migrants, going to Thailand was likely perceived as an 
occasion to go to another city, rather than going abroad because most of them could 
speak Thai and they shared many similarities to Thai people. And, even though these 
similarities may have blurred their movement between internal and international 
migration, at the same time they provide some form of convenience and comfort to the 
migrant workers in terms of adjusting living and working with Thai people. But, these 
commonalities were not sufficient to eliminate their migrant status in another country.  
6.5 Conclusion   
In this chapter, I have explored migration landscape in a village in northeastern Thai 
borderland, and in two villages located in the borderland and the hinterland of Laos. I 
have demonstrated the causes and the patterns of migration in each location. While the 
focus of most of the earlier research into migration from Lao to Thailand has been on 
rural-to-urban migration, my study suggests the additional determining of the locations 
of sending and receiving areas, the histories, social connections, and the rural-to-rural 
migration across nation-state boundaries that occur extensively between the more and 
the less affluent countries.   
As the border villages, both Ban Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong served as sending and 
receiving migration landscapes. On the one hand, the people of each village were 
struggling to get access to the more diverse economic areas in many parts of Thailand. 
On the other hand, the need for agricultural labour force provided opportunities for 
people living far from the economic centre. Migration in Ban Kaemkong, as Lao border 
village, was, however, more diverse. It involved migrants keen to participate in the new 
businesses that emerged after the re-opening of the border, and labourers interested in 
securing wage-labour jobs. The better living conditions that now prevail have resulted in 
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the discontinuation of crossing the Mekong River to get wage-labour jobs in Ban 
Fangthai.  
The movement of the northeastern Thai people to urban cities, and of the Lao people 
from Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua to Ban Fangthai and other parts of Thailand, 
revealed two major aspects. First, it demonstrates the links between internal and 
international migration, i.e., that the traditional categories of migration based on 
destination and the dimension of short/long/seasonal migration fail to adequately 
describe the situation of Lao migrants working in Thailand. It also marks the blurring 
and overlapping of rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration. This chapter suggests 
that this dynamic migration requires a situated examination, not only of the two 
localities, but also of the process in which such mobility is made possible. 
Second, the movement of the northeastern Thai people from their agricultural lands and 
their replacement by Lao migrants is evidence that internal migration can often lead to 
international migration. This finding challenges the conventional views embedded in 
contemporary migration studies, which only analyse migration in accordance with the 
dichotomies of international migration or rural-to-urban migration. The relevance 
between migration and agricultural livelihoods will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
Borderlands Agriculture, Labour Relations, and Agrarian Aspirations 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two, I addressed the key processes pertinent to the growing body of literature 
on de-agrarianisation: moving away from strictly agricultural livelihoods to off-farm 
occupations; the growth of off-farm incomes; and, the young generation’s lack of 
interest in agrarian livelihoods. However, some contemporary works problematise 
another side of the linear process of de-agrarianisation. Vandergeest (2012), for 
example, raises a question regarding re-agrarianisation based on renewed interests in the 
new chances available in agriculture effected by the boom in cash crops and food prices. 
Hirsch (2011) suggests reconsidering a unilinear approach to agrarian transition in light 
of the cultural, geographical and historical specificity of diversified rural transformation. 
 
In this Chapter, I discuss the conditions of agriculture in the northeastern Thai-Lao 
borderlands and a hinterland village of Lao PDR. I argue that, although rural livelihoods 
in both Northeast Thailand and Laos have changed in similar ways in line with de-
agrarianisation due to job diversification, mobility and migration, and the growth of 
remittances, farming has persisted and, agriculture is still a desirable alternative for 
many people. However, the interaction between people and agriculture is determined by 
different family contexts; e.g, land ownership, education, gender, and generation. 
Educated and successful migrants, who have moved socially upward may find an 
opportunity to invest in cash crops as entrepreneurs. Conversely, uneducated migrants, 
who cannot move upward to middle-class jobs, viewed agriculture more favourably than 
the labouring jobs in the city. 
 
In the first section of this Chapter, which delineates the agricultural conditions of Ban 
Fangthai, I suggest that the village faced agricultural labour shortages because the young 
cohort were moving to the city. This section, as well as revealing the specific contexts of 
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Ban Fangthai, argues that a certain type of agriculture persisted because the villagers 
were able to absorb Lao migrants across the border. In addition, the abundance of land, 
the boom in the price of rice, support from the government’s rice mortgaging schemes 
or price guaranteeing, and the new opportunities stemming from rubber plantations, 
together facilitated agrarian livelihoods. Villagers from different backgrounds in terms 
of generation, ages, and gender interacted differently with agricultural jobs for different 
reasons. The discussion explores the nature of differentiation and social class became 
more complicated in a more mobile rural context.   
 
In the second section, I outline the agrarian livelihoods in two villages in Lao PDR, Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban Laonua. Ban Kaemkong is located at the border and Ban Laonua in 
the hinterlands. Agriculture persisted in both villages albeit in different ways. In Ban 
Kaemkong, half of villagers were salaried people. Those who owned lands grew rice 
only for subsistence consumption. The other half diversified their livelihoods to off-farm 
jobs in Thailand, remitted money to their natal village, or pursued their agrarian 
livelihoods. Differentiation in Ban Kaemkong was evident in the proportion of family 
members who obtained salaried and off-farm jobs, and in remittances. In Ban Laonua, 
fewer opportunities for off-farm jobs encouraged some villagers to migrate to Thailand. 
Both the wealthy and poor households were equally dependent on the amount of 
agricultural land and remittances. My in-depth interviews revealed that many Lao 
migrants in Bangkok wanted to quit their intensive labour jobs in Thailand and return to 
invest in both farming and off-farm jobs in their home villages. Some had returned to 
work on their parents’ lands. Their earnings from labour jobs in Thailand allowed many 
of them to invest in small businesses, build new houses, or buy new lands, all of which 
provided upward mobility for the Lao villagers.   
7.2 Agrarian Transformation in Ban Fangthai     
Over the past decade, studies of agrarian transformation have shown that Thailand’s 
agricultural sector is in a process of de-agrarianisation (Rigg 2001, Rigg & Sakunee 
2009). Focusing on the diversification of livelihood strategies, Rigg (2001) argues that 
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subsistence-based agriculture, if it ever existed, was discontinued long ago. Rural-to-
urban migration, non-agricultural pursuits of the young generation and severe 
agricultural labour shortages shrink farming activities, diminish agricultural livelihoods, 
and ultimately push farmers into leaving their farmlands, renting them out or even 
disposing of their land completely. Inevitably, these conditions fuelled aspirations of the 
people to move away from the village (Rigg, 2001; Rigg & Ritchie, 2002; Rigg & 
Sakunee, 2001).  
The linear process of de-agrarianisation is currently being questioned by contemporary 
works (Hirsch, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Vandergeest, 2012). Vandergeest (2012), for 
example, argues that farming endures mostly through the process of re-agrarianisation, a 
process prompted by food prices, renewed interest in agriculture, poverty reduction and 
food security policies that agriculturalists view as alternative solutions. 
 
In the case of the villagers of Ban Fangthai, in the period 2010-2011, I found that not 
only had peoples’ livelihoods changed, but their sources of income had become 
diversified. But, they had not lost interest in farming. This section reveals why and how 
farming persisted and how this has enhanced our understanding of agrarian 
transformation.  
7.2.1 Livelihood diversification in Ban Fangthai  
Outwardly, Ban Fangthai looked very much like an agrarian community. Large areas of 
paddy fields, and the gardens surrounding the village distinguished it from the city. The 
houses were located along a small paved road that ran parallel with the Mekong River; 
other sealed roads led to the paddy fields. Most of the houses were built from concrete 
or a mix of concrete and wood. Electricity and water system were available to all, every 
household had a motorcycle, but cars and pickup trucks were rarely seen. The villagers 
led selectively basic lifestyles. All of the houses had television sets, refrigerators, fans, 
and radios; however, only five households in the village had air-conditioners.  
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Most of the households in Ban Fangthai owned and farmed their land, of which 71 per 
cent was defined as agricultural. Others were involved in fisheries in the Mekong River 
(10 per cent) or labouring jobs (10 per cent), (See Table 7.1). Based on the TAO’s and 
the local Agricultural Office’s data, Ban Fangthai villagers’ livelihoods were mainly 
derived from the agricultural sector. 
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Table 7.1 Ban Fangthai: Summary Data (2010) 
 
Population   
Household 362 
Population 1275  
People/household   3.52 
Land use (rai)
53
 
Agricultural land in total      
 Rice land             
 Rubber and orchards 
            Sugarcane and Cassava     
            House plots  
 Public land  
Occupation  
            Farming households  
 Fisheries households 
            Labouring households 
            Government households 
 Trading and business Households 
 Average Income/Villager/Annum 
 Sources of income          
 Farm 
             Cropping 
             Livestock  
             Fisheries 
             Other 
             Total-farm 
Non-farm 
              Salaried/Labouring 
              Trading and business  
              Others  
              Total non-farm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2,350 
1,500(63.8%) 
227 (9.66%) 
300 (12.77%) 
303 (12.90%) 
20 (0.85%) 
 
71% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
4% 
42,600.87 baht 
 
 
33.24% 
7% 
4.26% 
0.7% 
45.20% 
 
32% 
12.08% 
10% 
54.8% 
 
Sources: the data were collected by the local government offices which are the Tambon Wan Yai 
Administration Organisation (TAO) and the Department of Community Development (CDD) of Wan Yai 
District Governor Office in 2010.  
 
 
However, some doubt surrounds the figures reported by the TAO (2010) and the CDD 
(2010), particularly those relating to income and occupation. In terms of sources of 
income, the balance of livelihoods were dominated by agriculture and farming. Yet, 
                                                 
53
 1 hectare (ha) is 6.25 rai. 
166 
 
households were more likely to depend on non-farm than farm pursuits.  Grandstaff et 
al. (2008, pp. 302, 308-309) also reflected this trend in their study that the northeastern 
Thailand region as a whole has the proportion of households whose main source of 
income was from agriculture declined from 71 per cent in 1986 to 37 per cent in 2004. 
At the same time, households’ non-farm cash earnings have gone from 21 per cent in 
1981 to 42 per cent in 2004. This became clear from the results of my survey of 100 
sample households with traditional and second occupations: only 25 among them 
declared agriculture as their main occupation (see Table 7.2).  The majority of villagers 
embraced multiple occupations, combining their agricultural pursuits with various forms 
of off-farm enterprise and employment. Two out of 100 interviewees were unemployed, 
having already given their land to their children. One local entrepreneur had no land 
because his parents had sold it to pay for their debts. Their current income came from 
selling ice-cream. And one household earned mainly from construction jobs. It should 
be noted that apart from these four households, the remaining 96 identified themselves 
as farmers, regardless of the small amount of income from agriculture.  Agriculture, rice 
farming in particular, was a very important source of cultural identity.  This persisted 
despite the fact that it became a subsidiary activity for the majority of households.  
 
Table 7.2 Occupations in Ban Fangthai by the Survey Conducted with 100 
Households in 2010 
Main jobs                                                                          Number of Households Number of Households 
(N = 100) 
  
Agriculture (Farming/Fisheries)      25 
Farmers/labourers (construction and agricultural labourers)  22                             
Local Enterprise(traders, food stallers, etc) /farmers                         39  
Local Enterprise (no farm)                                         1 
Salaried employees/farmers                 10 
Labouring jobs                                                                                      1 
Unemployed                     2 
 
Total                  100  
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
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Agrarian studies commonly point out that the phenomena of villagers multiplying their 
occupations and the large number of villagers migrating to off-farm jobs in the city are 
signs of de-agrarianisation (Bryceson et al., 2000; Rigg, 2001). However, I found this 
concept problematic when explaining agrarian livelihoods in Ban Fangthai because it 
tended to overlook the fact that farming remained significant for some villagers. The 
literature did not take into account different contexts, the amount of land, educational 
backgrounds and generational differences. As I have already suggested in Chapters five 
and six, out-migration and agricultural labour shortages were typical in Ban Fangthai. 
The spatial context of Thai-Lao borderlands supported this marginal village’s absorption 
of the Lao seasonal migrants. In the following section, I will show how the context of 
the borderland provided supportive factors to agriculture in association with land and 
labour.   
7.2.2 Land Holdings in the Borderland Context 
Scholarly research in agrarian transformation reveals that one of the factors leading to 
de-agrarianisation was the dramatic decline in the importance of agricultural land due to 
both non-farm job opportunities and the rising land prices, the combination of which 
urged farmers to cease farming and to sell their land (Rigg, 2001; Rigg & Sakunee, 
2001). Thailand’s export-oriented industrialisation efforts since the mid-1980s led to the 
establishment of large industrial estates in many provinces and to increased land prices.  
In Ayutthaya province in central Thailand, for example, the establishment of the 
Industrial Park resulted in the booming land prices which encouraged land owners to 
sell their land (Suriya & Amara, 2000). A study by  Rigg, Veeravongs, Veeravongs, and 
Rohitarachoon (2008, p. 371) conducted in a village in Uthai district where the 
Industrial Park is located, shows that before the Park began operations, the price of land 
was approximately 3,000–4,000 baht per rai. When land agents began to arrive in the 
village, the price rose more than 10-fold; by 1983–84, land was selling for up to 60,000–
70,000 baht per rai. By 1989, the figure had reached 2 million baht per rai; today, prime 
roadside land commands as much as 5–6 million baht per rai. These increase in price 
saw farmers become millionaires overnight.  
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In sharp contrast to events in Uthai district, this land boom did not occur in Ban 
Fangthai. Located on the border of Northeast Thailand, the poorest region in the 
country, the village was neither a popular tourist venue, nor was it zoned for industrial 
development. Hence, the pattern of development in the area was different from that of 
some locations, described in agrarian studies elsewhere and which describe agricultural 
land around a city being sold for tourism purposes or for the construction of gated 
communities. In essence, it is urbanisation that drives land price rises (Rigg & Ritchie, 
2002; Rigg & Sakunee, 2001; Tubtim, 2011). 
It was difficult for the Ban Fangthai villagers to convert their land for purposes other 
than agriculture. The low land prices were a consequence of low levels of 
industrialisation. While the villagers of Ayutthaya Industrial Park in Uthai district were 
able to sell their land for 2,400,000 – 12,000,000 baht per rai, villagers in Ban Fangthai 
could only realise 100,000 – 200,000 bath per rai (see Table 7.3). Thus, although the 
villages of Ban Fangthai earnestly wished to sell their lands, sales were impeded by the 
slow rate of land development in the area. Mr Derm, a 54-year-old male who owned 15 
rai of rice land stated that: 
Although the land price has been increasing over the years from 500 baht per rai when I 
was 18 years old to 50,000 to 100,000 baht per rai at the moment, I still do not want to 
sell land. The price is too low to lose the land that I am still cultivating. In general, 
villagers here do not sell land and nobody asks to buy land from neighbours or relatives. 
If they need money urgently, they tend to borrow from relatives. Some might mortgage 
the land and continue cultivating it but, in the end, they would try to pay and get the 
land back.
54
 
 
Some land in good condition was sold to outsiders, but this depended on the location 
and the individual reasons of the land owners for selling. Asked about the two newly 
built vacation houses along the Mekong River and the land owners, Mr Derm said: 
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 Interview (telephone), Mr Derm, 5 June 2013. 
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Those lands were sold to rich people from the city. It was worth selling because the land 
price was 500,000 – 1,000,000 baht per rai. In fact, the landowners did not want to sell 
it, but they were in debt.
55
 
 
 
Table 7.3 Comparative land prices between Wan Yai District and other Districts in 
the studies on de-agrarianisation in Thailand (baht per rai) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Districts/Province     Land price/rai/baht 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Wan Yai/ Mukdahan        100,000 – 200,000 
Muang/Chiang Mai                 3,120,000 – 100,000,000 
Hang Dong/Chiang Mai                2,400,000 – 8,000,000 
Uthai/Ayutthaya        2,400,000 – 12,000,000  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  The Treasury Department Thailand (2013) 
 
 
Land prices were among the factors that persuaded most of the households in Ban 
Fangthai to keep their land. According to interview with a 77 year-old lady, who had 
ceased farming and given all her land to her children: 
I had 120 rai of rice land but it is divided among my six children who all lived and 
worked in Mukdahan city and Bangkok. Nobody worked on the land. Some of them rent 
out their land to my relatives who are living in another village to farm. I owned a large 
amount of land because my husband and I had firstly cleared the jungle and had 
occupied the land since sixty years ago. Most of the lands were hilly, dry and infertile. 
We used to grow rice once a year and had stopped in the last twenty years. The land 
here is too cheap to sell and nobody wants to buy especially the hilly location of my 
land. It was only 50,000 baht per rai. My children said that they did not need money in 
urgent, so they do not need to sell the land. 
56
  
 
A survey of the land holdings conducted in 2011 by the District Agricultural Office 
revealed that a total of 169 households
57
 had reported owning rice paddies. The majority 
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 Interview (telephone), Mr Derm, 5 June 2013. 
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 Interview, Ms Kard, 10 June 2010. 
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 The total number of households of Ban Fangthai is 364 but the numbers of households reported on rice 
growing land is 169 because in many cases several households grow rice on the same piece of land.  
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were small to medium scale farmers, who grew rice on land ranging in area from 6.25 to 
15 rai. They comprised 51 per cent of total households, followed by households that 
grew rice on land of size range 16-30 rai or 28 per cent of total households (see Table 
7.4). Only seven large-scale farmer households grew rice on more than 31 rai of land; 
they accounted for four per cent of the total households. 
Table 7.4 Households’ Rice Growing land (Ban Fangthai) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Size of Land holding   Number of Households and Percentage 
____________________________________________________________________ 
< 6.25 rai       28 (17%) 
6.25-15 rai       86 (51%)   
16-30 rai        48 (28%) 
31 rai or more           7 (4%)   
Total                              169 (100%)
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Wan Yai District Agricultural Office (2011).  
 
7.2.3 Agricultural labour and technology in the Borderland Context 
The movement of people from farm to non‐farm employment and from rural to urban 
areas led to agricultural labour constraints, but forced farmers to adapt their farming 
techniques. In many parts of Thailand including some areas in the Northeast, farmers 
adopt to mechanisation of rice production (Benchaphun, Sungkapitux, Kitchaicharoen, 
& Suebpongsang, 2007; Hirsch, 2012a; Molle & Srijantr, 1999). But mechanisation does 
not work with all geographical locations. In Ban Fangthai, the hilly environment played 
a vital role in limiting the adoption of agricultural technologies. This made agriculture 
highly dependent on human labour.   
Compared to other regions of Thailand, rice farming technology in Ban Fangthai was 
relatively less advanced. In central Thailand, the region had long been the main source 
of rice for the country’s exports. In more recent times, the farmers had abandoned the 
traditional practice of transplanting paddy seedlings or ‘Na Dum’ and changed to sowing 
rice seeds or “Na Whaan”. The villagers opted to use advance ploughing and rice 
cultivating machines to respond to labour shortages. In addition, they had been using 
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more chemicals. The rice fields were planted to yield two to three crops a year and most 
of the areas have irrigation systems (Hirsch, 2012a; Molle & Srijantr, 1999). In contrast, 
farmers in Ban Fangthai retained their rice transplanting growing method because 
according to them it guaranteed higher yields than the broadcast sowing technique. 
Without efficient irrigation and drainage systems, the people were dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture and human labour. For them, the most advanced technology was use of the 
two-wheeled tractor that arrived in the village in the 1980s. Gor Khor glutinous (sticky) 
rice species and jasmine rice species replaced their local rice species, they used chemical 
fertiliser mixed with natural fertiliser, and used chemical pesticides to kill the crabs and 
weeds.    
Households in Ban Fangthai grew glutinous rice predominantly for consumption: they 
sold the surplus. People who owned more than fifteen rai of land split the land so that 
they could plant part in sticky rice for household consumption and part in jasmine rice 
for commercial purposes. The rice-planting season started in May with the arrival of the 
rainy season. First, the farmers prepared the land. Then they cultivated the seedlings by 
growing rice seed in the wetland or the areas not far from the pond, the river or streams. 
Once the paddies were ploughed, and there had been adequate rain, farmers then 
transplanted the seedlings into prepared paddies. They pulled out the seedlings one by 
one and transferred them to the prepared paddies. This backbreaking constantly work 
was carried out from June to August. In the meantime until early October, the farmers 
had to constant remove weeds by hand or use pesticide for this purpose. After the rainy 
season, the rice seedlings grew and turned gold in colour. By late October, the crop was 
ready to be harvested.  
Table 7.5 Specific months allocated to rice production 
 
April June October December January Februay March
harvesting
May July August September November
weed removing 
transplanting seedling, fertilising
ploughing, prepare seedlings, and broadcasting pesticide in the soil 
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Prior to the 1960s, the villagers engaged in relatively few activities. Rice growing, the 
most labour intensive job, spread over several months a year. Ploughing, using cattle, 
was predominantly done by males. Behind them came the women and children who 
worked on transplanting. The whole process would take at least four months and 
involved the whole family. And because they grew local rice, they had to wait for at 
least three to four months for cultivation.  
Today, rice transplanting takes only three to five days for farmers who own less than 
6.25 rai of land, and two weeks for farmers who own more than 31 rai of land. The 
standing plough machine allows villagers to work quickly, especially the households 
that hired the owner of the standing plough to work for them. However, the 
unpredictable rainfall and their non-farm jobs make all of the farmers eager to finish 
their rice farming as soon as possible. When they find that the rainfall is sufficient to 
make the soil muddy, they start ploughing and rice transplanting at the same time, a 
joint action that spawns competition among the labour forces.   
 
In Ban Fangthai, the villagers have taken advantage of the marginal location of the Thai-
Lao border to employ seasonal Lao migrants for their labour intensive rice production. 
Research programmes conducted in other border provinces of Thailand also demonstrate 
the use of seasonal migrants from neighboring countries, who come to stay during the 
peak demand for labour. Providing an example of research conducted in Chiang Rai 
Province, Makpun (2008) notes that Thai farmers growing cash crops under the contract 
farming system, hire the cheap Lao seasonal workers from the other side of the Mekong 
River. Similarly, in a study undertaken in Ubonrachatanee Province, Taotawin (2011) 
points out that farmers who are faced with labour shortages hire cheap Lao seasonal 
migrants for intensive organic rice farming.  These examples all highlight the fact that 
farmers living in the borderlands respond to labour constraints by seeking new sources 
of labour from their poorer neighboring countries rather than use more farm machinery.  
In this sense, their borderland location proves advantageous for the farmers. They can 
acquire cheap labour across the border easily whereas their hinterland counterparts have 
difficulties acquring seasonal migrants. However, the borderland farmers’ ability to 
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absorb cheap labour may give rise to lack of incentive to improve their rice cultivation 
technologies. 
7.2.4 The Boom in the price of rice and Alternative Cash Crops  
In a major rice consumption and rice-growing country like Thailand, rice is deeply 
rooted in the people’s way of life. It is the repository of traditions and customs that are 
profoundly linked with particular aspects of Thailand’s economic, social and political 
conventions. The story of rice has been primarily one of de-agrarianisation in Thailand 
(Vandergeest, 2012).  The moving away from rice fields of the farmers to off-farm jobs 
and the lack of desire to be farmers among the young generation, are frequently 
addressed topics in a mainstream de-agrarianisation literature (Rigg, 2001).  In the 
borderlands, although an abundance of land and migrant labour has increased the 
capacity of farmers to continue rice farming, they are not sufficiently strong push factors 
to encourage people to continue farming where income gains from rice cultivation are 
very low and the working conditions in the paddy fields are unfavourable, especially due 
to hot weather and hard labour work. Under such conditions, villagers opt for off-farm 
jobs that offer better incomes than rice. When I asked the villagers why they kept on 
farming, most replied that it was because they had been farming the land for a long time 
and could not just abandon it.   
 
Further enquiry, however, revealed a number of factors that support 
villagers’continuance of rice faming, factors such as the boom in the price of rice and 
government policy to subsidise rice farms around the country.
58
 An increase in the price 
of glutinous rice in 2009 was one of the major factors that encouraged farmers to 
continue working on their farmland.
59
 Table 7.6 shows that the overall price of glutinous 
rice in Thailand rose steadily between 2002 and 2012.   
 
                                                 
58
 As Vandergeest (2012) notes, there was a revitalisation of rice farming due to a price boom and 
government rice rice price guarantee scheme.   
 
59
 In 2007, the boom was affected by a price guaranteeing scheme that focused on jasmine rice. As a 
result, the majority of farmers turned to growing jasmine rice, which led to a low supply of sticky rice.  
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Table 7.6 Average Price of Unmilled Glutinous Rice between 2002 and 2012 (baht per 
Tonne)* 
Year Baht per tonne 
2006 7,612 
2007 10,710 
2008 8,654 
2009 9,363 
2010 15,109 
2011 13,614 
2012 11,925 
*The price of unmilled glutiouns rice in each of the year 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) Thailand (2013) 
 
The boom in the price of rice which was triggered by surplus demand (starting in 2007) 
reinforced the Ban Fangthai villagers to continue growing rice for household 
consumption and keep the leftover amount for selling. Although family farms in Ban 
Fangthai relied heavily upon hiring both Thai and Lao workers, the cost of growing rice 
for household consumption was considerably cheaper than buying rice. Among the total 
100 sampled households, the inputs for one rai of rice farm would cost approximately 
1,000 baht. This cost included wages, fertilizer and other miscellaneous items. At the 
same time, the farmers would gain 503 kg (milled rice) average rice yield per rai.
60
  
The cost of growing rice was cheaper than buying rice. Ms Sud, a 45 year-old woman 
who had been a farmer for her entire life, said that her family of two adults consumed 
approximately one bag of milled rice (50 kg) per month. At the time that I conducted my 
fieldwork, the price of glutinous rice was 22 baht for one kg. If Ms Sud had to buy rice, 
it would have cost at least 1,100 baht per month. However, she grew rice on her land 
which yeilded approximately 400-500 kg milled rice yield per rai. Ms Sud invested 
                                                 
60
 Rice yields in Wan Yai District in 2011-2012 were approximately 13.75 tonne (unmilled rice), per 
hectare or at 503 kg (milled rice) per rai  (Office of the Governor of Mukdahan, 2010). This was above the 
rice yield of Northeast Thailand rice yields in general (336 kg of milled rice per rai, or 2,100 kg unmilled 
rice per hectare) and the national average (370 kg milled rice per rai, or 2,312 unmilled rice per hectare) 
calculated by  Thai Rice Exporters Association (2013). 
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1,000 baht per rai in her land; and she and her husband worked the land helped by 
migrant labour.
61
   
Aided by labour from Laos, rice farming generated a certain amount of rice for domestic 
consumption and some money from selling the surplus. In terms of non-salaried families 
who were dependent on agricultural production, such as local vendors and small-farm 
holders, rice farming was not only an income source but also their source of food 
security. This was in the form of diversification, not the subsistence survival as was the 
case decade ago. Ms Yao, a 39 years old female stated that: 
Living costs and the price of rice are increasing yearly. If I have to buy rice, I might 
have to spend more than a thousand baht per month. Growing rice in our land is 
cheaper. Rice is the staple food for my family. It is the most important thing. For other 
food, we can gather from the nature. We can catch fish in the River and get vegetables 
from the forest.
62
   
 
Another important factor that encouraged farmers to invest in rice farming was the 
government rice price guarantee scheme introduced in 2010 that allowed farmers to 
pledge their rice to the government. If the market price was higher than the pledged 
price, farmers could sell rice for the higher amount. If not, the government would 
compensate for the shortfall to provide financial relief for farmers who had been 
suffering from climatic fluctuations and market instability. Because the majority of 
farmers in Ban Fangthai were small-to-medium scale farmers who owned rice land 
below 30 rai,
63
 most of them benefited from this scheme and were encouraged to 
continue investing in rice farming.  
 
The villagers in the borderlands not only invested in rice: additional major crops were 
cassava, corn, eucalyptus, tamarind, and sugar cane (see Table 7.7). Cassava grew 
particularly well in poor soil. Small areas were allocated for growing peanuts and corn. 
                                                 
61
 Interview, Ms Sud, 7 April 2011. 
62
 Interview, Ms Yao, 14 November 2010. 
63
 The rice mortgaging schemes limited to 25 rai (4 hectares) of rice land per household.   
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Cropping systems were mainly mono cropping; double cropping was undertaken only in 
the irrigated areas. Although agriculture had become a subsidiary activity for many 
families, land was considered the fundamental way of generating food and money.  
 
Table 7.7 Major Cash Crops Based on a Survey Conducted with 100 Sampled 
Households in 2010 
 
Main jobs                                                                          Number of Households Number of 
Households (N = 100) 
  
Rice only                                                          41 
Rice and cash crops (cassava, beans, corn, eucalypts, orchards)      22 
Rice and rubber                                                                                                   11 
Rice, rubber and other cash crops                                                                       20 
Cash crops only                                                                                                    2 
Stop farming, no farming                                              4            
 
Total                                   100  
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
 
In the 1990s, commercial crops such as rubber trees and eucalypts were introduced and 
sponsored by the government. Rubber tree plantations extended from southern to 
northeastern Thailand, beginning in the border areas near the Mekong River. However, 
plantations on a larger scale did not emerge until 2005. Rubber tree plantations in 
northeastern Thailand had increased from  2,984,097 rai in 2009 to 3,362,791 rai in 
2011, and 3,477,303 rai in 2013 (Rubber Research Institute of Thailand, 2013).  In 
Mukdahan Province, the total rubber tree planted area in 2010 was 136,083 rai while the 
total rubber tree plantation in Wan Yai district was 2,473 rai (Office of the Governor of 
Mukdahan, 2010, p. 23). 
 
The growing demand and consistent rise in rubber prices over the decades motivated the 
villagers of Ban Fangthai to invest in rubber plantations. Some visualised profit in the 
long run, but not everybody was able to make the switch given that rubber tree 
plantations required considerable financial investment. Table 7.7 shows that 31 out of 
100 sampled households grew rubber along with rice and other cash crops, but only five 
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of them earned money from the rubber. The remainders were new growers. The success 
of early rubber growers in Ban Fangthai and in the nearby villages in Nakorn Phanom 
Province became their inspiration.  
7.2.5 Rural differentiation in the borderland context 
Rural differentiation based upon the differential access to means of production, e.g., 
land, capital, and labour, is the main focus of earlier agrarian studies. Class is based on 
the ownership of means of production while social relations are connected with 
production forces in agriculture (White 1989). In contemporary agrarian studies, many 
scholars suggest extending the criteria for understanding rural class structures and 
inequalities to a broader range of access to new opportunities such as off-farm 
occupations, commercialised agriculture, and migration (Kelly, 2011, 2012; Rigg & 
Sakunee, 2001). While the new opportunities are available, villagers do not have equal 
access. Rigg & Sakunee (2001) highlight education as an important determinant of the 
opportunities. They point out that villagers with a low level of educational attainment 
are marginalised as wage labourers on the agricultural lands or in unskilled non-farm 
employment. For those who complete secondary school, new job opportunities in non-
farm sectors open up.
64
 Likewise, Vandergeest (2012), highlights that agriculture is a 
favourable alternative for local villagers lacking post-secondary degrees, that is, people 
faced with the choice of either agrarian occupations or working as unskilled hire labour 
on construction sites and in the factories. This was partly true in Ban Fangthai, which 
saw many middle-aged people below 40 years of age return to agriculture and other off-
farm jobs. However, the factors that determined whether people stayed in agriculture 
were also differentiated by generation, gender, family, and educational background, all 
of which shaped their interaction with agriculture and rural differentiation within the 
village. 
 
                                                 
64
 Prior to 1999, Thailand compulsory education was six years. In 1999, Thailand compulsory education 
was increased to nine years, enforcing all parents to enroll their children in schools until they graduate 
from the lower secondary level. It consists of six years of primary education, three years of lower 
secondary, and three years of upper secondary education. 
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In order to investigate rural differentiation in Ban Fangthai, I categorise households 
based on their main occupation and range of income and draw attention to individual 
and household case studies. Table 7.8 shows that marginal households with below 5,000 
baht of income per month were evident in both categories, i.e., agricultural pursuit 
households and job diversification households. And while off-farm jobs provided some 
rural families with better income, this may not have been the case for other households. 
Many households that were dependent on agriculture alone could earn more than 10,000 
baht per month. By categorising household incomes, I will reveal households that 
pursued agriculture, and the factors that shaped their decision making and their social 
mobility trajectories. 
 
Table 7.8 Range of Income based on Main Occupations in Ban Fangthai
65
  
Main Occupations Range of Income/Number of Households Total 
(N=100) Below 5,000 
baht/month 
5,000-9,999 
baht/month 
10,000 or 
above 
baht/month 
Agriculture 
(Farming/Fisheries) 
4 8 13 25 
Farmers/labourers 
(construction and 
agriculture)  
6 18 15 39 
Local 
Enterprise/farmers 
(traders, food 
stallers, etc)              
6 14 2 22 
Local Enterprise 
(no farm)  
- 1 - 10 
Salaried 
employees/farmers 
- - 10 1 
Only labouring 
jobs                                                                               
- 1 - 1 
Unemployed 
  
- 2 - 2 
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
                                                 
65
 The range of income presented here is based on my survey. According to the office of Governor of 
Mukdahan (2010), the average income per household in 2010 was 13,497 baht/month.  
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 Households that earned above 10,000 baht per month  
Most of the agricultural pursuit households that earned above 10,000 baht per month 
held at least 15 rai of land and diversified their crops. They grew rice along with 
cassava, sugarcane, rubber, and orchards to maximize their profit from agriculture. 
Some also caught fish in the Mekong River to sell. Ten out of 25 households, whose  
members were a couple both above 50 years of age. They were entrepreneurial farmers, 
who had invested in agri-business and obtained loans from the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) for agricultural investment
66
. All had more than 31 
rai of rice fields and at least 5 rai of rubber plantations; but, only three of them could 
earn money from rubber while the rest had just started to grow rubber.  
 
Non-labour intensive agriculture proved an alternative means of livelihood for an 
entrepreneur who wanted to ensure long-term saving after retirement. Ms Mon, a 59 
year-old female, married an Australian and moved to live in Australia for 20 years. She 
returned to Ban Fangthai last year and stayed with her mother. Her husband still travels 
between Australia and Thailand and plans to retire in Ban Fangthai. Ms Mon owned 15 
rai of rice paddies and hired Lao migrants during the rice cultivating season. She had 
recently bought five rai of land from her neighbour and planned to invest in rubber. I 
met Mr Ken and Ms Mon in January 2011. Mr Ken, Ms Mon’s husband, who was a 60 
year-old man, stated: 
 
We wanted to retire here and found that rubber is a good thing to invest in. It is a low-
labour intensive business with a good return. In only five years, we can earn money 
from it and it will last for at least twenty years. It could be an earning for our 
retirement.
67
 
 
                                                 
66
 Most households in Ban Fangthai were in debt to the BACC and/or village fund. However, they mostly 
stated that objective of taking loans was for consumption. Only the entrepreneurial farmers earning more 
than 10,000 baht per month stated that they used the money from the BACC and other funds for 
investment in cash crops.  
67
 Interview, Mr Ken and Ms Mon, 21 January 2011. 
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The young cohort, many of whom have little education,
68
 regarded agriculture as a 
favorable alternative. Three out of 25 of the prominent agricultural households that 
earned more than 10,000 baht per month were young households composed of the 
siblings below 35 years of age. They had finished in the elementary education and had 
experienced working in urban cities. But they chose to return to Ban Fangthai to invest 
in agriculture on the condition that they would inherit the land from their parents.  
 
Agriculture is a complementary income for those households that have diversified their 
income generation. Households that earned more than 10,000 baht per month usually 
had diversified their income generation to include local enterprise, and labouring jobs. 
And, most of the salaried households allocated more time to their non-farm jobs, both 
within and out of the village. The two local enterprises were households that owned the 
big grocery stores in the village. They were both managed by females with a male 
sibling who had experienced migration to Bangkok and the Middle East. In terms of 
laboring households earning more than 10,000 baht per month, they usually had two or 
more household members working. Their ages were below 50 years so they had more 
opportunities for jobs than the elderly family members. It was also interesting to find 
that although many sources of income came from off-farm jobs, households in this 
category still pursued agriculture as an alternative livelihood strategy. Notably, these 
households did not own much land: the majority of households in this group owned less 
than twenty rai of rice paddy. 
 
Villagers with higher educational backgrounds and salaried people maintained their 
farms as safety nets.  All of the salaried households that earned more than 10,000 baht 
per month comprised people who had reached post-secondary school education level 
and worked as teachers, government officials, or local leaders, e.g., the village head and  
                                                 
68
 Villagers educated below secondary school level. 
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the staff at TAO.
69
 The upward mobility of these households was obviously generated  
by education and work experience. In the highest-achieving family, the father was a 
teacher while the mother engaged in agricultural activities which are included 50 rai of 
rice fields and ten rai of rubber plantation. Their two daughters, both of whom had 
university degrees, worked as nurses in a private hospital in Bangkok: each earned more 
than 40,000 baht per month.  
 
However, education did not necessarily bring people away from farming. Some people 
who had good education profiles and were employed in middle-class jobs, would 
consider returning home if they could access opportunities in agriculture. Four highly-
educated villagers working in Bangkok, who returned to their natal village during the 
Thai New Year in April 2011, said to me that their natal village could be a retirement 
place. Bee, a 28 year-old female, who currently works as a teacher in a private school in 
Bangkok, stated: 
 
I left the village when I was fifteen years old to go to a high school in Udonthanee 
Province. I never return to work in my parents’ farm.  I know my parents invest in rice, 
cassava, and rubber but they have my elder brother to help. I like my job but the living 
condition in Bangkok is also tough. Things are expensive. If I have a family, I would 
have to send my kid to my parents to take care of. I could not return home if I got a job 
here or after retirement. I do not know how to cultivate rice but I have a lot of relatives 
and I know I could find wage-labourers to do it for me.
70
    
 
 Households with an average income of 5,001-9,999 baht 
The majority of households in Ban Fangthai earned approximately 5,001-9,999 
baht/month: they had average land holding of five to twenty rai and have diversified 
their off-farm jobs to support to return from agriculture.  
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 Some highly-educated villagers, e.g., teachers and local government officials who appreciated the  
sufficiency economy, realised that the idea could be put into practice. Some did organic farming and 
mixed farming - fish ponds, vegetable farms, and rice farms at the same time. They hired Lao migrants to 
do work. One teacher stated that he generally hired Lao migrants for most activities on his farm including 
rice transplanting and cultivating, removing weeds once a month, and digging the fish ponds.  
70
 Interview, Ms Bee, 12 April 2011. 
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Almost half of the agricultural and labour households (N=8) and agricultural and 
enterprise households (N=5), comprising people aged above 40 years, had children 
working in the urban centres.  Off-farm employment and/or enterprises were the most 
important sources of income for one third of these households that had approximately 
fifteen rai of rice land. They were also a supplementary source of income for the 
remainders who owned less land.  It is well recognised that agriculture provides food 
security, while the income from off-farm jobs helps to mitigate the risks involved in 
cultivation.  Some of my interviewees said that they were willing to pay wage labourers 
to help them finish their rice cultivation quickly. Then, the farmer could return to their 
wage jobs that provided regular incomes rather than the paddy fields, which they could 
cultivate once a year and from which they obtained low profit.   
 
More than 80 per cent of the household in this category had at least one household 
member who held Por 6 (Grade 6) to Mor 3 (Grade 9) or had only achieved the 
compulsory education level. Some had earlier migrated to off-farm jobs in the urban 
centres. Most of those of this generation, who were living in the village at the time I 
conducted my fieldwork, were return migrants. They had been faced with choosing 
between agrarian occupations or unskilled labour jobs in the cities. In terms of female 
returnees, most of the women had experienced working in urban cities. But, their 
opportunities to secure non-farm jobs were lost if they became pregnant. If they wanted 
to return to their city jobs, they had to leave their children behind with their 
grandparents. 
 
However, whether the villagers returned or chose not to return was based on 
determination of land ownership. Those who had land tended to return home more than 
landless migrants. During the Thai New Year Festival, I met some Ban Fangthai 
villagers who had migrated to work elsewhere but had returned home to visit their 
parents. Based on my informal conversations with these people, some young females 
with low education were working in factories. Their parents only had rice farms, so, the 
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girls did not want to return home because they would not find any better chances in 
agriculture.  
 
Somewhat interestingly, remittances were not necessarily a main source of income for 
the majority of households that with an average income of 5,009-9,999 baht per month 
in Ban Fangthai. My findings were slightly different from the extant scholarly research 
into the importance of remittances and off-farm jobs and their growing contribution to 
household incomes in northeastern Thailand (Grandstaff et al., 2008; Rigg & 
Salamanca, 2009). Only one third of households earning 5,000-9,999 baht per month 
continually earned money from remittances.  The rest stated that their children were 
working in factories. They remitted money only during agricultural season, when their 
families had to pay for labour costs, and purchase fertilizer and pesticides. When asked 
why their children did not remit money, one interviewee answered: 
 
How could they remit money to me? They earn only a little amount. I only wish them to 
survive from that money without asking me to support them.
71
 
 
Four households earning 5,000-9,999 baht per month were not involved in a farm. Two 
consisted of elderly people who lived on remittances from their children. One, who was 
landless, had become an ice-cream maker and seller. Another, who earlier had a small 
piece of land, had led his relatives to cultivate.  
 
 Households earning below 5,000 baht per month 
The low-income households (comprising 16 households out of 100) were among the the 
least successful farming households, especially those that only had access to less 
productive land, and the elderly, who could not effectively exploit opportunities from 
non-farm jobs.  
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 Seven households replied the same reason that their children earned less. Some said their children had a 
family in other provinces and needed to survive wih this small amount of money.  
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The members of the four agricultural prominent households that were the most 
economically marginal were above 45 years of age, had less than 6.25 rai of land, and 
had little choice of off-farm activities. One was a widow living alone, and another were 
elderly villagers who had children working in urban areas, but, they remitted money 
only during the agricultural season.   
 
Other households had jobs besides agriculture in order to diversify their income 
generation methods. Some had only a small piece of land (less than 6.25 rai), often on 
marginal land that lacked irrigation facilities and, in some cases, tenure security.  These 
households were also comprised of elderly people, often living with one of their siblings 
who had to be responsible for their family members.  
 
From the information I gathered on household sources of income and levels of income 
per month, it became clear that a certain type of agriculture persisted in Ban Fangthai, 
but each household dealt with it in a different way depending on age, gender, and 
education background. Land was still a concern of some households imbued with 
different characteristics such as entrepreneurial farmers, the left-over parent generation 
who had little chance to exploiting off-farm opportunities, and the young cohort who 
had not achieved post-secondary school education. All were struggling with choices 
either to remain on the farm or to seek intensive labouring jobs in factories in the urban 
centres.  People with secondary school educational background tended to seek access to 
different sectors of the economy, particularly those that provided high levels of income. 
 
Another important finding was that it was difficult to categorize members of family 
households in Ban Fangthai into one class. Spatially, households become fragmented as 
members become increasingly mobile across both rural and urban sectors. And, this 
fragmentation is exacerbated by members having different interests. I found that 
households that were considered to be autonomous entities with common interests in  
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previous studies were, in fact, rare (Rigg, Salamanca, & Parnwell, 2012).
72
 Few 
household members shared the same interests. Rural disparities were reproduced both 
based on the amount of land and the composition of social groups based on gender, level 
of education, and generation. Since most of the households in Ban Fangthai hired Lao 
workers to labour on their farm, class was also reproduced across the border. This 
transborder class re-production and its spatiality will be discussed in Chapter eight.  
7.3 Agrarian Transformation in Laos   
The empirical findings on the persistence of agriculture in the two villages in Lao PDR 
were slightly different to those about Ban Fangthai. First, agriculture persisted along 
with off-farm occupations but they were associated with transborder migration to 
Thailand. And, second, rural disparities emerged significantly in the case of remittances. 
The circumstances propelling social mobility also differed. While education and middle-
class jobs were important upward social mobility in the northeastern Thai village, the 
Laos’ social mobility was mainly determined by consumption and visible material 
conditions, for example, a new modern home.  
 
As discussed in Chapters five and six, the Thai-Lao border proximity and the degree of 
compromise in state-village relations facilitated the complex migration patterns of the 
Lao migrants. Frequently these migration patterns fell into categories of long/short term 
migration and circular/seasonal migration, allowing the Lao migrants to also participate 
in agricultural work in their home villages when their families required their help. 
However, important questions arise here concerning how diverse patterns of migration 
affected agricultural conditions, class mobility and rural inequality in Laos.  
 
In the next section, I commence by discussing the economic conditions in Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban Laonua and the importance of migration and remittances. Then, I 
pose the following questions: who were able to migrate, who were the stayers, and how 
did ability to migrate affect agricultural livelihoods? I argue that migration to Thailand 
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 The previous studies that perceived rural villages as an autonomous entity, i.e., Nartsupha (1986, 1999).  
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has instigated processes of change. The remittances that have flowed from migrants to 
those left behind show that migration supports household incomes and facilitates 
differentiation between the movers’ and the stayers’ households.  
7.3.1 Economic condition: they are not the poor villages 
Lao PDR is the most rural country in Southeast Asia, with over three quarters of the total 
population currently living in rural areas. Approximately 38 per cent of these rural dwellers live 
below the poverty line, and population growth continues to be concentrated in the rural areas (80 
per cent of the one million population growth since 1993 is in rural areas). While population 
density is relatively low at 23 people per km², the distribution is uneven and the mountainous 
terrain of much of the country limits the possibility of planting crops and making a living from 
agriculture. Nonetheless, a large majority of people depend on agriculture and natural resources 
to subsist. Two-thirds of households have no access to electricity, half have no safe water supply 
and half of all villages are unreachable by all-weather roads during the rainy season.  
         World Bank (2013a) 
Lao PDR is classified as one of the least-developed countries with low income and a 
heavy dependence on agriculture by the majority of the population (UNDP, 2012). As 
the above excerpt from the World Bank’s website shows two-thirds of the households 
have no access to electricity and more than half have no safe water supply. Thirty-eight 
per cent of the population is living below the poverty line. The key challenges of the 
country are to improve rural productivity and link the rural population to the market.  
According to the World Bank’s criteria, Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua are not poor, 
despite the fact that not all villagers are better off. There is a sufficiency of food. Both 
villages have electricity and water systems, and can be accessed by road. But Ban 
Laonua still has dirt roads and is difficult to reach in the rainy season.  
Based on the information I acquired from the village heads of Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua on the acquisition of electrical appliances and transportation, Ban Kaemkong 
was relatively better-off compared to Ban Laonua in ownership of assets (see Table 7.9). 
Indicators such as motorbikes, CD players, and mobile phones were evidence of 
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household consumption of non-food materials. More than half of the households in both 
villages owned motorbikes and television sets, a positive sign of the level of income 
earnings. However, the number of tractors in Ban Kaemkong was significantly low 
compared to Ban Laonua because the majority of households in Ban Kaemkong were 
involved in non-farm jobs rather than farm jobs.  
 
Table 7.9 Durable Assets in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua   
 Ban Kaemkong Ban Laonua 
Number of household  204 213 
Number of population 1,165 1,559 
Durable-assets 
Tractors 32 154 
Trucks 12 8 
Motorbikes 189 151 
Bicycles 30 96 
Television sets 191 182 
CD Players 130 125 
Radios 196 168 
Mobile Phones 268 205 
 
Sources: Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua Village Data (2009) 
The same set of data from the village heads additionally shows that almost half of 
villagers in Ban Kaemkong were salaried people while most villagers in Ban Laonua 
embraced agricultural jobs (see Table 7.10).  However, my survey of 50 households in 
each village with traditional and second occupation revealed that villagers had exercised 
job diversification albeit Ban Kaemkong had more job varieties (see Table 7.11).  
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Table 7.10 Main Occupation in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Main occupations     Number of Households 
             Ban Kaemkong        Ban Laonua 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Agriculture (Farming/Fisheries)               64   193 
Local Enterprises                           25                           10  
Labouring jobs     25       8  
Cattle                     10       -  
Government Officials     80       2  
Total                           201   213 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua Village Data (2009) 
 
Based on data from my surveys conducted with 50 households in each village, Table 
7.11 shows that the majority of villagers in Ban Kaemkong combined their agricultural 
jobs with others. The salaried villagers, mostly government officials, had more 
opportunities in diversifying their income generation in both enterprise and agriculture. 
However, in Ban Laonua, much labouring work was still within the agricultural sector. 
The villages’ location and the history of its establishment enhanced job opportunities 
and diversified village populations.
73
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 A history of the villages was detailed in Chapter five. Ban Kaemkong, which was a newly-established 
village in the 1980s, was comprised of both government officials and local farmers (50 per cent of each).  
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Table 7.11 Main Occupations in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua  
(N = 50) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Main occupations     Number of Households 
             Ban Kaemkong        Ban Laonua 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Agriculture (Farming/Fisheries)               17    16 
Farmers/business owners        3      7 
Farmers/labourers         5               20  
Local Enterprises /salaried employees      7      0 
Local Enterprises/farmers                 1                 3  
Salaried employees/Farmers                  3                 2  
Salaried employees       4      - 
Labouring jobs                  7      0 
Unemployed (parents receiving remittances)               3      2 
Total                             50    50 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
 
In relation to land holding, I conducted a survey in 2011 and found that the majority 
farmlands in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua were small to medium scale. Farmers 
grew rice on land ranging in size from 6.25 to 15 rai comprised more than half of the 
total households (see Table 7.12). Only two large-scale farmer households in Ban 
Kaemgkong and five large-scale farmer households in Ban Laonua grew rice on more 
than 31 rai of land; they accounted for 4 per cent and 10 per cent of the total households 
respectively. In both villages, there was still a strong subsistence focus on rice with 
limitation of mechanisation and irrigation system. Villagers reported that they were 
lacking money to invest. Additionally, the plot sizes were small and the terraced terrain 
was uneven. They only adopted two-wheeled tractors to plough a rice plot. Rice cultivation 
relied on reciprocal exchange labour. However, the use of wage labour was increasing. In 
Ban Kaemkong, almost half of rice growing households (thirteen out of 29 households) 
hired labourers within the village, or from other villages nearby, as a result of competing 
demands on the available workforce. Ban Laonua, only five out of 48 rice growing 
households hired wage labourers within the village because they were households with a 
couple both above 50 years of age. Their children were working in Thailand and could not 
return in the cultivating seasons.  
190 
 
Nonetheless, there was not a clear correlation between the amount of land and poverty. 
In Ban Kaemkong, more than half of the landless (N=8) operated local enterprises 
(grocery stores). On the other hand, a small number of households in Ban Kaemkong 
that owned above 31 rai of land had less productive upland fields. One of them rented 
the land out to the sugarcane company to grow sugarcane and earned only 18,000 baht 
per year (the rent was 600 baht per rai per year). Several households that owned less 
land at 6.25 – 15 rai that had two to four family members who had migrated to Thailand, 
had considerably better income.   
 
Table 7.12 Distribution of households’ landholding in Ban Kaemkong  
and Ban Laonua 
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
 
Another key poverty indicator was monthly and yearly income.  According to the World 
Bank (2012), Lao’s GNI per capita in 2011 was $US 1,130 (approximately 33,900 baht 
per year or 2,825 baht per month). Huijsmans (2010) claims that measuring the incomes 
of peasant households is extremely difficult since the majority of what they produced 
does not enter the market. In addition, consumption, income and asset-ownership is 
notoriously prone to being misreported as there may be vested interests in appearing 
poor on paper, ranging from being included in various programmes to tax evasion.  I 
faced the same problem: I learned that people did not regularly think about their 
monthly income and expenditure. They tended more to live in the same manner 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 Size of Land holding    Number of Households 
             Ban Kaemkong        Ban Laonua 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 Landless         12 (24%)        1 (2%)   
< 6.25 rai                            4 (8%)        7 (14%) 
6.25-15 rai             15 (30%)      20 (40%) 
16-30 rai               9 (18%)        9 (18%) 
31 rai and more                     2  (4%)        5 (10%) 
Working on parents’land         8 (16%)        8 (16%)   
Total                       50 (100%)                  50 (100%) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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described in the Lao proverb ‘Go to find food in the morning, eat in the evening [ha sao 
kin kum]’. With this firmly in mind, I encouraged people to calculate their household 
incomes by day, including their labour payment, and their seasonal incomes from 
activities such as growing/selling seasonal vegetable. Then, I collected data on any 
family members working out side of the village and the approximate remittances they 
sent per month. As shown in Table 7.13, the majority of people in both villages earned 
incomes ranging between 2,000 to 4,999 baht per month (their yearly income was 
approximately 24,000 – 59,988 baht). Ban Kaemkong villagers were obviously better-
off, a number of people earning more than 10,000 baht per month compared to Ban 
Laonua. 
Table 7.13  Range of Monthy Incomes in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua   
(N = 50)
74
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Range of income (baht)    Number of Households 
     Ban Kaemkong  Ban Laonua 
____________________________________________________________________ 
< 2,000       5    12 
2,000 – 4,999     20     23 
5,000 – 9,999     14    13 
10,000 – 14,999      8      1 
>20,000       3       1 
Total                  50    50 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
 
Thirty-six and thirty-eight out of 50 households in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua 
respectively had at least one family member working in Thailand. The survey findings 
in both villages additionally revealed that remittances were very important additions to 
the household income. The majority of families had remittances sent from migrant(s) 
family members (see figure 7.1). Remittances were the biggest share of household 
income of eight families in Ban Kaemkong and for one family in Ban Laonua that 
earned 10,000-14,000 baht per year. Regarding households that earned more than 
20,000 baht per month, two out of three households in Ban Kaemkong were migrant 
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 The Lao’s income was significantly lower than the Thai’s. Therefore, I have made a lower range of 
incomes for clear presentation.  
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households. Their remittances totalled more than twice the agricultural income. This 
was also the case with a family in Ban Laonua that fell into the same range of income.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Numbers of Households with Migrant (s) and Numbers of Households receiving 
Remittances in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua (N = 50) 
25 30 35 40
No. of households with
migrant(s)
No. of households with
remittances
Ban  Laonua
Ban Kaemkong
 
Source: Author’s survey (2011) 
In the following sections, I analyse the differentiation of households in Ban Laonua and 
Ban Kaemkong in relation to migration, and the contribution of migration to the socio-
economic conditions of the households. My analysis focuses particularly on the 
differences between migration and non-migration households in terms of income and 
socio-economic conditions, and the association of migration with agricultural 
livelihoods.  
7.3.2 Migration and socio-economic differentiation  
Migration from Laos to Thailand has not only become a feature of Lao’s village life but 
has also received considerable scholarly attention. Some studies examined the nature of 
migration and the remittances that migrants send to families in Laos (Barney, 2012; 
Deeleen & Vasuprasat, 2010; Rigg, 2005). However, the consequences of migration and 
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remittances on agrarian relations in sending communities, in terms of rural 
differentiation between migration and non-migration households have not been given 
sufficient attention. Kelly (2011), who provides the conceptual perspectives on the 
effects of migration on rural inequality and class structure, stresses three points. First, 
the wealthier families can afford to migrate while the poor cannot.  Second, the benefits 
that occure from migration lead to mobility and class hierarchy, both of which are 
rooted in production. Apart from being direct economic earning in the form of 
remittances, it is also relative to learning about new kinds of production methods which 
allow households to diversify their income generation. Third, and last, class is reworked 
given that the same individual may experience different class processes in different 
places.    
In terms of Laos, a survey by Deeleen and Vasuprasat (2010) shows that 95 per cent of 
Lao migrants remit money home. Moreover, their study reveals that more than 94 per 
cent of the surveyed households, who had more than two family members working in 
Thailand, confirmed that remittances had positively changed their livelihoods. Focusing 
on the sending migrant communities in Laos, Barney (2012) contends that the majority 
of remittance receiving families use the money for food and assets. However, his in-
depth interviews revealed that one of his interviewees used remittances as capital for 
investment in rubber plots. Barney’s study delineates how migration and remittances 
situate rural differentiation.  
Based on Kelly’s conceptualisation on the effect of migration, I will explore how 
migration and remittances affected the two sending communities in Laos. I will pose 
three questions: (1) who can migrate (the movers), who cannot migrate (the stayers) and 
how far can they go – only to the Thai border, further to Bangkok, or to other areas? (2) 
what are the implications of remittances for livelihood; and, (3) what are the 
implications for class mobility? 
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7.3.3 The movers and the distances of migration 
For poor individuals and households with few assets, migration may be a case of moving to 
survive. For the very poor or ultra poor, lack of resources may be such that migration is 
impossible. For richer households, migration is more likely to lead to a degree of accumulation 
of both ﬁnancial and human capital (skills). (Rigg, 2007: 174).  
The above quote clearly portrays the differences between migration among the poorer 
and the rich households in Laos. It stresses that a basic requirement for movers is to 
have some resources for migration. Writing on migration in the Philippines, 
Lukasiewicz (2011) argues that the ability to migrate differ between the rich and the 
poor. Because migrants have to pay recruitment and overseas travel costs, this already 
categorises those who are able to migrate. In the case of Laos, to migrate further afield 
to Bangkok and its vicinities required an amount of money that the ultra-poor could not 
obtain. However, the poorer Lao families living not far from the Thai border had the 
opportunity to undertake seasonal migration to agricultural areas in the Thai 
borderlands. Thus, in a sense, they were beneficiaries of border proximity, and the social 
networks that exist between the Thai and Lao people. 
What I discerned from the surveys and in-depth interviews were the differences in 
migration methods and destinations.  The wealthier families generally chose to pay for a 
passport to migrate legally to Bangkok and its vicinities, whereas the poorer families 
could only join the informal seasonal migration to the Thai borderlands. With more 
opportunities in off-farm jobs within and outside of the village, villagers in Ban 
Kaengkong who were more well-off compared to Ban Laonua tended to invest in long-
distance migration rather than short-distant seasonal migration to Ban Fangthai.
75
 In Ban 
Laonua, eight out of twelve households without family member working in Bangkok 
had at least one return migrant from different parts of Thailand, but still moved to Ban 
Fangthai for labouring jobs. When asked why she no longer migrated, one of them said 
she was afraid to migrate again because she had been cheated by the Thai employer. 
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 See information on migration in Laos in Chapter six.  
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Three out of this group said that they did not have enough money to pay for a Lao 
passport. As Ms Tan said: 
In the previous ten years, I could cross the river to Thailand with some friends. Now, we 
need to cross the bridge and pay for a passport. Having a passport is more secure but it 
costs a lot of money. I do not want to take a loan and I do not know whether I can make 
money in Bangkok. Many people come back with a lot of money while some are 
cheated and came back with nothing and have to pay off debts from migration.
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However, this does not suggest that the poor cannot migrate out of Laos. Two 
households in Ban Kaemkong and seven in Ban Laonua that earned less than 2,000 baht 
per month had one or more family members who practiced long-distance migration to 
Thailand. They took a loan from their neighbours to pay for travel costs. One household 
in Ban Laonua reported that a family member working in Bangkok could not remit any 
money because he had just left for one month. The earning in the first three months had 
to be used for debt repayment. 
7.3.4 Remittances and livelihoods 
Scholarly research into migration and development recognise the positive impact of 
remittances on rural development. Remittances can significantly improve the well-being 
of households, increase household savings, facilitate the purchase of goods, and alter the 
local income distribution. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to remittances and 
their implications for agriculture.  
Following a survey conducted in Laos in 2010, Deelen and Pracha (2010) wrote that 
approximately 37 per cent of remittances in Laos were used for daily expenses and 
housing. Only seven per cent was used for investment in agriculture or business. 
Interviews conducted in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua revealed similar outcomes. 
However, in-depth interviews conducted in both villages showed an explicit connection 
between migration destination, period, and how the villagers used remittances. In Ban 
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Kaemkong, the majority (seventeen out of 50) of households used most remittances 
received for daily expenses, followed by seven houlseholds used most remittances for 
housing improvement (find Table 7.14). In Ban Laonua, seventeen households used 
most remittances for daily expense while fourteen households used most remittances for 
housing improvement. Only one interviewed household in Ban Kaemkong and two 
households in Ban Laonua reported that they invested in agriculture and livestock. In 
Ban Kaemkong, the household collected money to invest in rubber plantation, while 
buying cattle and a two-wheeled tractor was a priority for households in Ban Laonua: 
Table 7.14 Use of remittances among remittance-recipient households in Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua 
Distribution of expenses Number of households 
Ban Kaemkong (N = 32) Ban Laonua (N =35) 
Invest in agriculture and livestock 1 (3%) 2(6%) 
Daily needs and buying durable assets 17(53%) 17 (48%) 
Housing improvement 7(22%) 14(40%) 
Buying land 1(3%) 2 (6%) 
Savings 1(3%) - 
Other 
 Education for family members 
 Medical treatment 
 Paying debt 
 Informal credit 
 
1(3%) 
2(7%) 
1(3%) 
1(3%) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Source: Author’s survey 
Asked about their use of remittances from the Thai borderlands, some households that 
had at least one family member who had worked or was working in Ban Fangthai at the 
time,
77
 said that the money was used for daily needs and expenditure. They could only 
earn 800-2,000 baht per time when they crossed the Mekong River and stayed for a few 
nights working on Thai agricultural land. This money was too little to use for other 
expenses. However, the majority of households confirmed that migration - whether short 
or long distance – yielded positive outcomes to their families. In Ban Kaemkong, for 
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 Some households (21 out of 36 in Ban Kaemkong and 23 out of 38 in Ban Laonua) had at least one or 
more family members working in Thailand and additionally had at least one family member experienced 
working in Thai border.  
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example, earnings from migration were enough for two families to stop working on their 
agricultural land.  
7.3.5 The nature of class mobility 
You can differentiate the households with and without migrants from their houses. Families with 
children working in Thailand were always able to build a more beautiful house. Some turned 
from a small hut to a beautiful concrete house. They became rich because all their children were 
going to Bangkok and remitted a lot of money.
78
    
The earlier agrarian studies define class mobility from production relations and the 
differential access to means of productions (Hart et al., 1989) . However, contemporary 
agrarian studies have proposed more criteria for understanding rural class structures and 
inequalities. In a country like the Philippines where people typically migrate overseas, 
remittances have become a factor supporting social mobility. Kelly (2012)  writes that 
the notion of class goes beyond unequal access to resources, income and wealth. Rather, 
class is reproduced by education and the kinds of work that are shaped by the family’s 
class background and remittances. Families with one child or sibling working overseas 
tend to invest in education for their children as a pathway to higher education and 
upward class mobility. Class in the Philippines is clearly reworked both by Filipino 
migrants employed as domestic workers in Hong Kong or by landowners and 
moneylenders in their home villages. Thus, people have different identities and classes 
in different places (Lukasiewicz, 2011). This is similar to Laos wherein uneven class is 
not only based upon agrarian land, but also associates migrant identities with where the 
person comes from and where he/she works. However, limited education development 
in rural Laos manifests in the different forms of social mobility. A new wealthier 
household has emerged in Laos, built upon remittances from Thailand that are utilised 
for both agricultural investment and consumption. 
As I showed in the previous section, the Lao migrants in Ban Fangthai were not 
landless: they often had their own agricultural lands and were farmers in their home 
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villages. Some were even landowners, hiring people to work on their land. But because 
out-migration to Thailand decreased the supply of domestic labour, many families had 
to spend their remittances on hiring domestic workers. Among the remittance recipient 
households, twelve out of 32 families in Ban Kaemkong and eight families out of 35 in 
Ban Laonua hired labour during the cultivating season. This showed that the ways in 
which they used remittances were not disconnected from agrarian issues, but they did 
not take it as a first spending because these costs occurred seasonally. Some remittance 
recipients said they requested money from their family members working in Thailand 
when they needed to pay for fertilizer, pesticides and wage labour during the rice 
cultivating and harvesting seasons.  
However, the number of families hiring wage labourers in Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua was moderate compared to the Thai villages, where the majority of households 
demanded wage labour. One reason was because the Lao families still had several 
family members. Some families comprised up to ten to twelve children, so, they always 
kept at least one child at home and work on agricultural land.   
Another consequence of the sending of remittances from Thailand was on class 
mobility, which tied economic remittances to social and cultural norms. Mills (1999) 
maintains that migration is associated with a notion of modernity, which may be 
expressed through the body (i.e. clothing) and experience of a new environment. 
Building upon Mills’ notions, High (2008) argues that aspirations to modernity are 
important factors that pushes people in Southern Laos to migrate to Thailand. Besides 
the money and the remittances they earn, migration transforms their social status in 
accordance with wealth. Within this scenario, one obvious element I had found in Ban 
Kaemkong and Ban Laonua was the demand for investment in a place to live. As 
demonstrated in Table 7.12, besides using remittances for household consumption, 
housing improvement was the second task that the villagers wanted to spend money on. 
With these findings, to distinguish the rich from the poor in the village was not only 
based on the amount of agrarian land they owned and the amount of income they had, 
but also the material condition of the house and other belongings they occupied.  
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7.4 Agrarian Aspirations of the Lao migrants 
 
For many of the young people interviewed, the prospect of working on the land year 
after year was not an attractive option. Farming held neither the promise of financial 
gain nor the promise of personal independence that working abroad appeared to offer. 
On the other hand, migrants spoke highly of their ability to make lifestyle choices 
abroad that they could not make in the village. 
(Social Environmental Research Consultant, 2010, p. 2) 
 
Currently in Laos, the large majority of migrants do return home. Migrants acquire, at 
best, only low-level skills and the moral imperative to return home remains strong. But 
it seems likely that the trend will be gradually towards migrants leaving home 
temporarily and then making the decision to remain away for longer and longer periods. 
When they do return, it will be increasingly as individuals towards the end of their 
working lives where the village becomes, in effect, a retirement home. Before that point, 
returns home will become consumption performances where the successful migrants 
parade their new-found wealth and sophistication. 
           (Rigg 2007: 173)  
 
A main focus of the themes of migration and development is the impact of migration on 
rural communities. Some of the more widely discussed impacts are the changes in 
agricultural labour, rural class structure, cultural change, and agricultural inputs from 
financial remittances (Kelly, 2011). Regarding the first impact, the movement of the 
young rural cohort away from agricultural activities has been dubbed ‘aspirations to 
modernity’ (High 2008: 544) and it is extended to the vision of not being peasant 
farmers (Barney, 2012, p. 61). These motivations, i.e, migration and mobility, have 
sparked the debate surrounding de-agrarianisation, one main reason for which is that 
people have lost the desire to farm.    
 
The discussion I have presented above has so far been based on long term 
anthropological studies. Focus has been on the experience of some households in 
particular places and times.  As stated in the second quote by Rigg, many Lao migrants 
are strongly motivated to return home for retirement, a motivation based on the 
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assumption that the village is no longer a place for production because wealth has been 
generated out of community. As I argue in Chapter six, the Lao people in fact have 
multi-patterns of - and unpredictable - migration. Therefore, the movement of Lao 
migrants cannot be understood only in certain times and places. It is difficult to 
categorise the Lao as ‘migrants’ or ‘returnees’. Many return migrants might 
recommence migration again anytime, due to it not being far, inexpensive, and not 
difficult to enter Thailand. The distinction to draw here is how the Lao migrants see 
themselves, their expectation in income generation, and the changes in their perceptions 
and social status post migration.  
 
Employing a multi-sited ethnographic methodology, I conducted additionally interviews 
with ten teenage migrants and their parents in Ban Kaemkong, Ban Laonua, in their 
workplaces in Thailand, in Ban Fangthai, and in many places in Bangkok. As well, I 
conducted telephone interviews with two migrants from Ban Kaemkong and three 
migrants from Ban Laonua. The majority of them stated that they wanted to return home 
when they had enough money for housing and land. Only one female who had a Thai 
husband were reluctant to return to Laos. Asked to envision themselves in ten years 
time, all of the male migrants had positive ideas that they might be home with their 
families working on their land. Lhai, a Lao migrants I met in Ban Fangthai during the 
cultivating season in November 2010, who returned to work in Bangkok in February 
2011, alluded to his dream future as follows: 
 
I will go back to stay home with my girlfriend. I only need to collect some money to 
buy land and build a home. My parents have five children. I want to have my own 
home rather than staying my parents.
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Questioned about what kinds of jobs he wants to do in the future, Lhai replied: 
 
What I can do in my village besides growing rice and take care of the livestock?
80
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Lhai’s answer was similar to those of other male migrants I interviewed in Bangkok. 
They all envisioned themselves working on agricultural land when they returned to 
Laos. Based on this information, I argue that it is not possible to assume the 
relationships between out-migration and agrarian transformation in the linear de-
agrarianisation without first considering the nature of the socio-economic and job 
opportunities in Laos.   
 
Gender is partly relevant to perspectives regarding employment. Lao females dream of 
having small businesses rather than being farmers. Here, Noi’s answer provides an 
example. Noi, a 27 year-old female from Ban Kaemkong was working in a massage 
parlour in Bangkok. I made a phone call to her through the number I obtained from her 
farther. She refused to talk to me at first but when I referred to her father and her village, 
she seemed more comfortable talking to me. Noi is single. She told me about her young 
life after her mother passed away. She helped her father who was working as a wage-
labourer in agricultural jobs in both Ban Kaemkong and Ban Fangthai. She did not fear 
hard work but she wanted to earn more money. Thus, she was not reluctant to leave 
home at the age of sixteen. Noi realised that she could not work in a massage parlour for 
her whole life as with time she would get old. She planned to go home and open a small 
grocery store. Asked about the farmland, she replied: 
 
I know how to cultivate rice but I will not return to work in the farm.  I send money to 
my father every month and let him manage the farm. I have my relatives to work for 
me.
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The answers provided by the Lao interviewees clearly demonstrated why the Lao 
workers migrated to Thailand. It was a place for them to earn money.  Most, though not 
all, Lao migrants do not intend to stay permanently in Thailand. Migration studies, 
which tend to oversimplify the lives of Lao migrants, insist that even though many of 
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the migrants are marginalised in their workplaces and are faced not only with the hard 
labour, but also with the poor conditions of living, they wanted to stay in Thailand to 
escape from their rual lives in Laos. Previous studies tend to overlook the flexible 
movement of migration between Laos and Thailand and the flexible relationships that 
obtain between the Lao migrants and their farm and off-farm activities. The important 
factor that ties the Lao people to their natal households is the status of Lao migrant 
workers in Thailand. Because these people usually have a low level of education, it is 
hard for them to get well-paid and stable jobs. Furthermore, although the Lao and Thai 
peoples share cultural and language similarities, this commonality is not sufficient to 
eliminate their migrant status and the vulnerability of their stay in Thailand. Their 
expectation of going back home implies strong bonds and the maintaining of rural-based 
tradition in their everyday lives. As two young Lao migrants aged 30 years and above 
told me during our interviews in their workplaces in Bangkok: ‘I want to go to die in 
Lao, my home. I don’t want to die here in Thailand’.  
 
I agree with Rigg’s observation that migration trends in Laos seems gradually to be  
towards migrants leaving home temporarily, then making the decision to remain away 
for longer and increasing time periods (Rigg, 2007, p. 173). However, my research 
offers further insights into the everyday lives of migrants and their practices in different 
places and times. I argue that the form of migration in Laos might require to investigate 
people’s life experiences and their expectations in the long-term. As I found in my 
study, the lives of migrants are not stable: they are unable to say whether they will 
return home permanently or not. Some Lao migrants leave home for two to three years. 
They might return home for a short period of time to work on their family farm, then 
return to their off-farm jobs in Thailand. I will provide another example to demonstrate 
the flexible movement of Lao migrants and circulatory farming.  
 
I first met Pan in a paddy field in Ban Fangthai; later, I followed him and his friends to 
Ban Laonua. During our initial talk in November 2010, Pan told me that he had made a 
decision to stay in Ban Laonua permanently.  He stated: 
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I spent more than 10 years in Phang Nga and Phuket provinces working in a furniture 
factory. I met Lom there and got married three years ago. We tried to work and collect 
money to build our home. Now, we have a home. Lom has just given birth to my 
daughter so we decide to go back to stay in Ban Laonua permanently.
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I met Pan in Ban Fangthai again in January 2011. He had crossed the river to work in a 
rubber plantation. At that time, he got fifteen days of employment. In March 2011, I 
returned to Ban Laonua to conduct a survey. Pan told me that it was very difficult to find 
a wage labour job in the village. Asked what he needs since he has already had a new 
home, Pan said: 
 
I want to collect some money for my daughter and want to buy a new two-wheeled 
tractor for my father-in-law. I am thinking to go back to Thailand with my wife again 
for a year.
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Although, I completed my fieldwork in July 2011, I still kept in contact with the Lao 
people. I heard from Lhai that Pan and Lom returned to work in Thailand in February 
2012. I asked Lhai whether he would return to work in the paddy field this year: he said 
he did not know. It depended on his family. If his father could manage to recruit enough 
labourers among relatives and neighbours, he would stay in Bangkok and work to send 
money so that his father could invest in the farm. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the patterns of agrarian transformation in the Thai-
Lao borderlands, using case studies from Ban Fangthai, the borderland of northeastern 
Thailand, and the two villages in Lao PDR, Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua.   
 
In Ban Fangthai, the villagers have diversified their economic activities to non-
agricultural spheres along with their agricultural activities. However, both land and 
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agriculture remain important to them. Villagers who have sizable tracts of land still 
cultivate and maximise profit from agriculture. Villagers who have little land combine 
their farm and off-farm agricultural activities to mitigate the risk associated with 
unpredictable incomes from agriculture.  
 
This chapter also reveals that each generation in Ban Fangthai valued agriculture 
differently. Young villagers, with secondary school education or lower, saw agriculture 
as a good alternative compared to intensive labour jobs in the city. Some among the 
elderly invested in non-labour intensive agriculture, rubber in particular, for long-term 
profit. Marginal villagers, mostly the elderly who have little land and cannot exploit 
opportunities in off-farm jobs, and landless villagers, remain dependent on agriculture as 
their main source of income. In addition, some highly-educated villagers, who had 
already moved away from their natal villages, viewed agriculture as a possible social 
safety net for their future retirement.   
 
The case studies in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua, the chapter argues that rural 
differentiation and social mobility in Laos were partly based on remittances in 
combination with agricultural land. The long-distance and longer period of migration 
typically generated more remittances than shorter distance and periods of migration. 
Remittances were important factors for upward mobility as they supported consumption 
and material conditions. But, in turn, the ability to generate those remittances based 
upon the ability to migrate in the first place. Not all villagers had access to migration 
opportunities.  
 
The Chapter also shows that farming in Laos has persisted: it will not easily disappear or 
lose importance. Return migrants have few alternatives apart from farm work due to the 
low economic development in Laos. Therefore, Lao people can either stay in their own 
villages and work on their farm or contemplate in cross-border migration whenever they 
need money.   
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Finally, this Chapter provides the link to the flows on labour and capital on the 
northeastern Thai borderland with Laos.  The flow of migrants from Thailand’s rural 
areas to its cities and other growth centres, which has resulted in the replacement of 
labour forces from the country’s less-diverse economic areas, challenges the focus of 
agrarian studies on rural areas of a particular country. Such focus overlooks the larger 
picture of the agrarian transformation taking place in one country that has wider 
linkages to a neighbouring country. These linkages in turn serve to reproduce a 
particular pattern of agrarian relations and class identity which will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter 8 
Reconceptualisation of Agrarian Transformation in the borderland context 
8.1 Introduction:  
In Chapters five and six, I have demonstrated the spatial characteristics of the 
northeastern Thai-Laos borderlands in terms of regulations, state-village relations, and 
migration patterns. In Chapter seven, I reveal how the geographical landscape of the 
borderlands, and their cultural and historical specificities have shaped agrarian relations. 
Just as transnationalisation in the northeastern Thai - Lao border region supports cross-
border migration, and given that the linguistic and cultural similarities of the Thai-Lao 
people give rise to complex migration patterns, the thesis argues that borderland 
agriculture variously persists because of the availability of labour, new cash crop 
expansion, and remittances from family members working in urban centres.  
This chapter aims to explore the links between the empirical findings and conceptual 
framework of the thesis. In the first section, I will draw on agrarian transformation in a 
specific context to question how contexts matter in the transformation. In the following 
section, focus is on transnationalisation and the role of the state in agrarian 
transformation. The discussion will then focus on to the empirical findings regarding 
migration between Laos to Thailand and the dialogue with the existing literature on 
migration and agrarian transformation.  
In the last section, I attempt to show why the northeastern Thailand and Laos show little 
evidence of de-agrarianisation. The persistence of agriculture is supported by the geo-
politics of the Thai-Lao borderlands and transborder migration. What needs to be taken 
into consideration is the ways in which constitution of agrarian relations, class and 
identity goes far beyond the local. All findings confirm the viability of rural livelihoods, 
and that agriculture remains a part of rural livelihoods, but that needs to be understaood 
with reference to multi-local and transboundary livelihoods.  
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8.2 Spatiality in Agrarian transformation   
Examination of agrarian transformation has centered on changes in the rural world. 
Traditional studies have focused on the pathway to capitalism and the emergence of an 
agrarian class and highlighted linear capitalist development, that is the transformation 
from an agricultural to an industrial and urban society that has occcured with the 
disappearance of the peasantry. However, later studies point out that there is no 
universal form of agrarian questions. Because the pathways of transformation are 
diverse, more attention should be paid to empirical and political contexts in each 
country, but, the focus of study has remained primarily on the agricultural core areas 
(Hart et al., 1989).   
 
Contemporary scholarly research points out that the historical, geographical, political, 
and economic contexts in which the studies are taken place diversified agrarian 
transformation (Hirsch, 2011, 2012b; Rigg & Vandergeest, 2012). In 2005, the 
Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia or ChATSEA (2002) project
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categorised the major locations of agrarian studies in Southeast Asia as follows: 1) 
agricultural core regions; 2) marginal zones i.e. upland areas; and, 3) changing space 
due to a rural-to-urban interface. The researchers’empirical findings, based on 
researches undertaken in different areas of Thailand under the ChATSEA project, show 
the different impacts of agrarian transformation.  
 
With reference to the upland areas of Thailand, Latt (2009) contends that exploitative 
agrarian relations not only emerged from the relations between the landlords and the 
landless, but also occurred due to different ethnicities. The exploitative relationship 
between Hmong landowners and the Shan migrant workers, for example, was based on 
historical contingency. The latter’s illegal status in Thailand allowed the former to 
underpay and exploit them in hard labour jobs. Leblond (2008) who researched in 
Petchaboon Province in northern Thailand, explored the relationship between increased 
                                                 
84
 This project involved a group of researchers, who worked on agrarian and rural studies in Southeast 
Asia. The research programme was implemented over a period of nearly six years, from early 2005 to late 
2010.  
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forest cover and the decline of agriculture. He stresses that one of the factors generating 
agricultural decline was the abandonment of agricultural land. Unlike in Latt’s research 
site in Chiang Mai Province, Leblond’s site revealed little immigration. In Petchaboon 
Province, labour shortage was the major factor causes abandonment of agricultural land. 
Rigg and Salamanca (2011, p. 563), who consider labour shortages to be the main 
reason of land abandonment in a village in Mahasarakam Province in Northeast 
Thailand, argue that when rural populations moved to off-farm occupations, and the 
labour gap is not filled by immigrant labour, farmland is either left idle, farmed 
inefficiently, rented out, or disposed of. The above projects conducted in Thailand have 
shown that cultural, geographical, and historical specificity have resulted in different 
transformations and conditions of agriculture.   
 
Taking borderlands as a specific geographical context through which to understand 
agrarian transformation, I argue that a singular framework in agrarian studies in 
reference to land, class differentiation and production relations as a consequence of 
capitalist development, cannot explain the dynamic changes in the context of the 
borderlands. Chapters five, six, and seven have illustrated the empirical dimension that 
is the transnationalisation and scope of compromise inherent in state-village relations, 
the linkages between out-migration from rural areas and in-migration of migrant labour, 
and the way remittances and social mobility affected those left behind. The spatiality of 
the village in this thesis is reworked through social relations across the border. More 
specifically, the research was undertaken in the Thai-Lao borderland areas, where 
historical ties and similarities of ethnicity, language, and culture combine to intensify 
transnationalisation.  
 
The northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands in the 20th century are a newly constructed 
space. For this reason, the role of the state in regulating migration is addressed. Issues of 
ethnic identity are foregrounded: different groups of people come into contact along the 
Thai border in response to the demand for agricultural labour. At the same time, 
migration both from the Thai border to urban cities and from Laos to Thailand, has 
209 
 
resulted in individuals being allocated into diverse class statuses and multiple identities 
in different spaces and may ultimately lead to class mobility. The fixed class categories 
in agrarian studies, that is peasant, landlord, and wage labourer, need to be reconsidered 
(Kelly, 2011). As such, borderland location provides challenges to understanding 
agrarian transformation in a variety of ways. In the next section, I will analyse the role 
of the state in agrarian transformation.  
 
8.3 Bringing the state back in: the scope for compromise in state-village relations in 
the borderlands 
The state, class-based actors, and revolutionary movements were key actors in early 
studies of agrarian transformation.  According to Araghi (1995), the three decades after 
the end of World War II were considered the decades of state-led development. 
Scholarly research into the political economy of agrarian transformation in developing 
countries during that era highlighted the struggles of the peasantry, and of those who 
were negatively affected by the particular structure of domination. At the time, state-
village relations were locked in uncompromising, oppositional and antagonistic 
conditions.  The role of the state in bringing a capitalist market economy to peasant 
communities, along with the peasants’ responses, has been widely discussed (Byres, 
1996; Moore, 1966).   
 
The surge of neoliberalism and globalisation over the past four decades, and the absence 
of class-based revolutions and rebellions, have resulted in a reduction of class and class 
analysis in rural development studies  (Borras Jr, 2009, pp. 19-20).  Other actors besides 
the state, such as corporates, NGOs, and development agencies, became targets for 
social change movements at the turn of the 21st century, when the politics of agrarian 
transformation moved away from the left-right axis (Borras Jr, 2010). This era saw the 
emergence of new types of agrarian movements and coalitions, for example, the radical 
transnational agrarian movements, and movements that made the environment a 
discourse for protest (Hirsch, 1993b, 2013). Yet, contemporary resistance continues to 
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exist in response to a variety of dominating structures albeit in a more diverse process 
that involves negotiation and opportunism (Caouette & Turner, 2009). In some cases,     
a new commercial activity can be considered a subtle form of resistance and 
opportunism because it allows the rural people to become more involved in the market 
and development (Walker, 2009a, 2009b). The growing pluriactivity of rural households 
and the increasing inter-penetration of city and country additionally complicate the lives 
of the rural poor. Regarding the state’s rural development programme and marketisation, 
many contemporary works reveal the growing interaction between the villagers and the 
state authorities. Rather than exploring the antagonisms and dichotomies resulting from 
the integration of villages into the wider spatial political economy, many studies address 
the positive form of state village relations, i.e., state-village articulation (Hirsch, 1989), 
non-antagonistic state-village relations (Akarapongpisak, 2012), or the types of relations 
between the state and people in which people make use of the state to gain benefit from 
development (Li, 2007; Walker, 2012).    
 
In my effort to understand agrarian transformation in the context of borderlands, I have 
paid particular attention to the relationship between the state and the borderland 
communities. In effect, the specificity of the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands in terms 
of the geo-politics of the borders, historical ties and language and cultural similarities 
that contribute to the degree of compromise in state-village relations. The results of 
scholarly fieldwork in the research sites reveal another aspect of the state that relies on 
people’s collaboration. The study of Walker (1999) on cross-border trade in the Upper 
Mekong borderlands of Thailand, Laos and Burma, for example, exemplifies that 
various illegalities persist based on personalised engagement between the local traders 
and state border officials. In this case, local petty traders were bringing goods across the 
border without paying border duties and fees. Their practice was to negotiate with the 
custom officers, with whom they established friendships by supplying them with beer or 
pornographic videos. According to my research, cross-border employment was operated 
locally by local villagers, many of whom had multiple identities, e.g., the local farmers 
who faced labour shortage problems, and the local state officials whose task was to 
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protect state laws and regulations. In an attempt to protect their interests as farmers, the 
former claimed that the cross-border practices - which included hiring Lao migrants 
from across the borders - were legitimate; that is, they could be seen as licit practices, 
illegal but ostensibly legitimate practices (Abraham & Van Schendel, 2005). 
 
The Thai border officials, the District and Provincial Governor, for example, knew that 
illegal practices were occurring. And, despite the fact that cross-border practices were 
subjected to state regulation at the provincial and district level, the local villagers chose 
not to follow said regulations in the knowledge that the local state authorities had opted 
to turn a blind eye because they found it expedient to compromise with the people in 
terms of border surveillance. In other words, they waived observance of the regulations 
in the interests of consolidating border security. Claims that the remote borderlands 
were out of control and subverting central government’s rules were oversimplified. The 
case, I am addressing in this thesis is that state boundaries exist through the 
collaborative state-village relations in which local state authorities and villagers 
compromise to serve them mutual interests.  De Koninck (1992, 1996) who has 
examined the territorial compromise, observes that states and peasants gain mutual 
benefits from the process of agricultural expansion in the frontiers of Southeast Asia. 
While the state sends peasants to their peripheries and negotiates to protect them in 
order to consolidate state territory, the peasants develop interest in the new agricultural 
frontiers. This kind of mutual interest may be seen as a degree of compromise vis-a-vis 
state-village relations. 
 
The scope of compromise in state-village relations in Laos was similar. There was little 
doubt that local state authorities knew that Lao migrants crossed the border illegally to 
work across the Thai border. While the Lao government officials on the one hand 
realised that the large numbers of undocumented Lao migrants were travelling to 
Thailand, at the same time they recognised that migration was an important form of 
income generation and livelihood strategy employed by the Lao people (Huijsmans, 
2010). At the local level, the Lao officials gained mutual benefits from the Lao 
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migrants’ cross-border fees that were determined by social connections. Lao migrants 
from villages located far from the border were required to pay for higher passage fees. 
But as I have demonstrated in Chapter six, that is as the Lao migrants were willing to 
pay because they saw this process as an investment, i.e., a way of earning money in the 
Thai border. They were fully aware that their route across the Thai border was illegal. 
Paying the Lao border officials not only helped protect them from being apprehended 
but was a way compromising with the border officials.  
 
As well as rethinking state-village relations, the thesis considers how the above scope of 
compromise in state-village relations contribute to an understanding of state power. In 
the traditional agrarian studies, the village is an institution that has its own form of 
organisation: state power is located outside of the village. The expansion of state power 
to include the village community following the market expansion is seen as a form of 
state penetration and peasant resistance (Nartsupha, 1999; Scott, 1998). This thesis, as 
well as disaggregating state power, argues that the state is implanted in local social 
relationships (Migdal, 2001). The state, in this thesis, comprises the local state 
representatives who in case of conflict of interest mediate between the government and 
the locals. Also, the state has the responsibility to enforce laws and regulations, for 
example, when the local state officials who did not have any farmland, turn a blind eye 
to local cross-border practices and regard them as licit practices. What needs to be 
clarified here is how we look at the state as the central government, and at agencies or 
officials within states who have an important role in restricting and/or supporting the 
flows that occur at state boundaries. 
Finally, analysis of state power in the borderlands has revealed that borders may be seen 
as sites of exception, places where certain distinctive forms of state practice emerge 
(Das & Poole, 2004).  This thesis stresses that the forms of exception, and the problem 
of the legal/illegal and licit/illicit that occurs throughout the state structure, are most 
apparent in the borderlands. This study reveals the obvious sites of exception in relation 
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to the right of passage, and the illegal but licit nature of employment of Lao seasonal 
migrants by Thai farmers. 
8.4 Transborder rural-to-rural migration and agrarian transformation 
In this section, the thesis contributes to a new understanding of migration and its 
connection to agrarian transformation. Literature on agrarian transformation pays 
significant attention to rural-to-urban migration. Contextualising the Northeast Thailand 
and Laos, this thesis emphasises that themes of rural-to-rural migration - and the 
overlaping patterns of rural-to-rural, rural-to-urban, and transborder rural-to-rural 
migration add another material dimension to agrarian transformation.  
 
Migration has been considered one of the dimensions of agrarian transformation.  
Classic scholars of agrarian transformation, for example, Lenin, Kautsky, and 
Chayanov, highlighted industrialisation in Europe and the proletariatisation of the rural 
peasantry (Byres, 1996; Marx et al., 1978). Their primary focus was on rural-to-urban 
migration, the changing relations of production, and the emergence of an urban society. 
Rural-to-rural migration and transborder migration were beyond their concerns.  
 
In the contemporary era, much research has focused on rural-to-urban migration as an 
important key factor in rural changes (Kelly, 2000; Keyes 2012; Mills, 1997; Rigg, 
2001, 2005; Rigg & Salamanca, 2011). Rural-to- rural migration appears in studies of 
settlement of agricultural frontiers where migrants come from other regions of one 
country (De Koninck, 1992; Hirsch, 1990).  At the same time, scholarly research into 
movement across national boundaries has focused upon rural-to-urban migration. In 
general, it has describes population movements as a response to and part of the process 
of economic growth, globalisation and urbanisation. This thesis addresses the 
consequences of livelihood diversification in the Thai borderlands which have resulted 
in a labour shortage in the agricultural sector. In this case, focus has been on the geo-
politics of the borderlands of Northeast Thailand and Laos, and on the economic 
disparities that characterise rural-to-rural migration from Laos to the Thai border. In 
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addition, case studies of a village in the border of Northeast Thailand, and two villages 
in Lao PDR show that in many instances there is a blurring and overlapping of the 
patterns of migration. Lao seasonal migrants, who opt to work in agricultural areas 
along the Thai borderland, inevitably engage in both rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban 
migration patterns at different stages of their lives. 
 
Apart from bringing transborder rural-to-rural movement into consideration, this thesis 
also explores the linkages between internal and international migration. In migration 
studies, there is an increasing awareness that internal and international migration may 
not be clearly and separately distinct from each other (King, Skeldon, & Vullnetari, 
2008; Skeldon, 2006). Empirical findings from many researches reveal the linkages 
between these two types of migration. For example, the case of Albania, Çaro, Bailey, 
and Van Wissen (2013) point out that remittances from international migrants are not 
only used for household consumption purposes, but also to support the internal 
migration of other household members to migrate internally to urban areas. Drawing 
upon international labour migration, and internal migration patterns from the mountain 
and hill regions to the lowlands of Nepal, Poertner, Junginger, and Mueller-Boeker 
(2011) contend that successful international migration to India supported internal 
migration, or the movement of migrant households from the highlands to lowlands.  
 
In Southeast Asia, there is little study of the connections between internal migration in 
the rural areas and international migration from neighbouring countries. Two significant 
difficulties affecting the linkages between the two are: (1) the separate sphere between 
studies of internal migration and studies of international migration; and (2) the extensive 
attention devoted to rural-to-urban migration. In terms of studies on rural-to-rural 
migration, most are conducted within frameworks of rural studies and focus on the lives 
of migrant workers rather than on the connection between out-migration in the rural 
areas and in-migration to replace labour gaps (Latt, 2009; Makpun, 2008).  However, in 
the main, all of the authors of these studies conducted their research in receiving areas of 
migrants in Thailand only. Likewise, studies on migration in Laos to Thailand mainly 
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focused on rural-to-urban international migration. While there have been some 
anthropological studies on migration undertaken in Lao PDR, most have highlighted the 
factors that push people to consider international migration, including intensified 
economic integration, marketisation, expansion of infrastructure, and cultural 
motivations. In other word, most of studies have been conducted under the framework 
of rural studies and as such they have focused on the lives of migrant workers rather 
than the connection between out-migration in the rural areas and the in-migration to 
replace labour gaps (Barney, 2012; Huijsmans, 2010; Rigg, 2007). This oversight has 
resulted in significant knowledge gaps in the linkages between Thai-Lao context, there 
is little evidence of connections between internal migration in rural Thailand and 
international migration from neighbouring countries.   
 
This thesis has discussed internal migration in rural Northeast Thailand, and the 
agricultural labour shortages, that result in the in-migration of Lao workers in peak 
agricultural season. The distinction between internal and international moves between 
Lao PDR and Thailand is blurred, not only due to border proximity and ethnic and 
cultural similarities, but also because the Lao migrants’ journeys are multiple, complex 
and fragmented. The thesis aims not only to fill this gap, but also to show how these 
linkages fit into a larger picture of internal migration flows from Thailand’s rural areas 
to cities and other growth centres, and how they facilitate the replacement of labour 
forces from less-diverse economic areas. Aided by the spatial characteristic of the Thai-
Lao borders, Lao migrants not only replace agricultural labourers in rural Thailand, but 
also are able to move between rural and urban areas, in the process complicating the 
conventional explanation of the migratory route. 
 
8.5 Rethinking agrarian transformation 
In this section, I look at how the empirical findings from the northeastern Thai-Lao 
borderlands, i.e., the geo-politics of the borders and the complex migration patterns, 
contribute to the reconsideration of a conceptual framework for agrarian transformation. 
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While a significant proportion of agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia focuses on 
livelihood change, de-agrarianisation and social relations associated with changes in and 
beyond agriculture, this thesis explores non-linear agrarian transformation, the 
reworking of agrarian relations, and the social identity of the rural lives.  
8.5.1 The non-linear pathways of agrarian transformation 
There has been an attempt in the past to interpret how the lives of rural dwellers have 
changed. The traditional views on agrarian transformation highlight the pathways to 
capitalism and class differentiation. Later studies have pointed out that many key factors 
shape agrarian transformation; for example, environmental change, intensification of 
regulations, population dynamics, and urbanisation (ChATSEA, 2002). However, most 
interpretation of agrarian transformation links the pathways to urbanisation, 
industrialisation and marketisation with the disappearance of peasantry. A set of studies 
conducted in Thailand by Jonathan Rigg (Rigg, 2001, 2003, 2004; Rigg & Sakunee, 
2001) highlight increases of mobility, non-agricultural employment, and off-farm 
incomes, and the fact that Southeast Asia is moving towards de-agrarianisation.  
 
However, de-agrarianisation is problematised due to its too absolute nature and too 
linear interpretation (Hirsch, 2011). Using Europe as an example, Van der Ploeg  (2007, 
2008) argues that agrarian crises, that is the neglect of a peasant agriculture, together 
with neo-liberal projects and the rise of food empires, juxtapose re-peasantisation 
against industrialisation and de-agrarianisation. Re-peasantisation is a phenomenon in 
which people enter the peasant mode of production to counter crises and neo-liberalism: 
it has been reported in certain areas of the developing world, for example in Latin 
America. In Thailand, the role of agriculture was widely recognised during the 
economic crisis in 1997. Scholars claim that while the financial, industrial and service 
sectors had fallen into crisis, rural agriculture has served as a social safety net by 
absorbing many unemployed people returning from the cities (Siamwalla & 
Sobchokchai, 1998; Sussangkarn, Flatters, & Sauwalak, 1999). However, a view of 
agriculture as a safety net for the rural dwellers is controversial because people in rural 
Thailand are heavily dependent on an urban economy that has absorbed the poor and the 
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landless from the rural areas. Farming sectors are, in fact, frequently financed by 
remittances from off-farm sectors (Li, 2009). In addition, while many rural people have 
abandoned subsistence livelihoods, in many areas, they have become degraders of the 
environment and unsustainable resource users (Australian Mekong Resource Centre, 
1999). In such cases, cash crops and the food prices boom, urbanisation, and the 
government’s subsidisation of agriculture have proven crucial factors in the re-
positioned relationship between urban migrants and their rural livelihoods. It some 
areas, people have been inspired sufficiently to renew their interest in agriculture and to 
return to the farm or re-peasantisation (Vandergeest, 2012). All of the above reflects the 
multiple pathways to agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia. In his later work, Rigg 
makes clear that although rural livelihoods in Southeast Asia are being transformed by 
the process of de-agrarianisation, the process coexists with the enduring importance of 
farming (Rigg & Vandergeest, 2012).  
 
This thesis, as well as revealing the non-linear pathways of agrarian transformation in 
the borderlands, claims that irrespective of how rural livelihoods in both Northeast 
Thailand and Laos have changed in line with de-agrarianisation, farming remains a vital 
component of the rural dwellers’ livelihoods. But, the de-agrarianisation alluded to in 
my thesis was quite different from the processes taking place in other geographical 
locations. Under certain circumstances, people abandoned agriculture due to agricultural 
labour shortages, more inspiring opportunities in off-farm jobs, and rising land prices. I 
demonstrate in Chapter Seven that farmers in Ban Fangthai and Ban Kaemkong had 
multiple sources of income. While most households had family members who had 
migrated to the cities, villagers who completely abandoned agriculture were rare. 
Villager put one foot into off-farm jobs but kept the other foot in agriculture. Some 
combined off-farm jobs with work on the land. In Ban Laonua, given the limited 
availability of off-farm jobs, agriculture remained important. Lao migrants in Bangkok, 
commenting on their future occupations, said that they would have to work on the farms 
because the limitation of non-farm jobs in their home villages reflected the degree to 
which agriculture was still relevant to rural people’s lives. My fieldwork undertaken in 
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northeastern Thailand and Laos concerning de-agrarianisation, revealed that livelihood 
reorientation, occupational adjustment, and spatial relocation of rural people away from 
a strictly agricultural base might not be a linear process. 
  
The sptial interconnectness of the Northeast Thailand and Laos contribute to cross-
border migration, the employment of Lao seasonal migrants on the Thai farmlands, and 
the persistence of agriculture. Employing migrants in commercial agriculture in many 
countries, such as berry farms in Scandinavian countries (Partanen, 2009), fruit farms in 
Spain  (Constant et al., 2012) and Australia (Blanco, 2009), and agricultural areas in the 
United States (Martin, 2002), has become common practice. Nonetheless, the case 
involving the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands is distinguishable from other cases, as 
much as long historical ties and cultural similarity support licit cross-border 
employment by the Thai farmers of Lao workers. 
 
Important factors that contribute to the unique pathways of agrarian transformation in 
the northeastern Thai - Lao borderlands include the availability of labour, the 
geographical location, new opportunities for rice farming, and cash crops facilitated by 
government policies.  The existing literature on de-agrarianisation, while focusing on 
labour shortages, rural-urban interpretations, migration, and tensions between the farm 
and off-farm sectors (Bryceson et al, 2000; Rigg, 2001, 2004), omits factors relevant to 
geographical location and transnationalisation.  
 
Clearly, from the empirical findings of this thesis, the geographical margin of the 
borderlands does not contribute in any way to agricultural marginalisation. Rather, the 
Thai farmers benefit from seasonal labour, most notably that of illegal migrants from 
Laos, whose wage rates are often less than those of domestic workers in Thailand. The 
de-agrarianisation concept ignores the fact that farmers are combining farm and off-farm 
labour. And, there is less re-peasantisation because agriculture has always persisted 
parallel to the multiple livelihoods of the rural dwellers. This thesis suggests that the 
transformation in the northeastern Thailand borderland can be understood by joining the 
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linkages between domestic and cross-border migration. What we see in this study has 
less to do with de-agrarianisation and re-peasantisation and more to do with reworking 
the labour relations and class identities that are spatially constituted.   
8.5.2 The new labour relations  
Labour relations have long been an important component of discussion in agrarian 
transformation. In Thailand, major studies conducted between the 1960s and 1980s 
highlight the contexts in the core rice-growing areas upon which agrarian society was 
based. The Green Revolution accompanying development programmes manifested 
changes in the production methods, labour relations, and land ownership, and 
consequently led to inequality within and between the rural and urban areas. Agrarian 
transformation focuses on the themes of class and rural differentiation and on the 
relationship between the state and village people. Anan (1984) wrote that the 
commoditisation of rice cropping led to an emergent class of capitalist farmers, who 
tried to control the tenants, labour - and wage-labour in general - by negotiating between 
the share-cropping method and the monetisation of labour employment.  Turton (1989) 
also examined the politics of agrarian differentiation, extending his attention to the 
patronage system and how the local elites exercised power between the state and the 
local people. 
 
Nowadays, those old agrarian contexts do not equate to the wider economic and social 
relations. Labour mobility, and the shift from farm to non-farm occupations, have 
transformed labour in the agricultural sector and seen it become increasingly determined 
by a wider labour market beyond local and village agriculture. Scholarly research today 
tends to focus on rural-to-urban migration tension and competition between the farm and 
non-farm sectors, and the pressures on agriculture (Grandstaff et al, 2008; Rigg, 2001, 
2004; Rigg & Sakunee, 2001; Rigg & Salamanca, 2012). The contexts of immigration, 
and of migrant workers and rural-to-rural migration that open opportunities for farmers 
to adapt their labour management, remain understudied.  
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This thesis focus is on the complexity of the labour relations shaped by the movement of 
Thai local people and immigrant labour from neighbouring countries. Particular 
attention is paid to the specificity of Northeast Thailand and Laos, which together shape 
labour relations in the area in a particular way. With reference to farmers in Ban 
Fangthai, hiring the Lao workers puts them into a more obvious employer role. Prior to 
the 1990s, farmers used to employ their own labour and family farms, reciprocal labour, 
or even limited hired labour amongst themselves, which was not really an employee-
employer relationship. After the 1990s, farmers in Ban Fangthai survived by the 
employment of cheap and available Lao workers, who stayed on the farmers' land for 
extended periods during the planting season. Hiring labour and using household labour 
to plant glutinous rice for their household consumption and non-glutinous rice for cash 
capture a glimpse of villagers’ semi-entrepreneurial character. It shows the increasingly 
vague distinction between farmers, rural workers, and entrepreneurs that class base 
analysis could not equip with. In addition, characteristics of farmers in Ban Fangthai 
resonate with the critical perspective on the Thai villages that they have become middle-
income peasants (Walker, 2012). They are not poor, despite the fact that not all villagers 
are well-off. They have diversified their livelihoods and have developed non-
agricultural sources of income, although agriculture is still an important part of their 
lives.   
  
Research in other regions of Thailand shows that the use of transnational migrant labour 
in agriculture culminates in the control of labour, extremely flexible employment and 
new labour division based on ethnicities (Latt, 2009; Taotawin, 2011; Makpun, 2008). 
Scholars have highlighted the fact that in some regions the labour relations between 
ethnic minorities and the national population have created a disenfranchised underclass. 
Latt (2009), for example, reveals that the Shan ethnic minority, who migrated from 
Burma to Thailand are labelled as poor, marginalised and illegal migrants. Their arrival 
has provided an opportunity for Hmong employers to take advantage of them by paying 
them low wages, in this way facilitating commercialised agriculture. Similarly, 
Taotawin (2011) and Makpun (2008) observed that Lao labourers working in 
221 
 
commercialised farming in Chiang Rai and Ubonratachatanee, border provinces located 
in north and northeast Thailand, earned lower wages than the local Thai labourers. And, 
they were unable to negotiate. All of these observations point to exploitative labour 
relations wherein workers are in vulnerable situations and their economic freedoms are 
limited. 
 
With reference to the working conditions of the Lao migrants in Ban Fangthai, their 
Thai employers paid them approximately 130-150 baht per day, which was lower than 
the official minimum wage of 159 baht per day in Mukdahan province, and lower than 
the 200-250 baht paid to their Thai farm labour counterparts. Men and women were paid 
the same rate. From my point of view, however, the labour relations between the Thai 
farmers, as employers, and the Lao labourers cannot be simplified as exploitative 
relationship. Certain factors should be taken into considerations; for example: (1) the 
scope of compromise reached between the Thai farmers and their  Lao workers due to 
the pursuance of  licit practices; and, (2) the social relations based on village locations, 
historical ties and cultural similarities that trimmed down the exploitative nature of their 
labour relations.   
8.5.2.1 The scope of compromise between Thai farmers and Lao workers that 
accommodates their illegal practices 
In Chapter five, I discussed the differences between illegal and licit practices, and the 
perceptions of the local state officials and borderland villagers via-a-vis the cross-border 
employment practices engaged in by the Thai and Lao peoples along the Mekong River. 
Regulations declared it illegal to hire undocumented Lao seasonal migrants and to keep 
them resident on farmlands until the end of the cultivating season.  Similarly, the 
migration of Lao people who cross the Mekong River and enter Thailand via the village 
checkpoint was also considered illegal. However, these practices have become 
legitimate and continue to be carried on, demonstrating the degree of compromise 
reached by the local state officials and the villagers.  
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In so far as this context is concerned, my thesis differs from work undertaken in other 
regions. According to Latt (2009, 2012), the illegal status of the Shan migrants working 
in commercialised agriculture in northern Thailand leaves them little opportunity to 
negotiate with their employers. And, because these workers did not want to return to 
Burma due to political oppression, they had no alternative but to accept whatever jobs 
were available. Without legal work permits, their stay in Thailand remain insecure. 
Their employers could call the police to arrest them and have then deported back to 
Burma.   
 
In the case of the Thai-Lao villagers, the Lao workers not only entered Thailand 
illegally, but the Thai farmers knew that they were employing them illegally. Both 
parties perceived these as licit practices that allowed them to have mutual benefits. As 
Ms Nang, a 74 year-old landowner, who had been hiring the Lao workers for over 20 
years and had been arrested by the Thai police, said: 
 
A new policeman who had just moved from an other district saw the Lao workers in my paddy 
field. I was brought to the Police Station while my nine Lao labourers were deported back to Lao 
right away. The police asked me about hiring nine Lao workers and told me that it was illegal. I 
told that I knew but I did it for a long time. Then, they said they would release me because of 
misunderstanding but I had to pay 200 baht fee. They told me not to do it again. But, how can 
such an old woman like me working in the paddy field on my own. My children and 
grandchildren were away. There was none Thai labourers to hire because they were busy with 
their land. I then called the Lao workers from another village to work for me.
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As suggested in Chapter five, the villagers of Ban Fangthai continue to hire the Lao 
workers and to hide their practice from the district government officials. At the same 
time, the government officials know what the people are doing but turn a blind eye. 
Only in cases where someone reports them do they arrest Thai farmers, charge a fee, or 
simply let them go. They do not arrest the Lao workers: they are deported back to the 
Laos. Just as the Thai farmers fear arrest, so do the Lao workers fear deportation back to 
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Lao because it eliminates their chances to earn money.  This repositions their labour 
relations in a more compromised way. 
8.5.2.2 Social relations based on village locations, historical ties and cultural 
similarities 
It became clear to me that Thai-Lao historical ties, border proximity and cultural 
similarities diminished exploitative labour relations between the Thai farmers and the 
Lao seasonal migrants. For many Thai farmers, their Lao employees were not strangers. 
The former repeatedly hired the same person, after circulating him/her among their 
relatives. But, some Thai farmers, widows, or families with female members only feared 
keeping the Lao workers with them overnight so they ‘borrowed’ workers from their 
relatives and friends during the day time. The male workers regularly stayed in the 
temporary shelters in the fields. But, the Thai farmers always allowed the young Lao 
female workers to stay in their homes in the village for safety reasons.   
 
The Lao migrants who had earlier worked in Ban Fangthai usually contacted Thai 
employers who they knew would treat them well. Some came through social 
connections established by the parental generation. A 32 year-old male migrant from 
Ban Don said: 
 
I first came to work for Ms Nang with my parents when I was 9 years old. When I turned 12 
years old, I went to work in Bangkok with my auntie and never returned to work in Ban 
Fangthai. I returned to Laos 3 years ago and did all wage-labour jobs that were available in the 
village. Last year, my parents told me to come to work for Ms Nang. My parents are too old to 
do wage-labour job so I came with 3 neighbours. Ms Nang can remember me and treats me very 
well. Besides my wage, she provides good food and regularly pays for my boat trip back to 
Laos.
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Unlike the Shan workers, who, according to Latt (2009), were separately marginalised 
to live in the poor housing conditions outside of the village, the Lao workers in Ban 
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Fangthai were treated relatively well. They were kept away from the police in small 
shelters in the middle of the rice farms. They were provided with three meals per day, 
mats, pillows, and blanket for sleeping with nets to protect them from insect and 
mosquito bites. In addition, toilet and bathing necessities were provided. In some cases, 
if the Thai landowners were sufficiently familiar with their Lao workers, that is, they 
had hired the same group of people over a few year, they invited their Lao workers to 
stay in their house with them. 
 
Finally, the high labour demand in the peak cultivating season, and the increasing 
numbers of hired migrant labourers from Laos gave negotiation power to the Lao 
migrants. In the past, the Thai villagers were competitive. Their attempts to get Lao 
workers by offering higher wage rates caused conflict among them because the Lao 
workers opted to work for those who offered to pay higher wage rates. Recently, to 
discourage conflict, the Thai farmers agreed upon the standard rate. At the same time, 
negotiation power lay in the fact that if the Lao workers were not happy to work, they 
could leave. In addition, the labourers selected the landowners they considered the best 
to work for, and shared this information among their friends, emphasising the kind and 
unkind landowners. Thus, the Lao migrants no longer had to enter into subordinate 
relationships. One of the Thai farmers had a reputation for making her Lao labourers 
work overtime and not paying them extra money. Lao workers who came to Ban 
Fangthai frequently refused to work for her and spread the news among their friends. 
During the period of my fieldwork, this landowner acquired three new comer Lao 
migrants, but they only worked for her for approximately two days. Then, they moved to 
work for other landowners. Finally, this woman could no longer attract any Lao 
workers, so she had to wait until almost the end of the cultivating season to get Thai 
workers who had already finished cultivating their land. Most of them were her relatives 
and neighbours.  
8.5.2.3 Multiple identities and class identities 
In his discussion of agrarian transformation in northern Thailand over the last 30 years, 
Ganjanapan (1984) took land ownership as an analytical focus and categorised the rich 
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and poor villagers accordingly to the amount of their land holdings. In his study, a 
village was a community that could be understood as a small unit comprising local 
males and females with distinct cultures, politics and economics. Class conflict occurred 
due to the socio-economic differentiation between the rich who owned land and the 
poor, who were either landless or owned only a small plot of land.  
 
In recent times, class conflict based on land ownership has been re-examined. Basing 
their analysis on the fact that rural livelihoods are now less tied to the land, Rigg and 
Sakunee (2001) explore the class-based analysis that shows that today, new factors 
generate class differentiation, not land ownership. They stress that landless people are 
not necessarily poor. The factors that shape social mobility and rural differentiation, 
they claim, are education, non-farm occupations, and migration incorporate rural lives 
into the wider economic sphere.   
 
 As I have suggested in Chapters six and seven, opportunities for migration are not 
equally distributed. In Ban Fangthai, age, gender, and education have determined the 
villagers’ opportunities to exploit non-farm work, whereas in Ban Kaemkong and Ban 
Laonua, age and gender were major factors, with education playing a lesser role. 
Seasonal migration to Ban Fangthai was an alternative for some people, who were 
marginalised from long-distance migration.  The older people in each village were 
predominant in agriculture while the younger people, who were more educated were in a 
better position to move to off-farm employment. In terms of gender, unmarried females 
could exploit more opportunities than their married counterparts who tended to return 
home to establish families. The effect of migration on each village could be elaborated 
conceptually. Rigg states:  
 
Migration may be propelled by poverty, and encouraged by wealth; it may reflect resource 
scarcities at the local level, or be an outcome of prosperity; it may be embedded in economic 
transformations, or better explained by social and cultural changes; it may narrow inequalities in 
source communities, or widen them; it may tighten the bonds of reciprocity between migrants 
and their natal households, or it may serve to loosen or break these bonds; it may help to support 
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agricultural production, or it may be a means to break away from farming altogether (Rigg, 2007, 
p. 163). 
As noted in Chapters six and seven, migration could provide economic return to migrant 
families that in turn could lead to social mobility. Some aging families in Ban 
Kaemkong, Lao PDR, with members working in Thailand and remitting money, could 
stop working on their farm while remittances from migration have allowed some 
households in Ban Laonua to hire wage-labour. Successive migrants have the 
opportunity to showcase their improved economic status through their new houses, new 
small businesses, or new land ownership. In the case of Northeast Thailand, earnings 
from migration have supported many families to re-investment in rubber plantations.  
 
However, I would like to stress here that this thesis goes beyond village and national 
scales of class differentiation. Transborder migration, and the employement of seasonal 
Lao migrant workers on Thai farmlands, complicate rural class differentiation between 
the Thai farmers and the Lao workers. It not only reveals the fluidity of class and social 
identities, but also how class is reworked in different spaces and times (De Haan & 
Rogaly, 2010; Kelly, 2011, 2012). As demonstrated in Chapter seven, the majority of 
the Lao migrants in Ban Fangthai were not landless; in fact, they had their own land but 
they were faced with problems of low productivity and a limited chance of accessing 
non-farm job opportunities in Laos. Some among them opted to send money back to 
their villages for investment in their houses, better clothing and material objects that 
could distinguish them from their neighbours. But, when they chose migration, and 
opted to stay in Thailand, their social identity in Laos shifted to that of migrant workers. 
Even though non-farm work could project them into the modern economy, opportunities 
for such work remained marginal, and they were unable to be upwardly mobile to 
upgrade their social status to urban middle class. This fact shows that the same 
individual may experience different class processes in different times and places. 
Lukasiewicz (2011), in his article ‘Migration and Gender identity in the Rural 
Philippines’, has elaborated on the reworking of classes and social mobility in the 
Philippines that has resulted from international migration. That class is clearly being 
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reworked is evident in the status of the Filipino migrants employed as domestic workers 
in Hong Kong, but who are landowners and moneylenders in their home villages. Thus, 
people have different identities and classes in different times and places.   
8.6 Conclusion   
This chapter links the empirical data from the fieldwork to the literature on borderlands, 
migration, and agrarian transformation. This thesis argues that there are some 
commonalities in the agrarian transformation processes, such as migration, urbanisation, 
and increasing importance of off-farm occupations in all of the research sites. As well, 
this thesis shows the differences in agrarian transformation in particular places, spaces, 
and contexts, and how they are diverted by historical, geographical, cultural, political 
and economic factors. It reveals the oversimplification of claiming that a linear process 
of de-agrarianisation explains the persistence of agriculture in the borderlands, based on 
transborder migration from a poorer neighboring country. At the same time, re-
agrarianisation is more than the reverse of de-agrarianisation because agriculture in the 
borderland - and the peasants - have persisted in parallel to new opportunities in off-
farm sectors. The chapter problematises the new agrarian relations in this complex and 
wider context to reconceptualise agrarian transformation.  
In the first section, I have discussed the role of the states and their relationships with the 
villagers in the borderlands. I have attempted to show how the specificity of the 
Northeast Thailand and Lao borderlands contributes to the scope of compromise in 
state-village relations. In addition, I have sought to unravel the complex nature of the 
state at both the local and national levels, and to make clear that the state has several 
layers. In effect, the study focuses on local state officials, who have an important role in 
restricting or supporting the flows of migrants across the state boundaries. The mutual 
interests between local state officials and villagers support the making of the licitness of 
cross-border migration and employment in the Northeast Thailand and Lao borderlands.  
In addition, this chapter explores the overlapping patterns of rural-to-rural and rural-to-
urban migration and the linkages between internal and international migration, all of 
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which are associated with the movement of migration between the rural and urban 
sectors.  In the last section, the chapter reconceptualises agrarian transformation by 
demonstrating the more complex labour relations, classes and identities of the rural 
people that are shaped differently in each space. This reinforces the delocalised frame of 
reference needed to understand contemporary agrarian transformation.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
In this study, I have questioned how the spatial interconnectedness of the northeastern 
Thai-Lao borderlands shapes agrarian transformation, in particular through patterns of 
migration. Working from the premise that the borderlands are fields of relations rather 
than fields of location, I have demonstrated local cross-border practices, in particular the 
transborder migration of Lao seasonal migrants and their labour substitution on Thai 
farmlands that are facing severe labour shortages. Cross-border employment and the 
immigration of undocumented Lao migrants appear to confront the state’s law. I argue, 
however, that they in fact throw light on the apparent licit practices and scope of 
compromise in state-village relations in which local borderlanders and local state 
officials negotiate their mutual interest in the transnationalised border. While the 
farmers undoubtedly benefit from migrant labour, the state co-opts the local people into 
surveillance of the borderlands.  This allows a great deal of overlapping of rural-to-rural 
and rural-to-urban migration across agricultural and other sectors and of the obvious 
linkages between internal and international migration. In addition, it shows that the 
marginality of the border do not contribute to agricultural marginalisation. Agriculture 
remains a significant activity along with other off-farm opportunities that a potentially 
allow villagers to gain benefit from the cash crops. The research shows the pathway of 
agrarian transformation in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands is beyond the linear 
de-agrarianisation process. The employment of Lao labour in the Thai farmlands and the 
complex migration patterns of the Lao workers raise important points concerning 
agrarian relations and the identities of the people involved in this process of change.    
 
I will now briefly recall the composition of this thesis: Chapter one illustrates the overall 
framework, rationale, and study sites. Chapter two focuses on theoretical considerations 
in relation to the borderlands, migration, and agrarian transformation. Chapter three 
introduces the research methodology, challenges and methods. In chapter four, the thesis 
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provides the historical backgrounds of Northeast Thailand and Laos and the two 
countries’ trajectories of development. Chapters five to seven presents the empirical 
findings from my fieldworks in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands, and a village 
which is located in the hinterland of Laos. The findings are linked to the literature to 
show how the research contributes new knowledge and provide better understanding of 
the agrarian studies explored in Chapter eight.  
 
This concluding chapter (Chapter 9) aims to revisit the main themes of the thesis and to 
summarise the major findings which are reiterated in the research questions. Attention is 
also given to the main contribution of the research and to subjects requiring further 
investigation. 
 
9.2 The Borderlands as a Spatial Context in Agrarian Studies and the Main 
Empirical Findings 
In this section, I discuss how the study of agrarian transformation in the context of 
borderlands provides a broader understanding of agrarian transformation, based on the 
empirical findings.  
  
Moving beyond the conventional agrarian studies that tend to focus on core-rice 
growing areas in particular countries, this thesis fills empirical gaps, both in agrarian 
studies and in studies of borderlands. I am alluding here to the absence of investigation 
of agrarian transformation in the locally specific context of borderlands and the 
broadening scales of agrarian studies from specific country to cross-country analysis. 
The borderlands, as a researchable field, not only provide insights into a border space 
that is socially and politically constructed, they also reveal the scope of compromise in 
state-village relations. The empirical findings in Chapter five encourage the rethinking 
of conventional models of state power in the borderlands of Southeast Asia. I discuss the 
more powerful state centre, the diminished power at the margins, and the confrontations 
that occur between the state and local communities as a form of resistance. Although the 
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reality of unequal power relations cannot be denied, this thesis reveals the interplay 
between illegal and licit practices based on the local borderland residents’ claims on 
historical ties and social networks which allow for the scope of compromise in state-
village relations and the multi-layers of state entities, i.e., the central and local state 
authorities, and the synaptic roles of the state officials.  
 
Unravelling the linkages between out-migration from rural Thailand to urban cities and 
in-migration of seasonal Lao migrants as replacement labour in the agricultural sector, 
this thesis highlights the specificity of Lao-Thai migration flows across rural-to-rural 
and rural-to-urban sectors, and the further connections with many areas beyond 
Bangkok, such as many provinces in southern and eastern Thailand. The particular 
geographical location, the porous Thai-Lao borderlands, and the similarities between the 
Northeast Thai and Lao peoples facilitate migration and blur the distinction between 
internal and international migration. However, these commonalities shared by the 
northeastern Thai and Lao peoples cannot eliminate the migrant status of the Lao 
people. In the last section of Chapter six, I discuss the landscape of legality or the 
interface between illegal and licit migration that is determined by different spaces. Apart 
from its contribution to migration studies in terms of revealing the above multi-faceted 
migration activities and linkages of internal and international migration, this thesis also 
highlights how the rural and urban sectors are connected through migration patterns. 
While most Lao migrants practice seasonal migration, they return to their natal villages 
to labour on their family farms when required.  
 
In addition, this thesis argues that, although rural livelihoods in both Northeast Thailand 
and Lao PDR are now more reliant on off-farm income and remittances, farming persists 
albeit fundamentally altered by many changes. Regarding Northeast Thailand, the study 
confirms that the young generation is moving to off-farm occupations and that as a 
consequence, villages are facing with labour shortage problems. However, the villages’ 
marginal locations allow immigrant Lao seasonal workers to fill the labour gaps. Thus, 
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farming persists in the borderlands rather than being abandoned as has been the case in 
many other areas of Thailand. 
 
The ability to absorb Lao seasonal migrants illuminates two sides of consideration in 
association with agrarian transformation. While it has helped farmers in the Thai 
borderlands to maintain their farms and has decreased the competitiveness between farm 
and non-farm jobs, at the same time, it has created conditions that have delayed the 
mechanisation and various more modern adaptations to the farming system. Rather than 
pursuing the linear pathway to mechanisation and de-agrarianisation, agrarian 
transformation in the Thai borderlands has been largely determined by labour 
substitution has introduced news form of agrarian relations across the border.  
 
This thesis is also shown that agriculture has remained a viable alternative for rural 
dwellers in the northeastern Thai-Laos borderlands, and the hinterland of Laos. In 
northeastern Thailand, many young migrants, who could not join middle class 
occupations, found that agriculture provided a reasonable income and allowed them to 
avoid having to take labouring jobs in the city.  Meanwhile, those successful or educated 
migrants, who opted not to become farmers as they did not know how to work in a farm, 
aspired to become entrepreneurial farmers and invested in new cash crops in particular 
in rubber plantations. Empirical findings also revealed the different perspectives 
between the young cohort and the elderly. While the younger generation viewed 
investment in rubber plantation as a mean of prosperity, their parents viewed it as 
insurance for their life security since it involved long term investment.  
 
In terms of Lao PDR, farming has persisted. It has neither totally ceased nor lost its 
importance due to lower level of urbanisation and fewer off-farm job opportunities. 
Earlier return migrants had little opportunity but to farm; however, migration and 
remittances have contributed to differentiation among rural people. Longer distance 
migration has generated an increase in remittances, and the chance to join long-distance 
migration has been selectively embraced by the younger people who are in a stronger 
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position to migrate. In the case of females, those who were likely to exploit off-farm 
opportunities in Bangkok and other urban cities were either unmarried or married and 
accompanied by their husbands. But despite the higher wages that non-farm jobs, 
offered, along with the chance to join Thailand’s modern economy, the non-literates 
(both legal and illegal) migrant status allowed them access to marginal laboring jobs 
only. This prompted many Lao workers to consider returning to Laos, using the money 
they had to set up small business in the villages. They returned to earn money in 
Thailand only when it was needed.  
9.3 Theoretical contribution of the thesis 
This thesis provides empirical evidence that contributes to the broader understanding of 
the diversity of paths of agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia. The extant scholarly 
literature on agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia focus in the main on the rural-
urban interface, out-migration, shifting from farm to non-farm occupations, and the 
abandonment of agriculture due to labour shortages within a broad concept of de-
agrarianisation (Rigg, 2001; Rigg & Sakunee, 2001). In the northeastern Thai-Lao 
borderlands, people are generally involved in wide range of activities; but, at the same 
time many are engaged in farming. Labour shortages in the Thai borderlands have been 
resolved by transborder rural-to-rural migration. The availability of land, labour and 
capital from remittances has facilitated agriculture in the three research sites. These 
findings demonstrate that the concept of de-agrarianisation is too linear and 
oversimplifies diverse pathways. 
 
As well as addressing agrarian change from the conceptual angle of de-agrarianisation, 
some scholars have introduced the concepts of re-agrarianisation and re-peasantisation 
to explain why and how rural people who were once involve in off-farm occupations 
have renewed their interest in agriculture (Van der Ploeg, 2008; Vandergeest, 2012). 
This study contends that re-agrarianisation is not a reversal of de-agrarianisation and has 
little to do with borderland field sites because such sites were never really de-
agrarianised. The study also suggests re-conceptualising agrarian relations in the wider 
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context beyond village and national levels. In Chapter eight, I explore the new class 
relations based on ethnicity that have occurred across the national boundaries. I also 
argue that exploitative class relations might not be able to explain the social relations of 
the Thai-Lao people living in the borderlands. At the same time, labour shortages in 
Thailand have increased the Lao people’s negotiation power to choose to work with the 
Thai landowners who have treated them well.  
 
This study agrees with many previous studies that non-farm work and migration 
determine rural differentiation. The landless may not be necessarily poor and people 
who own land might not be as rich as the landless, who have the potential to earn money 
from off-farm jobs (Rigg & Sakunee, 2001). The thesis, by moving beyond the national 
to cross-country analysis, has established that many Lao seasonal migrants in fact own 
farmland in their natal villages. In addition, many of the Lao migrants who work in the 
marginal jobs in the urban cities in Thailand are in fact landlords or landowners in their 
own right in their home villages. This shows that while migration can be an outcome of 
agrarian transformation, at the same time it can produce many changes in rural areas. In 
this case of this thesis, transborder migration between Thailand and Lao has driven the 
rethinking of agrarian class position and relations and multiple class identities 
constituted by spatiality.  
 
Conventional studies regard village as an immobile and subsistent unit comprising the 
peasantry (Nartsupha, 1986, 1999). Later studies argue that earlier studies ignored the 
degree of market relations and differentiation (Chayan, 1993; Kemp, 1993a; Nartsupha, 
1999). Many scholars, for example, included migration and the movement of people as 
key factors transforming rural society; however, what has transpired over in the previous 
two decades was not as intensive as in the current era, where one sees the intensification 
of technologies and information flows combined with infrastructure development and 
growing region integration giving rise to internal and international migration. Within 
this scenario, rural households have become multi-sited and stretched over space (Rigg, 
2013, p. 9).    
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In addition to the theoretical contribution, there is also a methodological contribution.  
This thesis contributes clear examples of the delocalisation of rural lives and invokes 
multi-scarlar examination and awareness of the spatiality of livelihoods (Hirsch, 2012, 
p. 401). Increasingly mobility within and across countries has led to methodological 
challenge now that members of households are residing, living and working in different 
places. These changes provide a practical challenge to rural studies. Earlier studies have 
shown that rural people in Thailand are increasingly moving from farm to non-farm 
jobs, but the statistical data do not make clear their aspirations and their connection to 
agricultural livelihoods. In addition, there is awareness of the growing numbers of Lao 
migrants in the Thai economy, but uncertainty surrounds their migration across urban 
and rural sectors. Rigg (2013, p. 12) points out that it is not unusual for people to ‘keep 
a foot on the land even while they step on to the factory floor’. This is even truer when 
one consider occupations at the household level. Certain individuals and households 
pursue multi-stranded livelihood strategies (sometimes termed ‘occupational 
multiplicity’) in which they juggle a variety of activities and occupations. The empirical 
findings in this thesis reflect those changes and challenge the researcher to develop the 
most effective way to conduct a research. Instead of focusing on households in one 
space, I have conducted multi-sited ethnographies across the national border and follow 
people to different places to observe their geography of employment and migration 
across rural and urban sectors. The context of the borderlands and the methodological 
challenge in this thesis in my view provides a new approach to the analytical 
methodological exploration of agrarian studies that has taken the study away from a 
single-sited ethnography of core rice or upland areas, moving beyond a sole research site 
in one specific country. 
9.4 Borderland Agriculture and Labour Migration: The Road Ahead 
The thesis investigates agricultural livelihoods in the northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands 
and the employment of Lao workers in the Thai border areas in the present and recent 
past. However, the situation is dynamic. The situation in the borderlands is shaped by 
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the changing contests, including policy change. New government policilies have thrown 
up many questions in need of future investigation. 
 
On the 1
st
 of April 2013, one and a half years after I completed my fieldwork, the Thai 
government under the leadership of Yingluck Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai Party 
increased the Thai minimum wage from a variable rate by profince of around 200 baht 
to 300 baht per day throughout Thailand.  This policy mostly impact to the Thailand’s 
Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and some labour-intensive industries such as 
textiles, garments, and services that found the higher minimum wage a threat to their 
continued operation.  In the agricultural sector, the Thailand Development Research 
Institute (2013) pointed out that it would be hit hard by the wage hike, with monthly 
wage costs rising by two to three billion baht or 22-30 per cent.    
 
The increase in minimum wage in Thailand led to questions about labour strategies in 
the agricultural sectors.  It could prove interesting to ask what will happen in the 
northeastern Thai-Lao borderlands when the Thai farmers are forced to pay 300 baht per 
day to procure not only Thai labour but also migrant labour? It has been reported that 
many Burmese living in the surrounding rural areas (farm workers, day laborers, etc.) 
are already holding out for the new minimum wage, declining to accept anything less 
than 300 baht (Pattaya News). Referring back to the Northeast Thailand and Laos 
borderlands, how will the villagers cope having to pay the minimum wage of 300 baht 
per day? Will the Thai farmers resort to hiring only Lao seasonal migrants because they 
are able to negotiate a cheaper wage rate? Will they invest in more mechanisation next 
year, or plant crops that require less manual handling? Will food prices rise due to more 
labour costs for rice farming? It may be that textual development will reshape the 
relations between employers and workers and transborder relations. If the Lao migrants 
opt to move to the non-farm sector due to the 300 baht wage policy while high labour 
demand in the peak cultivating season persists, competition among the Thai farmers 
may equip the Lao migrants with more power for negotiation. I foresee a change in the 
237 
 
employment strategies of people in Northeast Thailand which may prove of interest to 
future researchers. 
  
Furthermore, an increase in wage labour prove an incentive for people to move from 
farming to the industrial and service sectors that provide all year round jobs rather than 
only seasonal agricultural jobs. The Thai Entrepreneurs have gradually adjusted to the 
300 baht minimum wage following the law enforcement. The wage increase to 300 baht 
effectively makes Thailand No.3 in the region for wage levels, after Singapore and the 
Philippines. The wage rates in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia are three times lower than 
those of Thailand’s. These new 300-baht per day minimum wage could lead to a surge 
in the numbers of migrant workers going to Thailand to work in the industrial sectors.  
 
Finally, another interesting question is whether the shift in wage rate in Thailand has 
prompted to an increasing numbers of Thai people to return to agriculture? Dilaka’'s 
article published in the Bangkok Post Newspaper on 12 March 2012 referred to his 
research conducted with the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) that the 
300-baht minimum wage has had no major effect on employment rates; but, it has 
significantly affected employment reduction in small and medium manufacturing 
enterprises (SMEs) with no more than 100 workers. SMEs would then lay-off the 
workers and they could be forced to serve household business without any pay or serve 
small agricultural business of which pay structure is unclear. Many workers in these 
SMEs have moved into the agricultural sector where they do not receive salary 
payments as they are working for their families. The sum of all of these factors is 
beyond analysis in this thesis and provokes further research. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire Household survey in Ban Fangthai (Thai) 
แบบสอบถามส าหรับกลุ่มท่ี 1 ชาวนาไทย บ้านฝั่งไทย 
 
 
ครัวเรือนเลขท่ี  บ้านฝ่ังไทย  
โทร.      
 
วันที่สัมภาษณ์   เวลาสัมภาษณ์ :  เริ่ม      น. เสร็จส้ิน    น.   
 
 
 
 ครัวเรือนของคุณประกอบอาชีพหลักอะไร ? (ค าตอบเดียว) 
 ครัวเรือนของคุณมีอาชีพเสริมอะไร ?  
 อาชีพหลัก อาชีพเสริม 
เกษตรกร (ท านา ท าไร่ ท าสวนไม้ยืนต้น เช่น ยางพารา ผลไม้) 1 1 
ค้าขาย 2 2 
งานรับเงินเดือน เช่น ข้าราชการ / พนักงานรัฐวิสาหกิจ 3 3 
รับจ้าง  4 4 
เกษียณ 5 5 
ว่างงาน 6 6 
อ่ืนๆ (. . . . . . . . .) 7 7 
 
ครัวเรือนของคุณมีท่ีดินของตัวเองหรือไม่?  
ม ี 
 
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
 
ถ้ามี กรุณาระบุจ านวนที่ดินท้ังหมดของคุณ 
ต่ า กว่า 6.25 ไร่ 1 
6.25-15 ไร่ 2 
16-30 ไร่ 3 
31 ไร่ขึ้นไป 4 
 
 
ขณะนี้ ครัวเรือนของคุณมีผู้ไปรับจ้างท างานนอกพื้นท่ี เช่น ในกรุงเทพฯ และจังหวัดอ่ืน ๆ หรือไม่ 
ม ี 
ไปจ านวน.....ปี 
ไปเฉพาะฤดูกาล......  
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
 
ในอดีต ครัวเรือนของคุณมีผู้ไปรับจ้างท างานนอกพื้นท่ี เช่น ในกรุงเทพฯ และจังหวัดอ่ืน ๆ หรือไม่ 
ม ี 
ไปจ านวน........ปี 
ไปเฉพาะฤดูกาล................. 
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
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ข้อมูลสมาชิกในครัวเรือน 
 
 
กรุณาระบุรายได้ครอบครัว ต่อเดือน  
ต่ า กว่า 2,000 บาท 1 10,000 - 14,999 บาท   4 
 2,000 - 4,999 บาท 2 15,000 -  19,000 บาท  5 
 5,000 - 9,999 บาท 3 20,000 ขึ้นไป 6 
 
 
ถ้าครอบครัวของคุณมีแหล่งรายได้จากคนในครอบครัวท่ีท างานอยู่นอกถิ่น กรุณาระบุว่าคุณใช้เงิน
ดังกล่าวอย่างไรบ้าง ระบุ 3 ค าตอบ เรียงจากมากไปน้อย  
  อันดับ 
- ลงทุนไปกับค่าใช้จ่ายเก่ียวกับการท าเกษตรกรรม เช่น ค่าจ้าง
คนงาน ค่าปุ๋ย ค่าเช่าท่ีดิน  01 
 
- ค่าใช้จ่ายในครัวเรือน เช่น ค่าอาหาร และซื้อสินค้าต่าง ๆ เช่น รถ
มอเตอร์ไซค์ เครื่องใช้ไฟฟ้า 02 
 
- ค่าใช้จ่ายในการศึกษาของบุตรหลาน 03  
- ชดใช้หนี้สิน 04  
- ปลูกบ้าน 05  
- ซื้อท่ีดินเพิ่ม 06  
- ใช้ในการลงทุนเพิ่ม เช่น ปลูกยางพารา 07  
- เก็บออม เช่น ฝากธนาคาร  08  
- อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ 09  
สมาชิก/ 
รายละเอียด
(เรียงอายุ 
น้อยไป
มาก) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
อายุ               
อาชีพหลัก               
อาชีพเสริม               
การศึกษา               
ท่ีอยู่อาศัย 
ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 
นอกถิ่น 
2 
นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 
รายได้ต่อ
เดือน 
              
แบ่งรายได้
ครอบครัว 
แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 
ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 
แบ่งให้
เท่าไร/ปี 
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.......................................................................................
............ 
  
 ข้อมูลการท าการเกษตรในปีท่ีผ่านมา  
 
แหล่งเงินกู้ท่ีเข้าถึง 
 
 
กลุ่มเงินกู้ รหัส กู้ไปใช้ท าอะไร 
ธกส. 1  
กองทุนหมู่บ้าน 2  
เงินกู้ในหมู่บ้าน 3  
กลุ่มออมทรัพย์ 4  
อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ 5  
 
 
เครื่องทุ่นแรงท่ีคุณใช้ในการเกษตร มีอะไรบ้าง เริ่มใช้มานานเท่าไรแล้ว?  
 
พืช/  
ข้าว
เหนียว 
ข้าวเจ้า ข้าวโพด 
มัน
ส าปะหลัง 
ยางพารา อ้อย 
ยูคา
ลิปตัส 
อ่ืน ๆ 
ปลูกก่ีไร่                 
เช่าท่ีปลูก
หรือไม่ 
เช่า     
1 
.........
ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 
ผลผลิตต่อ
ไร่ประมาณ 
                
ลงทุนต่อปี 
(บาท) 
                
ค่าจ้าง
คนงาน        
 
ค่าปุ๋ย  
       
 
ค่ายาฆ่า
แมลง         
 
ค่าเช่าท่ีดิน 
ไร่/บาท/ปี        
 
รวมต้นทุน
การผลิต        
 
 
 
 
242 
 
 รถไถ 1   
 เครื่องเก่ียวข้าว 
2   
 เครื่องปั่นข้าว 
3   
 อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ............................... 
4   
   
 
คุณจ้างแรงงานในการท าการเกษตรมานานก่ีปีแล้ว จ าได้หรือไม่ว่าเริ่มจ้างปี พ.ศ. ใด?   
 
.................................................................................................................................................... 
 
เคยแรงงานลาวมาด านา เก่ียวข้าว หรือท ากิจกรรมเก่ียวกับการเกษตรอ่ืน ๆ บ้างหรือไม่?   
เคย 
1 
ไม่เคย 
ครั้งสุดท้ายท่ีจ้าง กี่ปีมาแล้ว โปรดระบุ
................ 
2 
 
 
เคยจ้างแรงงานลาวท่ีมาจากหมู่บ้านฝ่ังลาวชื่ออะไรบ้าง  
บ้านแคมโขง 1 
บ้านลาวเหนือ 2 
บ้านสว่าง 3 
  
อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ...................................................  
 
จ้างแรงงานคนเดิมซ้ า ๆ กันทุกปีหรือไม่ 
ใช่ 1 ไม่ใช่ 2 
 
ครอบครัวของคุณมีญาติท่ีลาวใช่หรือไม่ 
ใช่ 
อยู่ท่ีบ้าน...................... 
1 
ไม่ใช่ 
2 
 
 
 
ช่วยให้ข้อมูลภาพรวมการท าการเกษตรปีท่ีแล้วว่าจ้างแรงงานรับจ้างมาท าอะไรบ้าง  
 
 ไถนา 1 
 รกกล้า 2 
ด านา 3 
เก่ียวข้าว  
ถางหญ้า  
ตัดอ้อย  
อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ...................................................  
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ถ้าแรงงานคนไทยเพียงพอ จะจ้างคนลาวหรือไม่ 
จ้าง 
  
1 
เพราะ
..............................................................................................  
ไม่จ้าง 
 
2 
เพราะ
.............................................................................................. 
 
คุณเคยน าคนลาวมาค้างคืนท่ีบ้านหรือไม่  
เคย 
ก่ีวันต่อครั้ง................วัน 
1 
ไม่เคย 
2 
 
ช่วยบอกวิธีการท่ีจะได้คนลาวมาท างาน ระบุวิธีแรกท่ีท าบ่อยท่ีสุด  
    
ติดต่อผ่านเครือญาติของคุณเองในลาว 01 
ติดต่อผ่านเพื่อนคนลาวของคุณเอง 02 
ติดต่อคนท่ีมารับจ้างปีก่อน โดยโทรศัพท์ไปตามเอง  03 
รอต่อคิวจากเพื่อนบ้านท่ีจ้างคนลาว 04 
ติดต่อคนขับเรือคนลาวให้หาแรงงานให้ 05 
ไปรับด้วยตนเองท่ีด่านประเพณีตอนเช้าโดยไม่ได้ติดต่อล่วงหน้า 06 
อ่ืน ๆ............................................................................. 08 
 
ช่วยบอกแหล่งรายได้หลักท่ีน ามาจ้างแรงงานท าการเกษตร ระบุ แหล่งท่ีมาท่ีมากท่ีสุด 
เงินรายได้ตัวเอง 01 
เงินท่ีไปยืมมา (จาก ธกส.หรือจากเจ้าหนี้อื่น ๆ)  02 
เงินท่ีคนในครอบครัวท่ีท างานนอกถิ่นส่งมาให้ใช้ 03 
อ่ืน ๆ............................................................................ 04 
 
เคยเจอปัญหากับทหาร ต ารวจเก่ียวกับการน าคนลาวข้ามแดนบ้างหรือไม่ 
  
เคย 
  
1 
แก้ปัญหาอย่างไร 
ไม่เคย 
 
2 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire Household survey in Ban Fangthai (English)  
 
Questionnaire for Farmers in Ban Fangthai 
 
 
House Number  Ban Fangthai  
Tel.      
 
Date of interview  time: start      end      
 
 
What is your household main occupation?   
What is your household second occupation ?  
 Main  Second  
Agriculture and Fisheries 1 1 
Trading and enterprise 2 2 
Salaried jobs  3 3 
Labouring jobs 4 4 
Retirement  5 5 
Unemployed 6 6 
others (. . . . . . . . .) 7 7 
 
Does your household own the land?  
Yes  
 
1 
No 
2 
 
If yes, how much? 
Below 6.25 rai 1 
6.25-15 rai 2 
16-30 rai 3 
31 rai or more 4 
 
 
At present, is there any household member working out of the village? 
Yes 
Practice long-term migration 
for….years 
Practice circular migration…… 
  
1 
no 
2 
 
In the past, is there any household member working out of the village? 
 Yes 
Practice long-term migration 
1 no 2 
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for….years 
Practice circular migration…… 
 
 
 
Household Members 
 
 
Household income/month 
Below 2,000  baht 1 10,000 - 14,999 baht 4 
 2,000 - 4,999  baht 2 15,000 -  19,000 baht 5 
 5,000 - 9,999 baht 3 20,000 baht 6 
 
 
How did you spend remittances? Give three ways of spending in order from the 
most the the least.  
  ranking 
- Agricultural investment  01  
- Domestic consumption 02  
- Education 03  
- Paying debt 04  
- Housing/ house improvement 05  
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Age               
Main 
occupation 
              
2nd 
occupation 
              
Education               
Live in or 
outside of 
village 
In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 
Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 
Salary/month               
Share with 
family or not? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 
No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 
How much 
money giving 
for 
hh/month? 
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- Buy a new land 06  
- Invest in agriculture 07  
- Saving  08  
- Other...............................................................................
.................... 09 
 
  
 Agricultural Data  
 
Did you make any loan ? 
 
Source of loan   How do you spend the loan ? 
BAAC 1  
Village fund 2  
Make a loan with 
people in the village 
3  
Saving Group 4  
Other 5  
 
 
 
Crops  
Sticky 
Rice 
Jasmine 
Rice 
Corn Cassava Rubber Sugarcane Eucalyptus other 
How many 
rai? 
                
Rent land 
or not 
Rent  1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent  1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent   1 
.........rai 
Rent   1 
.........rai 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 2 Not rent 2 Not rent 
2 
Yields/rai                 
Invest 
(baht/rai) 
                
Labouring 
cost        
 
fertilizer  
       
 
pesticides  
       
 
Pay for 
rent/year        
 
Total 
investment        
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What kind of machines do you use in farming ? When did you start using them ? 
 
Standing tracter 1   
 Rice harvest machine 
2   
 Rice spining machine 
3   
 other............................... 
4   
   
 
Do you use wage-labour in your farm ? When do you start hiring wage labourers ? 
 
........................................................................................................................................  
 
Have you ever hired the Lao migrant? When did the last time you hire them? 
Yes 
When……………………… 1 
No 
  2 
 
What are the name of villages in Laos that your Lao workers come from ? 
Ban Kaemkong 1 
Ban Laonau 2 
Ban Savang 3 
  
other...................................................  
 
Do you hire the same Lao migrants in each year ? 
Yes 1 No 2 
 
Do you have any relative in Laos ? 
Yes 
At Ban...................... 
1 
No 
2 
 
Last year, did you hire any labour ? What kind of jobs you hire them to work ? 
ploughing 1 
Pulling the rice seedings 2 
transplanting 3 
cultivating 4 
weeding 5 
Cut sugarcane  6 
other  
 
 
Have you ever let the Lao migrants staying in your place ? 
Yes 
How many days?..... 
1 
No 
2 
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How do you get the Lao workers ? (one answer) 
 
  
Contact relatives in Laos 01 
Contract my neighbour to find the workers for me 02 
Call the Lao migrants who worked for me last year  03 
Get the Lao migrants from my neighbours 04 
Contact the boat driver  05 
Go to wait at the checkpoint without making any contact in advance 06 
others  
  
 
Please identify your source of money to invest in farmings. 
 
Household incomes 01 
Make a loan  02 
Remmittances 03 
Other............................................................................ 04 
 
 
 
    Have you ever been caught by the police because of hiring the Lao migrants ? 
  
No 
  
1 
Yes 
2 
 
 
............................................ 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire Household survey in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonua 
(Thai) 
 
แบบสอบถามส าหรับกลุ่มท่ี 2 ชาวนาลาว บ้านแคมโขงและบ้านลาวเหนือ 
 
 
ครัวเรือนเลขท่ี  บ้านแคมโขง 1    บ้านลาวเหนือ 2  
โทร.      
 
วันที่สัมภาษณ์   เวลาสัมภาษณ์ :  เริ่ม      น. เสร็จส้ิน    น.   
 
ครัวเรือนของคุณประกอบอาชีพหลักอะไร ? (ค าตอบเดียว) 
 ครัวเรือนของคุณมีอาชีพเสริมอะไร ?  
 
 อาชีพหลัก อาชีพเสริม 
เกษตรกร (ท านา ท าไร่ ท าสวนไม้ยืนต้น เช่น ยางพารา ผลไม้) 1 1 
ค้าขาย 2 2 
งานรับเงินเดือน เช่น ข้าราชการ / พนักงานรัฐวิสาหกิจ 3 3 
รับจ้าง  4 4 
เกษียณ 5 5 
ว่างงาน 6 6 
อ่ืนๆ (. . . . . . . . .) 7 7 
 
 
ครัวเรือนของคุณมีท่ีดินของตัวเองหรือไม่?  
ม ี 
 
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
 
ถ้ามี กรุณาระบุจ านวนที่ดินท้ังหมดของคุณ 
ต่ า กว่า 6.25 ไร่ 1 
6.25-15 ไร่ 2 
16-30 ไร่ 3 
31 ไร่ขึ้นไป 4 
 
ขณะนี้ ครัวเรือนของคุณมีผู้ไปรับจ้างท างานนอกพื้นท่ี เช่น ในกรุงเทพฯ และจังหวัดอ่ืน ๆ หรือไม่ 
ม ี 
ไปจ านวน.....ปี 
ไปเฉพาะฤดูกาล......  
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
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ในอดีต ครัวเรือนของคุณมีผู้ไปรับจ้างท างานนอกพื้นท่ี เช่น ในกรุงเทพฯ และจังหวัดอ่ืน ๆ หรือไม่ 
ม ี 
ไปจ านวน........ปี 
ไปเฉพาะฤดูกาล................. 
1 
ไม่มี 
2 
 
 
 
 
ข้อมูลสมาชิกในครัวเรือน 
 
 
กรุณาระบุรายได้ครอบครัว ต่อเดือน  
ต่ า กว่า 2,000 บาท 1 10,000 - 14,999 บาท   4 
 2,000 - 4,999 บาท 2 15,000 -  19,000 บาท  5 
 5,000 - 9,999 บาท 3 20,000 ขึ้นไป 6 
 
 
 
ถ้าครอบครัวของคุณมีแหล่งรายได้จากคนในครอบครัวท่ีท างานอยู่นอกถิ่น กรุณาระบุว่าคุณใช้เงิน
ดังกล่าวอย่างไรบ้าง ระบุ 3 ค าตอบ เรียงจากมากไปน้อย  
  อันดับ 
สมาชิก/ 
รายละเอียด
(เรียงอายุ 
น้อยไป
มาก) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
อายุ               
สถานภาพ               
อาชีพหลัก               
อาชีพเสริม               
การศึกษา               
ท่ีอยู่อาศัย 
ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 ในถิ่น 1 
นอกถิ่น 
2 
นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 นอกถิ่น 2 
รายได้ต่อ
เดือน 
              
แบ่งรายได้
ครอบครัว 
แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 แบ่ง 1 
ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 ไม่แบ่ง 2 
แบ่งให้
เท่าไร/ปี 
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- ลงทุนไปกับค่าใช้จ่ายเก่ียวกับการท าเกษตรกรรม เช่น ค่าจ้าง
คนงาน ค่าปุ๋ย ค่าเช่าท่ีดิน  01 
 
- ค่าใช้จ่ายในครัวเรือน เช่น ค่าอาหาร และซื้อสินค้าต่าง ๆ เช่น รถ
มอเตอร์ไซค์ เครื่องใช้ไฟฟ้า 02 
 
- ค่าใช้จ่ายในการศึกษาของบุตรหลาน 03  
- ชดใช้หนี้สิน 04  
- ปลูกบ้าน 05  
- ซื้อท่ีดินเพิ่ม 06  
- ใช้ในการลงทุนเพิ่ม เช่น ปลูกยางพารา 07  
- เก็บออม เช่น ฝากธนาคาร  08  
- อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ
.......................................................................................
............ 
09 
 
  
 ข้อมูลการท าการเกษตรในปีท่ีผ่านมา  
พืช/  
ข้าว
เหนียว 
ข้าวเจ้า ข้าวโพด 
มัน
ส าปะหลัง 
ยางพารา อ้อย 
ยูคา
ลิปตัส 
อ่ืน ๆ 
ปลูกก่ีไร่                 
เช่าท่ีปลูก
หรือไม่ 
เช่า     
1 
.........
ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
เช่า    1 
…......ไร่ 
ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 ไม่เช่า 2 
ผลผลิตต่อ
ไร่ประมาณ 
                
ลงทุนต่อปี 
(บาท) 
                
ค่าจ้าง
คนงาน        
 
ค่าปุ๋ย  
       
 
ค่ายาฆ่า
แมลง         
 
ค่าเช่าท่ีดิน 
ไร่/บาท/ปี        
 
รวมต้นทุน
การผลิต        
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แหล่งเงินกู้ท่ีเข้าถึง 
 
กลุ่มเงินกู้ รหัส กู้ไปใช้ท าอะไร 
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 
เครื่องทุ่นแรงท่ีคุณใช้ในการเกษตร มีอะไรบ้าง เริ่มใช้มานานเท่าไรแล้ว? 
 
รถไถ 1   
 เครื่องเก่ียวข้าว 
2   
 เครื่องปั่นข้าว 
3   
 อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ............................... 
4   
   
 
คุณ หรือคนในครอบครัว มีใครข้ามไปรับจ้างท านาท่ีฝ่ังไทยบ้างหรือไม่ จ าได้หรือไม่ว่าเริ่มไปปี พ.ศ. ใด?   
 
........................................................................................................................................  
 
 
เคยไปรับจ้างท่ีหมู่บ้านฝ่ังไทยชื่ออะไรบ้าง 
บ้านฝ่ังไทย 1 
บ้านสว่าง 2 
บ้านน้ า 3 
  
อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ...................................................  
 
ไปท างานให้นายจ้างคนเดิมหรือไม่ 
ใช่ 1 ไม่ใช่ 2 
 
ครอบครัวของคุณมีญาติท่ีไทยหรือไม่ 
ใช่ 
อยู่ท่ีบ้าน...................... 
1 
ไม่ใช่ 
2 
 
ครัวเรือนของคุณจ้างคนท าการเกษตรหรือไม่ จ้างท าอะไร 
ไถนา 1 
 รกกล้า 2 
ด านา 3 
เก่ียวข้าว  
ถางหญ้า  
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ตัดอ้อย  
อ่ืน ๆ โปรดระบุ...................................................  
 
คุณไปค้างคืนท่ีบ้านฝ่ังไทย เวลาท่ีไปรับจ้างท างานท่ีนั่นหรือเปล่า 
เคย 
ก่ีวันต่อครั้ง................วัน 
1 
ไม่เคย 
2 
 
ช่วยบอกวิธีการข้ามแดนไปไทย ระบุวิธีท่ีท าบ่อยท่ีสุด 
 
  
ติดต่อผ่านเครือญาติของคุณเองในไทย 01 
ไปกับเพื่อนบ้าน 02 
โทรหานายจ้างคนไทย หรือนายจ้างโทรมาตาม 03 
ไปกับคนขับเรือ 04 
อ่ืน ๆ............................................................................. 05 
 
เอาเงินจากไหนลงทุนท าการเกษตร 
เงินรายได้ในครัวเรือนตัวเอง 01 
เงินท่ีไปยืมมา   02 
เงินท่ีคนในครอบครัวท่ีท างานนอกถิ่นส่งมาให้ใช้ 03 
อ่ืน ๆ............................................................................ 04 
 
 
 
    เคยถูกต ารวจจับเพราะไปท างานที่บ้านฝ่ังไทยหรือไม่ 
  
เคย 
  
1 
ไม่เคย 
2 
 
 
............................................ 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire Household survey in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonau 
(English)  
 
Questionnaire for Farmers in Ban Kaemkong and Ban Laonau 
 
 
House Number  Ban Kaemkong 1   Ban Laonau 2 
Tel.      
 
Date of interview  time: start      end      
 
 
What is your household main occupation?   
What is your household second occupation ?  
 Main  Second  
Agriculture and Fisheries 1 1 
Trading and enterprise 2 2 
Salaried jobs  3 3 
Labouring jobs 4 4 
Retirement  5 5 
Unemployed 6 6 
others (. . . . . . . . .) 7 7 
 
Does your household own the land?  
Yes  
 
1 
No 
2 
 
If yes, how much? 
Below 6.25 rai 1 
6.25-15 rai 2 
16-30 rai 3 
31 rai or more 4 
 
 
At present, is there any household member working out of the village? 
Yes 
Practice long-term migration 
for….years 
Practice circular migration……  
1 
no 
2 
 
In the past, is there any household member working out of the village? 
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 Yes 
Practice long-term migration 
for….years 
Practice circular migration…… 
1 no 2 
 
 
 
Household Members 
 
 
Household income/month 
Below 2,000  baht 1 10,000 - 14,999 baht 4 
 2,000 - 4,999  baht 2 15,000 -  19,000 baht 5 
 5,000 - 9,999 baht 3 20,000 baht 6 
 
 
How did you spend remittances? Give three ways of spending in order from the 
most the least.  
  ranking 
- Agricultural investment  01  
- Domestic consumption 02  
- Education 03  
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Age               
Main 
occupation 
              
2nd 
occupation 
              
Education               
Live in or 
outside of 
village 
In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 In 1 
Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 Out 2 
Salary/month               
Share with 
family or not? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 
No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 No 2 
How much 
money giving 
for 
hh/month? 
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- Paying debt 04  
- Housing/ house improvement 05  
- Buy a new land 06  
- Invest in agriculture 07  
- Saving  08  
- Other...............................................................................
.................... 09 
 
  
 Agricultural Data  
 
Did you make any loan ? 
 
Source of loan   How do you spend the loan ? 
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 
What kind of machines do you use in farming ? When did you start using them ? 
 
Crops  
Sticky 
Rice 
Jasmine 
Rice 
Corn Cassava Rubber Sugarcane Eucalyptus other 
How many 
rai? 
                
Rent land 
or not 
Rent  1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent  1 
.........rai 
Rent    1 
.........rai 
Rent   1 
.........rai 
Rent   1 
.........rai 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 
2 
Not rent 2 Not rent 2 Not rent 
2 
Yields/rai                 
Invest 
(baht/rai) 
                
Labouring 
cost        
 
fertilizer  
       
 
pesticides  
       
 
Pay for 
rent/year        
 
Total 
investment        
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Standing tracter 1   
 Rice harvest machine 
2   
 Rice spining machine 
3   
 other............................... 
4   
   
 
Have you ever crossed the river to work in agricultural land in Ban Fangthai or other villages ?   
When do you start going to get those jobs ? 
 
........................................................................................................................................  
 
What are the name of villages in Thailand that you have ever gone to work ? 
 
Ban Kaemkong 1 
Ban Laonau 2 
Ban Savang 3 
  
other...................................................  
 
Do you go to work for the same Thai landowners in each year ? 
Yes 1 No 2 
 
Do you have any relative in Thailand ? 
Yes 
At Ban...................... 
1 
No 
2 
 
Last year, did you hire any labour ? What kind of jobs you hire them to work ? 
ploughing 1 
Pulling the rice seedings 2 
transplanting 3 
cultivating 4 
weeding 5 
Cut sugarcane  6 
other  
 
Have you ever stay over in the Thai village (s) ? 
Yes 
How many days?..... 
1 
No 
2 
 
How do you get your wage labour jobs in Thailand ? (one answer) 
 
  
Contact relatives in Thailand 01 
Go with my neighbour   02 
Call the Thai landowners who I worked for last year, or they called me   03 
Go with the boat driver 04 
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Others  
  
  
  
 
Please identify your source of money to invest in farmings. 
 
Household incomes 01 
Make a loan  02 
Remmittances 03 
Other............................................................................ 04 
 
 
 
Have you ever been caught by the Thai police because of crossing the River to work in 
the Thai farm land ? 
  
No 
  
1 
Yes 
2 
 
 
............................................ 
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